

88. Paul R. Katz, "Identity Politics and the Study of Popular Religion," in Paul R. Katz and Murray A. Rubinstein (eds.), *Religion and the Formation of Taiwanese Identities*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 157, 158.
89. On the *ru* dimension of these sects (some of which even adopt the term *ru* in identifying themselves), see Philip Clart, "Confucius and the Mediums: Is there a 'Popular Confucianism'?" *T'oung Pao*, 89 (2004): 1-38; and Christian Jochim, "Carrying Confucianism into the Modern World: The Taiwan Case," in Clart and Jones, *Religion in Modern China*, 72-74. Clart's study of the development of phoenix hall liturgy and doctrine ("Confucius and the Mediums," 6) shows how "elements perceived as Confucian within popular religion" were appropriated "for the purpose of inventing a tradition for a new religious movement and carving out a distinctive niche in the highly diversified religious marketplace in Taiwan." Clart dates the origins of the phoenix hall tradition in Taiwan to the mid-nineteenth century.

The Movement to Indigenize the Social Sciences in Taiwan: Origin and Predicaments

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Toward the end of the 1920s, sociology began to be institutionalized as an academic discipline. The first national sociological association in China, the Chinese Sociology Association (*Zhongguo shehui xuehui* 中國社會學會; CSA), was formed in Shanghai in 1930. The development of sociology in China was interrupted first by the Japanese invasion in the late 1930s, and then by a prohibition in 1952, after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took control of mainland China. In 1951, some sociologists were exiled to Taiwan with the *Guomin dang* 國民黨 (Chinese Nationalist Party; GMD) government and started their own version of the CSA in Taipei. With the GMD's permission, and with resources endowed by the United States, a revival in the teaching of sociology commenced in the late 1950s in Taiwan.¹ By the 1980s, sociology courses in Taiwan had gradually overcome the constraints of political ideology and the suspicions of the authorities because of the softening of authoritarianism. Since the 1990s, sociology has been a widely taught and researched subject in Taiwan's higher education.²

As with other social science disciplines, sociology originated from the Enlightenment, the problems associated with the collapse of feudalism and the transformation of society pushed by the growth of industrialization and capitalism in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe. The formation of its assumptions and *problematiques* have been heavily influenced by the social and historical trajectories and

concerns of the evolving worldviews of the European powers and, since the World War II, those of the United States.³

Sociology is conventionally defined as the scientific study of society. As such, one may wonder just what kind of society or which particular society this field of study is all about. Likewise, when preparing to teach sociology, one may wonder just what kinds of knowledge about (which) society(ies) should be taught to students.⁴ In 1999, a group of Taiwan sociologists published a textbook for undergraduate teaching: *Shehuixue yu Taiwan shehui* 社會學與台灣社會 (Sociology and Taiwan Society).⁵ Drawing its primary sources from the many available sociological studies on Taiwan, the textbook was promoted as the first *bentū* 本土/*bentuhua* 本土化 (indigenous/indigenized) sociology textbook in Taiwan; and in the opening page of the preface the editors proclaimed their “indigenization.”

It is most regretful that we have always relied on original textbooks from Europe and the U.S., or their translations, for our elementary sociology teaching materials. Students have learned cases and illustrations, and concepts and theories derived from Europe and the U.S. The end result is that students could not comprehend social realities of “*bentū*” society, nor could understand those concepts and theories that may seem not to be part of their life experience. . . . The purpose of this textbook is to enforce *bentū* education. It attempts to use many sociological research findings about Taiwan and, through their incorporation in this book, to lead students not only to understand general concepts and theories in sociology, but also starting from this *bentū* society, to understand *bentū* society and the growth and development of Taiwan’s sociology studies.

The publication of this first “indigenous” textbook in the field of sociology in Taiwan represented only a very limited aspect of the practical needs in teaching, not to mention the more abstract and theoretical dimensions that had been discussed regarding the need for indigenization. Moreover, this modest progress and limited achievement took place after at least 20 years of serious thinking and enthusiastic debate.

The term “Sinicization” (*Zhongguohua* 中國化) later qualified or substituted by the term “indigenization” (also “localization”; *bentuhua* 本土化) is a prominent keyword standing out in the development of sociology in Taiwan.⁶ For instance, in 1982, the CSA organized a forum titled “Sociology in China: Problems and Prospects” to discuss issues concerning Sinicization.⁷ In 1991, to commemorate its anniversary, the

CSA published a special issue on a similar topic. As a key title-word, it has appeared in almost every one of the presidential addressees of the CSA (in 1995, the Association’s name was changed to the Taiwan Sociology Association [TSA]), beginning with Ye Qizheng 葉啓政 in 1987, Xu Zhengguang 徐正光 in 1991, Xiao Xinhua 蕭新煌 in 1995, Qu Haiyuan 瞿海源 in 1998, and Zhang Yinghua 章英華 in 2001.

If we focus on the more recent development of the indigenization of sociology in Taiwan over the past 25 years, we will find that it has really been part of a broader concern for the indigenization of the social sciences, in general, and social psychology and anthropology, in particular. Today, indigenization is commonly used in Taiwan to refer to the process of “Taiwanization” in the cultural and political arenas. Typically, the concept is opposed to “Chinese-ness” or Sincization, premised on the conviction that Chinese culture and national politics are alienating and have been imposed on the land and the people of Taiwan. In this chapter, however, the term indigenization is employed to refer to a process of engaging the putative generality contained explicitly or implicitly in the “theory” of social sciences derived from the West by asserting the importance of, or proposing the total replacement by, the sociocultural specifics or traditions of indigenous (non-Western) contexts. Indigenization advocates the production and practice of local knowledge and the interrogation of social sciences from the West. It was for this reason that the indigenization process in Taiwan began under the name of “*Zhongguohua*” 中國化 (Sinicization) because (in the social sciences) China was regarded as the “local” during the 1980s. Together with the change in imagination of the local from “China” to “Taiwan” that occurred in the 1990s, the terms Sinicization and indigenization have been constructed to qualify each other in order to adjust to changes in the larger environment.

The rationale for, and approaches to, the indigenization of the social and behavioral sciences were formally presented at the 1981 conference on *Shehui ji xingwei kexue yanjiu de Zhongguohua* 社會及行為科學研究的中國化 (The Sinicization of the Social and Behavioral Sciences).⁸ The conference proceedings, were published in 1982 under the same title.⁹ Today, this conference and the resulting volume are regularly identified as marking the beginning of the “Sinicization movement” (and later, the “indigenization movement”) among “Sinitic” (*Huaren* 華人) communities.¹⁰ The conference volume is still widely referred to (although not all readers have understood it properly) in different social science disciplines and in different polities. It is discussed not only by “Chinese” scholars, but also by

“indigenous” scholars in various corners of the “non-Western” world, and even by Western scholars.¹¹

The primary subject of this chapter is this “Sinicization–indigenization movement,” its origin, diffusion, and predicaments. As Arif Dirlik suggested, the confrontation between theory (that is perceived to be general and Westernized) and culture (that is seen as national, local, and historical) generated by indigenization discourse can never be transparent, and has different meanings at different times.¹² I therefore document and explain what this “movement” is all about, what its various standpoints and strategies are, and how and why its meanings evolved over the time. As an exercise in “the sociology of knowledge,” I look into the underlying structures of the various meanings of the multifaceted concept of indigenization, situate them in the larger context of the legitimation and institutionalization of the social sciences, knowledge production, and examine their intricate relations to interest, power, and hierarchical social/political positions.

Three disciplines are embraced by this “movement”: social psychology, anthropology, and sociology.¹³ Because of discipline-specific practices and heritages, the problems each of the three discipline faces are not always similar.¹⁴

ment and its relation to sociology, in particular. My analysis looks at Sinicization–indigenization not just from “within” the discipline of sociology, but also from the discursive and interested relations that the discipline has with the “outside” world. Toward the end, I also elaborate on the general significance of this movement and its implication for our understanding of the notion of indigenization in general.

The Sinicization Movement and Its Original Meaning

The 1981 conference initiated a series of conferences on related topics.¹⁵ The ensuing discussions went beyond Taiwan, and involved the participation of social scientists belonging to *Huaren* communities in other parts of the world. The scale and impact of the movement has changed the landscape of the social sciences in Taiwan, and contributed to the development of the “indigenization of anthropology” and the “indigenization of social psychology” in Hong Kong and mainland China. More recently, this movement has also stirred reactions from Western scholars, mainly anthropologists, who have responded both sympathetically and critically.¹⁶

In reflecting on these developments, Yang Guoshu related that he first came up with the idea of Sinicization in discussions with colleagues at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Yang’s initiative was to propose that Taiwan and Hong Kong—the two “most Westernized” Chinese societies—consider “Sinicizing their social and behavioral science studies.”¹⁷ Having reviewed the background to, and aims of, the conference, Yang and Wen then reflected on the accomplishments of the conference in their preface to the conference volume. Some of their main points were:

1. They were deeply dissatisfied with their own (earlier) writings, and that of their contemporaries, for blindly borrowing Western concepts, theories, and methods, while ignoring the social and cultural biases imported with this knowledge from the West. They raised an earnest self-critique: “May we ask ourselves if we have ever made any unique contribution to theory or method? Has there been any unique contribution by our sociologists to international sociology, by anthropologists to international anthropology, and by psychologists to international psychology?”¹⁸
2. They passionately called for a goal of “self-recognition”: a return to the culture roots of “being Chinese” in order to be liberated from Western subordination. “Although the subjects of our studies concern Chinese society and Chinese people, the theories and methods we employ are almost exclusively from the West or are Western in style. . . . Today, neither our contributions to the social or behavioral sciences of the world nor our withdrawal from them, matter at all. . . . We are nothing but ‘vassals’ (*fuyong* 附庸) of the West.”¹⁹
3. They also expressed a need for self-assertion and Chinese innovation, suggesting: “After so many years of absorbing (*xishou* 吸收) and imitating (*mofang* 模仿) we should be able to overcome this stage of learning. . . . [We should] establish social and behavioral science approaches that belong to the Chinese people themselves (*Zhongguoren ziji de* 中國人自己的) or Sinicize (*Zhongguohua* 中國化) such approaches.”

The phrase, still frequently quoted today, “we are nothing but vassals of the West,” and the reflective, passionate calls for attention to the indigenous social/cultural heritage, and hence the call for self-assertion, struck a cord in many people over a considerable period of time. After the three-day conference they summarized the significance of what they had constructed, and laid out future tasks for Sinicization.²

1. To make social and behavioral studies better reflect Chinese history and the unique characteristics of Chinese culture and society.

2. To emphasize the systematic study of problems that are significant and unique to Chinese societies in order to solve practical issues confronting Chinese societies and people.
3. To rehabilitate the unique and critical abilities of Chinese social and behavioral scientists so that they can regard themselves with self-respect and confidence.
4. To get rid of the “overly-Westernized” inclinations and “vassal” status of Chinese social and behavioral science researchers vis-à-vis the West (the United States in particular) and the world.

They also stipulated some very strong qualifications regarding their call for Sinicization, maintaining that they were not condoning conservatism, ethnocentrism, parochialism, or isolationism. Their attempt was not to construct so-called Chinese anthropology, sociology, psychology, and so on, since all of these disciplines should embrace both what is general to humanity and what is particular to the Chinese. They also warned against the misuse of Sinicization as a “fig leaf” (*zhexiubu* 遮羞布) to cover people’s ignorance about Western theories and methods. It is fair to argue that they really held a dialectical view about the implementation of Sinicization: only those who knew the West well, and who possessed maturity and self-awareness could pursue this course. Moreover, only those who had first “entered” (*jinru* 進入) the Western stock of knowledge could “come out” (*chulai* 出來) to understand the importance of Sinicization. Consequently, those who refused to “enter” the West first were not regarded as being qualified to discuss the matter at all.²¹

Their experiences and self-reflections in the 1980s can be understood today as an expression of “postcolonial sentiments,” a term that was not yet known to many. In a sense, they are no different from many postcolonial intellectuals, both modernistic—in that they opposed returning to traditionalism—and nationalistic in their calls to resist the West and for self-assertion. For them, the West was perceived as the source of domination, but it could be appropriated for their own interests and self-empowerment.

The key instigators of the Conference were Yang Guoshu (social psychologist; b. 1932), Wen Chongyi (sociologist; b. 1925), Li Yiyuan (anthropologist; b. 1931)—all from the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica—as well as Qiao Jian 喬健 (anthropologist; b. 1935) and Jin Yaoji 金耀基 (Ambrose King, sociologist; b. 1935), from the Chinese University in Hong Kong. They were all born in mainland China from where they were forced to flee in their teens to Taiwan in the 1950s, completing their college degrees in Taiwan before they went abroad

for postgraduate education. They shared a moderate liberal stand on politics and advocated a moderate approach to reform. Their cooperation can be traced back to their earlier project on the “Chinese character,” carried out between 1970 and 1972. This collective project resulted in the publication of the book, *Zhongguoren de xingge* 中國人的性格 (The Chinese Character),²² a landmark work in the development of the social sciences in postwar Taiwan. On the one hand, they believed that they had grasped genuinely “indigenous” research problems: Why is the society/culture of the “Chinese” people different from society/culture in the West?; Why could China not develop democracy? Why did the Chinese “fail” to develop “capitalism?” Although such questions might have already been studied by Western social scientists, they regarded those studies as unsatisfactory.

This early experience illustrated their first systematic *engagement* with both “the local” and “the general.” It provided them with self-confidence in working collectively (and democratically) to acquire skills in applying Western concepts to the study of Chinese-ness, and also the opportunity for deeper reflection on their own work. Perhaps most importantly, the project also helped them to establish a leading position in the modern development and growth of the social sciences in Taiwan since the 1970s through exemplary research work that attracted a talented younger generation to follow them. They collectively succeeded in setting a new trend in scholarly practices and their ideas about studying Chinese-ness later qualified them to speak of the need for Sinicization.

A Critical Interpretation of the Sinicization Movement

One of the most important attributes of the project on “the Chinese character” was its implicit criticism of traditionalism and the lack of a modern outlook among the Chinese people (in Taiwan). Relying on the standards of the West and the dichotomy between the “modern” and the “traditional,” the Chinese character was described in terms of an emphasis on filial piety, kinship networks, and Confucian ideas (leading to feudalistic social relations), collectivism (lacking the ability to think independently and being afraid to take an individual stand), particularism (which despises the value of due process and rule of law), and blind support for authority. And all of these “characteristics” were scrutinized against “objective” data collected from “standardized”

modernity measurement scales. The underlying political message was that the Chinese people must pursue modernization and this could be achieved by objective (positivist) analysis and through interdisciplinary work.

Recently, historian Fu Dawei 傅大為 has offered a critical interpretation of the political import of the Chinese character study, and the later Sinicization campaign. He suggests that what the Sinicization scholars really accomplished was the discursive formation of a hegemony aimed at “modernizing China” by blending positivism (in the name of being “scientific”) with a “watered-down” or moderate (vis-à-vis critical) liberalism (through a compromise between ultra-traditionalism and ultra-Westernization).²³ This happened at a critical political juncture in the authoritarian rule of Taiwan in the 1970s, when the GMD government was facing a crisis of legitimacy sparked by Taiwan’s loss of international recognition as a sovereign state, as well as by rising patriotism and demands for political reform.²⁴ Challenges to the regime came from two groups. The first was the *xiangtu wenxue* 鄉土文學 movement (literally, “literature of the country and soil”), comprised mainly of dissident writers who inclined toward Chinese nationalistic and leftist thinking, and who were critical of the general subordination of society to the rich and the powerful, and other beneficiaries of capitalist expansion and Westernization. The second group was the *dangwai* democratic movement (*dangwai minzhu yundong* 黨外民主運動), which included dissidents outside of the GMD who were mostly of Taiwanese backgrounds and who sought to promote a “Taiwan consciousness.” In 1979, the authorities cracked down on both groups after street violence that erupted on December 10, in Kaohsiung (known as the “Kaohsiung Incident” [Gaoxiong shijian 高雄事件] or the “Meilidao Incident” [Meilidao shijian 美麗島事件]). Both groups were crushed by the authorities immediately after the Kaohsiung Incident and many individuals were given harsh sentences and, in some instances, were tortured and terrorized.

Fu Dawei maintains that this crackdown was the last demonstration of the GMD’s era of “rule with predatory power,” and that a new era of “harsh yet delicate rule” ensued, due to the pressing need to consolidate and to win public support for regime legitimization.²⁵ It was during this transition from one stage of rule to another in the period immediately after the Kaohsiung Incident that the movement to indigenize the social sciences began.

During the decade from 1970 to 1980, Yang Guoshu was a young intellectual and a Western-minded liberal who played a leading role in

the reform-oriented magazine, *Daxue zazhi* 大學雜誌 (Intellectual Magazine), before becoming the chief editor of *Zhongguo luntan* 中國論壇 (China Forum). The latter magazine was associated with the liberal camp even though it received support from the rich *Lianhebao* 聯合報 (United Daily) newspaper, whose owner was a privileged Chinese nationalist and a client of the GMD ruling party. Fu suggests that Yang, Wen, and Li—the three pioneers of the Chinese character study conducted in the early 1970s—had formed an “iron-triangle” through interpersonal and organizational networks and that their Sinicization push in 1981 was an orchestrated self-proclamation of their collective position in both the academic community and the political sphere. Fu’s main argument is that together with Jin Yaoji (the other important Sinicization movement supporter based in Hong Kong) they began the movement in 1980 in response to earlier criticisms from both the anti-Western ultraconservative nationalistic camp and from the leftist nationalistic camp.²⁶ The Sinicization advocates also took cues from the softening of authoritarianism, namely, the new era of “delicate rule” after the Kaohsiung Incident. Their overall position is illustrated by their methodological stance—the conservative paradigms of positivism and indigenization on the academic front and moderate political intervention on the political and cultural fronts—as the self-proclaimed bearers of the liberal tradition associated with modern Chinese intellectuals such as Yin Haiguang 殷海光 and the May Fourth tradition that originated in 1919 in China. According to Fu, supporters of the movement were, in fact, maneuvering and juggling for a definite political and academic position at the same time, flying their flag in the midst of competitors of emerging academic and political groups, in a particular political era.

I agree with Fu’s account that this larger political context was conducive to the ascendancy of the call for Sinicization but believe he may have overstated the strategic aspect of the movement.²⁷ We need to take more seriously the persistent and genuine dissatisfaction that the movement’s supporters expressed about academic practices that relied on utilizing alienating Western theories and concepts, despite the fact that they were also “beneficiaries” of “Western social sciences.”²⁸ It is no coincidence that their research problems were couched in terms of the “people,” the “culture,” and the “society,” a formulation that easily leads to a polarized “us/we/ours” versus “other/others.” Consequently, their interests in social psychology, sociology, and anthropology, and their emphasis on the value of interdisciplinary research, differentiate them from other social science professionals, such as their

colleagues in experimental psychology and nomological economics.²⁹ Moreover, they did not resemble the majority of Chinese historians in Taiwan who were more like “nationalistic historians” rather than social scientists. There was a genuine desire to innovate and contribute to their respective disciplines, as well as a fear of being made vassals of the West—America in particular.

Diversification and Differentiation: Problems with Positivism

It is noted above that positivistic thinking was an integral part of the early Sinicization movement. During the second half of the twentieth century, however, different strands in the philosophy of science became influential, partly in response to the social and political unrest in Europe and the United States during the 1960s. Since the 1960s the positivistic conceptualization of the social sciences (and sociology) and the modernization thesis have often been targeted for criticism because of their conservative political orientation. Newly emerging social thinking included Western Marxism and Structuralism, the critical paradigm of the Frankfurt school, World Systems theory, Development theory, as well as interpretative paradigms from the humanities. So when positivism became the “in” thing in Taiwan during the 1970s and the 1980s, it was actually losing ground to competing paradigms in the West. In this respect, Taiwan was already lagging “behind” core developments in the discipline of sociology.

The “methodological fixation” on positivistic thinking needs further explanation. First, the academics promoting Sinicization were scholars of mainland origin and in their late forties and early fifties when the movement started. They believed that they were following in the footsteps of the May Fourth Movement and the liberal tradition of certain Chinese intellectuals. In their 1970s battle against traditionalism and authoritarianism, “Mr. Science” (*Sai xiansheng* 賽先生) and “Mr. Democracy” (*De xiansheng* 德先生) from the West were still two powerful allies. Also, when they looked to the West, they saw mostly American positivism and structure functionalism; they were not familiar with the European tradition, which was inclined toward interpretive, critical philosophy or Marxist thinking. For all these reasons, if the social sciences were to have a stronger impact on the status quo and to have their legitimacy as “nomological sciences” enhanced, positivistic empiricism seemed to be the default choice. At the same time, even the

repressive GMD government felt the need to resort to being scientific to legitimize its authority to lead social and economic development projects, and to control society more effectively. Under these circumstances, the noncritical or putatively “objective” standing of “science” was seen to be the best way to advance the social sciences. The academics promoting Sinicization even managed to get the authorities to accept their advice on social and culture issues for policy change, even if this raised the ire of the ultraconservatives.

The more senior and leading figures of the Sinicization movement, Yang and Wen, were strong supporters of positivistic research, and lobbied the government to invest in longitudinal studies and quality data collection through survey sampling and the sophisticated use of statistical methods. Two of Yang’s students and later close associates, Qu Haiyuan and Huang Guangguo 黃光國, contributed essays to the 1982 Sinicization conference volume based on the uses of survey and statistical analysis with illustrations of how “scientific techniques” could be applied to the study of China.³⁰

The implicit goal of Sinicization was to assist in rebuilding the motherland and to pursue modernization, a goal that all the key Sinicization scholars regarded as their intellectual responsibility. They conscientiously researched issues relating to social change brought about by industrialization, and the continued national suffering caused by previous (Western and Japanese) powers. The movement’s leaders garnered personal reputations for “leadership” and “authority” through their studies on issues that affected China (Taiwan), such as the impact of industrialization and modernization, pluralization, middle-class politics, contemporary social problems, social movements, and mitigation measures for rapid social change. Their moderate political stance and their promotion of positivism eventually resulted in even higher levels of support from the authorities and academic administration for “interdisciplinary (and empirical) studies” of social change and social problems. In this sense, Fu Dawei’s arguments concerning the coming of age of the positivistic social sciences in the 1980s and the ascendancy of the discourse on “objectivity” and science to a position of “hegemony”—which has both aided and been aided by the ambitions of state-led modernization—are well taken. The movement contributed directly to the enhancement of the interests of the social sciences, in general, and to sociology, anthropology, and Yang’s (own style of) social psychology, in particular, in Taiwan.

Not all of the sociologists, however, agreed with the dominance of empirical sociology. Both the rationale and the strategy for

Sinicization and indigenization promoted by Yang, Wen, and others, were regularly questioned, especially by more humanistic-oriented sociologists such as Ye Qizheng (b. 1943), Gao Chengshu 高承恕 (b. 1948), and Xiao Xinhuang (b. 1949). These younger scholars were more familiar with the new trends in Euro-American sociology and were forthright in attacking the positivistic sociology of the Sinicization movement.

Gao, for example, who studied with Habermas for a short time, was one of the few scholars who employed both Weberian and critical sociology in Taiwan during the 1980s and 1990s. He was skeptical about empiricism and its reproduction in Taiwan, especially in the Sinicization movement. He argued that the assumption of generalizability through empirical analysis was actually "Western sociology biased," and it should be the very first and primary problem to be tackled in the Sinicization process.

Ye was even more critical of the "superficial" and "blind-borrowing" of the natural science analogy, the misuse of sociology in policy making, and the false belief in the "scientifically objective nature" of sociology. He argued that these "unbearable" practices had reduced sociology to a "non-reflective," instrumentalist discipline, a problem that is very much rooted in Western instrumentalism and is foreign to Chinese culture.

Xiao Xinhuang maintained that the peripheral status of Chinese sociologists paralleled the peripheral status of China (meaning Taiwan) in the "World System." He looked at the problem from a World Systems' framework in conjunction with "dependent development" arguments borrowed from the newly emerging branch of the discipline, sociology of development. He proposed that China (meaning Taiwan) should tackle this issue in cooperation with other "third world countries" to overcome its peripheral status.³¹

Despite these differences regarding methodological assumptions, they shared the more general belief in pursuing knowledge about the "uniqueness" of "our" culture and society, about the development process of different civilizations, and about the contrast between *the* "West," *the* "foreign," out "there," and *the* "Chinese" or "ourselves" "here" in *this* particular society. Perhaps more importantly, in retrospect, they also shared a common interest: to expand the influence of sociology and to legitimize its position in the eyes of skeptical academic administrators, the authorities, and the general public, at a time of social change resulting from rapid industrialization, political crisis, and the rising political demands coming from the emerging

interests of more educated general public, such as the newly rising middle class.

Encountering the Mainland Chinese: Further Complications

In the movement's initial phase, Yang did not intend to include Chinese scholars from mainland China to join his call for "Western-dependent" Chinese scholars to become self-critical. He did not believe that the "Communist Chinese" were "qualified" to speak about Sinicization because they had insufficient experience of the "West" as yet.³² However this view was challenged when Chinese scholars from the mainland joined the second Sinicization Conference held in Hong Kong in 1983. The conference also marked the first encounter in decades between "Taiwan Chinese" and "mainland Chinese" scholars. As scheduled, Qiao Jian from the Chinese University of Hong Kong was conference organizer. Qiao made two significant modifications to the agenda. First, he warmly invited scholars from the mainland to attend, and second, he dropped the name Sinicization due to its lack of appeal in Hong Kong,³³ changing the conference title to "Modernization and Chinese Culture."

As China began to revive the discipline of sociology in 1979, former sociologists were given more freedom in meeting with the outside world. Some organizations and sociology departments were selected for rehabilitation in the 1980s after being banned and persecuted in the 1950s. Against this background, the Sinicization movement that originated in Taiwan and Hong Kong met with its professional counterparts from mainland China for the first time in decades.

Among the mainland participants was Fei Xiaotong 費孝通, the well-known student of Malinowski and author of the seminal works *Peasant Life in China* and *From the Soil*.³⁴ At the time, Fei was also leading the rehabilitation of sociology research in China. In commenting on the significance of the participation of both mainland and Taiwan sociologists, Qiao explained in his opening address that the first conference held in Taipei (1981) attracted wide attention among Chinese (i.e. mainland) social scientists. He said: "Shanghai's Fudan University abstracted some of the articles from the first conference and published them in *Shehuixue congkan* 社會學叢刊 (Bulletin of Sociology). Mr. Fei Xiaotong was very interested in the conference, and wished to expand its participation. . . . Hong Kong is a place that people can come to more easily, and therefore is an ideal place to hold this conference."³⁵

Even though Qiao suggested that the purpose of the conference was to carry on previous research on issues of Sinicization, Yang Guoshu's particular dialectical views about "Westernization" being the prerequisite of Sinicization as expressed in the first conference were no longer prominent because of the recent engagement with mainland Chinese scholars. As the conference proceedings show, the mainland scholars were mainly concerned with very practical issues such as aging, social welfare, child rearing practices, kinship change, economic improvement, socialism, and modernization, concerns that Ye Qizheng described as "unbearably shallow." These studies were generally based on empirical surveys of local communities, made regular reference to the Communist Party's leadership and its official lines, and proposed suggestions for public policy. Noticeably absent was reference to Western sources and Chinese classics in these papers.

In contrast, the Taiwan Chinese scholars were still struggling with the rigid dichotomy of the "West" and the "Chinese," as they tried to deepen their criticism of Western sociology and psychology, and offer new perspectives from which to pursue Sinicization to construct a more national-cultural specific sociology and psychology. They also expressed the need to promote their professional interests, including calling for government investment in the expansion of sociology institutions and the number of sociologists, in the belief that these measures would benefit the general public and society at large. Moreover, only the presenters from Taiwan and Hong Kong wrote anything about the "grand tradition" or specific characteristics of Chinese culture and society, such as topics on Confucianism and "the Chinese personality." The mainland scholars, however, demonstrated little to no interest in these matters, being preoccupied with social realities and problems under communism.

Ironically, Chinese intellectuals under communist rule in the mainland had advocated the Sinicization of Marxism and the rejection of the West for decades when the entire nation was striving to construct "the Chinese Socialist Road."³⁶ Shortly before China's policy change in pursuit of the "Four Modernizations," the West was officially portrayed as imperialist and dominating, and Western sociology was regarded as of little value in being able to contribute to the welfare of China's peasant masses and working class. Therefore the opposition between China and the West was a matter of unquestionable truth and reality and so required no scientific research during the entire Cold War era. The call for Sinicization, therefore, was not an academic issue but simply a matter of practicing social knowledge in the real

world under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party. On the contrary, in Taiwan and Hong Kong, Sinicization served as a vehicle for open self-criticism, soul-searching, or for the long-term development of professional interest of sociology.

Having been isolated from Western sociology for more than 30 years, the perspective of the mainland Chinese scholars in the 1980s was that they really needed to "catch up," and to become more "Westernized" in their sociological outlook (under the watchful guidance of the Communist Party, Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong thought). For them, the term Sinicization did not mean finding the "roots" of Chinese culture or society so as to correct an "overly-Westernized" or "vassal-like" tendency, but to continue to make sociology, now available from the West, serve the official line and Marxist historical materialism. Therefore, we can argue that Chinese participation in the second Sinicization movement may have had two purposes: to gain the confidence and support of Chinese authorities by conforming with the official policy on the use of sociology, and to provide a conduit to the West through more Westernized Chinese scholars as the middleman.

The unintended result of this conference was a "dilution" of the original focus on the problems of "over-Westernization" raised by Taiwan scholars, as mainland scholars pursued the goal of fostering the development of "Western" sociology in China. The 1983 Hong Kong conference thus brought to the surface the issue of "what China" and "whose China": the China that existed historically and culturally, or the China that exists now, under Communism. In the previous Sinicization campaign in Taiwan, the meaning of Chinese culture, society, nation, or Chinese-ness was often glossed over, as attention was focused on contrasts with the West, in such formulations as clannishness versus individualism, Confucianism versus Christianity, or humanism versus instrumentalist rationality. The analysis of real politics, such as government, institutions, economic structures, and hence, communism, were not matters of academic concern. Chinese-ness was treated as a very de-contextualized and highly abstract idea. It was defined or perceived as if it were a lump sum with commonly recognized essential characteristics; and even though these characteristics might require further clarification there was no doubt about its epistemological and essentialized existence. This view would be challenged by mainland scholars.

In 1983, soon after the Hong Kong Conference, Taiwan scholars led by Li Yiyuan, Yang Guoshu, and Wen Chongyi decided to promote their own edited volume of the conference papers, *Xiandaihua yu Zhongguohua lunji* 現代化與中國化論集. (Essays on Modernization

and Sinicization.)³⁷ They selected all of the eight papers written by Taiwanese scholars and the three papers written by Hong Kong scholars, deeming them all to address the topics of modernization and Sinicization. In this edited volume, not only did the editors reintroduce the term Sinicization that was excised at the Hong Kong conference, but they also excluded the ten papers by mainland scholars.³⁸ In the preface, the three editors continued to uphold their interpretation of the original ideals of the movement, such as the goals set at the first conference and how they should be carried out. This 1984 attempt to continue to separate the development of the social sciences in Taiwan (and Hong Kong) from their development in mainland China was obvious even if it was nowhere overtly stated.

In what follows, I argue that this separation could not be sustained for long if interest from the outside world in the development of sociology in mainland China continued to grow, and if the Communist government began to welcome sociologists of Chinese background from overseas to the mainland to teach and to do research. As such, the “center” of the movement and the priorities would have to be modified.³⁹

The Differing Perspectives of Chinese-American Sociologists

This simplistic notion that Chinese-ness is a quality shared by all Chinese people, regardless of conflicting political views and systems, was also challenged by Chinese-American sociologists, although perhaps not intentionally. In 1984, at Tempe, Arizona, five overseas Chinese-American sociologists⁴⁰ met to exchange views on Sinicization/indigenization. The meeting was organized by Cai Yongmei 蔡勇美, a sociologist of Taiwanese background.⁴¹ Two years later the participants published *Shehuixue Zhongguohua* 社會學中國化 (The Sinicization of Sociology)⁴² with additional papers contributed through post-conference solicitation. Xiao Xinhuang—a key participant in this conference and active participant in the previous two Sinicization conferences—described this gathering and the publication of the book as representing “the third wave” of the Sinicization movement.⁴³

The contributors to the volume were a select group of Chinese academics who had spent at least about 15 years of their adult life in the United States. Although some of them had recently returned to China or Taiwan (as “visiting” sociologists) most of them had spent a great amount of their time either teaching sociology to American

students (mostly in American state universities), or working for the U.S. government as researchers or administrators. One may argue that their professional interests and primary concerns in their day-to-day life would have been different from their counterparts in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China. After all, their working environment was in American academic and government institutions. As such they were not in the position—nor was it in their career interests—to critique America’s dominant position in the world of sociology. Being recipients of a reward system prescribed by the sociology profession in the United States there was little incentive for them to oppose American domination, or to introduce their daily work to a Chinese readership. To be successful as “go-between” sociologists, their interests in China would have to coincide with the interests of the sociology profession of the United States, just as their interests in the sociology profession in the United States would have to be recognized and respected by their Chinese counterparts.⁴⁴

Having explained this background enables us to understand better the attitudes of the Chinese-American sociologists toward Sinicization. For instance, in his paper, Nan Lin, one of the leading Chinese-American sociologists in North America, described himself as a sympathetic “outsider” (*juwairen* 局外人) to the Sinicization movement, and that this enabled him to analyze the movement more “objectively” by offering constructive “advice” and “reminders.”⁴⁵ He proposed asking appropriate and specific questions about the social systems in both traditional *and* communist China, and to collect more data and produce more and better-trained sociologists. Because he clearly opposed closed-door or ethnocentric tendencies that might be advanced under the rubric of “Chinese sociology,” he advocated increased contact between Chinese scholars and American-Chinese scholars.⁴⁶ It was clear that Lin did not think there was anything seriously “wrong” with the discipline of sociology or the main standards of American sociology. If sociology had been overlooking the Chinese people and Chinese society that was because Chinese sociologists had contributed little to the profession. The situation could be remedied through the organized participation of more and better trained Chinese sociologists able to ask the relevant questions. In short, for Lin, Chinese sociological studies could enrich sociology and make sociological theory “more generalizable.” Toward the end of his paper, Lin placed universal professionalism above nationalism, and suggested that the ultimate goal for Sinicization should be to enrich “world” sociology, or “global” sociology rather than seek to provide an alternative to it.⁴⁷

This particular view prompted the conference organizer Cai Yongmei to comment that although Chinese Americans in the United States might find Lin's position on global sociology attractive, scholars from the "motherland" might not necessarily find the proposition so appealing.⁴⁸ In fact we find at least three major points of difference between Lin as a Chinese-American sociologist and other "native" Sinicization advocates: (1) Lin did not express any views regarding the "subordination" of Chinese sociologists; (2) he did not come forward to support the need for self-assertion or for deep self-reflection other than what was necessary to enhance sociology's professional interests; and (3) he drew a distinction between the goal to build sociology in China (and Taiwan) and the nationalistic goal to modernize China. On the other hand, he and other Sinicization advocates shared the following views: there was a need to have more and better-trained sociologists, and there was a need to undertake more empirical studies with relevant questions asked in response to particular Chinese social/cultural settings.

Finally, toward the end of book, there is a dialogue between Li Zhefu⁴⁹ and Xiao Xinhua concerning the paths by which sociology had developed in mainland China and Taiwan. In describing mainland Chinese sociologists, Xiao related the negative impressions he had formed of them during his first and very recent meeting with them at the Hong Kong Conference. He described the mainland sociologists as "chauvinistic" and completely ignorant about Taiwan's history, just like "those mainlanders who came to rule Taiwan in the 1950s."⁵⁰ After interrupting Xiao on the grounds that he was being too political, Li Zhefu went on to offer an apologetic account of the unfortunate political upheavals in China over the previous 30 years, stressing the need for political correctness and policy practicality as the prerequisites for sociology's development in China. He even suggested that only in Taiwan (and Hong Kong) might Sinicization be an issue worth pursuing. In mainland China the issue was not about Sinicization, but about the political demands of a socialist government: how to conduct sociology in line with the government's expectations and official ideology while remaining selectively open to the West.

Xiao responded by remarking on the "advanced" state of development of sociology in Taiwan relative to China, suggesting that sociologists from Taiwan were younger, more westernized, pluralistic in outlook, critical minded, and not always obligated to follow the official ideological line.⁵¹ In his own chapter in the volume, Xiao outlined the historical development and lineage of Chinese sociology in Taiwan,

contrasting it with the general concern of Chinese-American sociologists to rebuild the discipline of sociology in mainland China.

By now it should be evident that with the "emerging market" of sociology in mainland China and the interest shown by Western scholars, overseas Chinese scholars (as "go-between" sociologists liaising between the core and the periphery), and Hong Kong Chinese scholars, the exclusion of the "majority" of "real" Chinese—those from the Motherland—as the premise of Taiwan's sinicization movement, became impossible to uphold.

The Self-Assertion of Taiwanese Consciousness

By the mid-1980s it became clear that the Sinicization movement, which originated in Taiwan, could not be applied to mainland China and that Taiwan could not represent China even culturally. This realization was compounded by the surging interest in mainland China expressed by Chinese-American and Hong Kong Chinese sociologists, and by the rising tide of Taiwanese consciousness and Taiwanese cultural and political nationalism. National identity issues also gradually became a focal point in domestic politics in Taiwan.⁵² The immediate reasons for escalating identity conflicts had to do with the power imbalance between mainlanders (*waishengren*) and Taiwanese (*benshengren*), the lack of representative government, and the regime's brutality and lack of justice. Taiwanese dissidents and their supporters confronted the ruling authoritarian regime, attempting to discredit the legitimacy of GMD rule by characterizing it as an "outsider and colonial regime" that must be toppled.

From the mid-1970s, the opposition movement started active political mobilization during elections and political campaigns. By 1984, the momentum of the movement had rebounded to a point surpassing that which it had experienced prior to its suppression in 1979. Like all political movements, the expansion of the opposition required effective mobilization of public consciousness. Successful political transformation depended on a growing number of supporters who shared similar views on such matters as Taiwanese historical consciousness, the responsibility that the GMD "outsider regime" had for causing contemporary social and political discontent, and the moral value of working to build a future ideal country for the Taiwanese people. In short, the indigenization of real politics also required the indigenization of the general public's cultural outlook. Here we find a broader

indigenization of many areas in the field of culture, including language, literature, arts, movies, popular songs, history, sociology, and anthropology in particular. If sociology is as sociologists define it—the scientific study of society—then its subject of study could not avoid this larger environment in the process of restructuration, or the making of a “homology” in many fields at the same time (following Pierre Bourdieu). Therefore, broader issues relating to nationalistic conflict began to surface in internal power struggles within the field of sociology. The following sorts of questions became the subjects of debate: which society, what kind of society, and, most of all, whose society are you or (we) sociologists studying? Are we Chinese or are we Taiwanese? Should our sociological studies represent Taiwan or China? What does the Sinicization movement in Taiwan mean? Should it be a Taiwanization movement instead?

Replacing Sinicization with Taiwanization?

In this section, we examine the changes that took place in the 1990s, when the term *bentuhua* became more popular and was used to qualify the original meaning(s) of Sinicization as the movement inclined more toward Taiwanization. In 1990, the Chinese Sociology Association (CSA) commemorated its sixtieth anniversary in Taiwan. According to traditional chronological schemes, every 60 years constitutes a completion of one cycle (*jiazi* 甲子), an auspicious event that calls for a special occasion. But the celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the CSA in 1990 was a subdued, almost unnoticed, affair. A special issue of this anniversary was eventually published by the *Chinese Journal of Sociology* (no. 15, December 1991). Two key articles on the evaluation and the future of the Sinicization/indigenization movement stood out in this issue due to their conflicting emphases. One of the articles was written by Wen Chongyi,⁵³ a longtime advocate of Sinicization. Wen’s article addressed the issue of the contradictory tendency inherited in the history of, and the making of, sociology in countries such as Germany, France, Britain, the United States of America, Japan, India, the Soviet Union, and, of course, noncommunist China during the 1930s to the 1940s. The contradictions were illustrated in terms of pairs of oppositions: “generality and particularity,” “universal theoretical models and national or indigenous research,” “global and national,” “empirical and interpretative/critical,” and so on. He tried to present the Sinicization movement as one instance of many national developments of sociology throughout the world.

The article represented a more sophisticated account of Sinicization than when the idea was first proposed a decade earlier. The basic theme of the movement, however, changed very little in the interim: Chinese social scientists should be self-conscious, self-critical, and independent (i.e., not subordinated to the West) so as to contribute creatively to the world’s social science disciplines with proper acknowledgement being afforded national and cultural particularities. He encouraged scholars to do more cross-cultural and cross-national comparative studies, and continued to caution against potential ultra-traditional, ethnocentric, and anti-global tendencies when supporting the long-term objective of a global discipline. He did, however, make the construction of a national-typical sociology his first priority. He submitted: “according to our current sociological knowledge, as long as it remains impossible to have one unified structure for the international community, it will be impossible to have one school of sociological theory that is able to account effectively for the global. So far, we have only been able to have American sociology, German sociology, French sociology, or Chinese sociology, but no real internationalized sociology. Therefore, until a global village can be realized, until a successful global social structure has been created, the path of Sinicizing sociology remains the only path; there should be no room for hesitation and waiting.”⁵⁴

Wen, like earlier participants in the movement, still supported the idea of Chinese sociologists’ developing an appropriate sociological knowledge of Chinese societies that had the potential to contribute to a general global sociology. As early as 1983 he was well aware of the political sensitivity associated with the term “*Zhongguohua* 中國化” (Sinicization),⁵⁵ but he never conscientiously distinguished Taiwan from China, and consistently suggested that sociology in Taiwan had its origins in the development of sociology in China in the 1930s, despite the fact that Taiwan was actually ruled by Japan from 1895 until 1945. He emphasized that the call for Sinicization in the 1930s by Chinese sociologists on mainland China paralleled the call for Sinicization in 1970s Taiwan. In a footnote of clarification, he maintained: “internationalization and globalization are synonyms, and so are indigenization (*bentuhua* 本土化), localization (*diquhua* 地區化), and nationalization (*guojiahua* 國家化).” By thus qualifying the complex relation between Sinicization and Taiwanization, he thought he could avoid the thorny issues of political movements and identity politics.⁵⁶

The next article was written by Xu Zhengguang (b. 1943).⁵⁷ In comparison to Wen, Xu belongs to a younger generation of sociologists and

is of Taiwanese–Hakka origin. The article was also his presidential address written to mark the completion of his term as elected president of the CSA between 1988 and 1990. Through commemorating and reexamining Chen Shaoxin's 陳紹馨 (1906–1966) last work, especially his hopes for the future of sociology in Taiwan,⁵⁸ Xu intended to outline a new direction for the sociological study of Taiwan, with an emphasis on the unique “subjectivity of Taiwanese culture and society” (*Taiwan wenhua yu shehui de zhutixing* 台灣文化與社會的主體性).⁵⁹ Chen Shaoxing was a native Taiwanese who studied sociology at Tohoku University in Japan during the 1940s. He was perhaps the only Taiwanese sociologist, by origin, of his generation during the Japanese rule of Taiwan. In this particular article, published in his last years, Chen believed that Taiwan was not only rich in cultural diversity but also more modernized than the mainland; therefore, the study of Taiwan could contribute significantly to the study of China. Chen concluded, “Taiwan is a laboratory for the study of Chinese culture and society,” but *not* a surrogate or a substitute for the study of China.

According to Xu's “reasonable speculation” (Xu's own words)⁶⁰ Chen was a Taiwanese native scholar oppressed in his time because of his education and ethnic background. In writing this article, Chen suppressed his anger in the hope of correcting the biases of his mainland counterparts who looked down on Taiwan and the value of Taiwan Studies.⁶¹ Xu praised Chen as a pioneer who had foreseen, although very implicitly, the value of Taiwan studies with a “distinctive Taiwanese identity.” Xu was highly critical of attempts in the past to use Taiwan as a surrogate or substitute for China studies, which in doing so failed to look at the uniqueness and subjectivities of Taiwan. Xu also made the bold suggestion that the Sinicization movement in the 1980s was an extension of Chen's “laboratory paradigm”⁶² since it was compatible with Chen's paradigm and put Chen's suggestion into practice in many ways. Xu maintained that Chen's “paradigm” and the movement both agreed that Taiwanese society and culture are a regional part of greater Chinese society and culture, hence the Sinicization movement in Taiwan should carry out studies on China as the general and Taiwan as the local. As a result, the Sinicization process and the Taiwanization (*Taiwanhua* 台灣化) process could develop hand-in-hand.⁶³ In this very ironic manner, Xu was really trying to connect a lesser-known Japanese-educated Taiwanese scholar—alienated and oppressed by Chinese tradition—with the later development of the Sinicization movement by many mainland scholars.⁶⁴

Xu then proceeded to criticize the problems associated with Sinicization. He started by raising the epistemological problem of “What is this so-called China?” He put the word “*Zhongguo*” in brackets,⁶⁵ and suggested that what was characteristically thought to be *Zhongguo* was highly problematic, but was never thought of as such by the Sinicization scholars. He believed that Sinicization's “blind spots” lay in its tendency to look at China without reference to changes and differences in time, places, and situation; and failure to take note of sociological differences in class and institutional structures. He also suggested that despite the claims of Sinicization scholars to be Westernized, in fact, they lacked understanding of the philosophical premises underlying the social sciences as practiced in the West. As such, their works were “superficial” and their criticisms of Western measurements, wording, or other trivial matters focused on the merely “technical.” They had not launched any serious challenge to Western epistemological issues at all.

Finally, he charged that although Taiwan Studies was incorporated in the Sinicization movement, many of these studies of Taiwan were “de-contextualized,” giving the impression that Taiwan had no identity or any meaningful existence in itself.

From reading the series of studies conducted by Yang Guoshu, one often finds that extremely complicated and dynamic people and events in Taiwan are distorted to fit the shape of a static measurement model. In this kind of analysis, one cannot see anything about such real life (*huo sheng sheng* 活生生的) matters as humiliation, the distortion of people's personality structures when impacted by real historical influences, the regime, or the international environment, as well as [the effects of] power and strategic domination in interpersonal relations. This kind of study says nothing regarding the strenuous effort and autonomous struggles of ordinary people under the dominant cultural and social system. Advocates of the Sinicization movement refuse to acknowledge that they are conducting realistic “Taiwan Studies” in name and in essence. Floating in the air of traditional China to find their research problems, they face incompatibility in their epistemology. Not only are they undermining the ideal objectives of the Sinicization movement, but they are also forcing the movement to succumb to academic formalism and vanity since the essential problems of Taiwan are overlooked.⁶⁶

Xu revealed his thoughts on the future development of sociology in Taiwan by proposing that the field move beyond Chen Shaoxin's paradigm and the Sinicization movement. That is, he proposed

moving away from critiquing Western cultural imperialism in order to construct a Chinese model of the social sciences, to critiquing the “internal conditions” in Taiwan so that Taiwan would become a valuable research subject in its own right.⁶⁷ Although Xu did not specify what these internal conditions in Taiwan were, elsewhere in the article he commented on the effects of the GMD’s cultural hegemony on the Taiwanese population,⁶⁸ and the “naïve” views held by many Sinicization advocates regarding a traditional and idealized China. The Taiwanization trend continued in many fields in Taiwan in the 1990s. Politics, education, and culture all became increasingly ethnicized and nationalized.⁶⁹ In December 1995, at its annual convention, members of the CSA eventually discussed the issue of changing its title from the Chinese Sociological Association to the Taiwan Sociological Association. The proposal was passed swiftly with almost no objection.

Despite this trend, the so-called Taiwanization movement has not replaced the Sinicization movement in the social sciences. Today people prefer the term indigenization to either Taiwanization or Sinicization. This is largely because the “Taiwan versus China” opposition and its political connotations are viewed as politically confrontational, and a threat to the free flow of ideas and scholarly exchange across political boundaries. Moreover, although locally the historical and cultural ties between Taiwan and China might be disregarded for the purposes of self-assertion of Taiwanese consciousness, this goal would be more difficult to achieve in the transnational and global communities of the social sciences in which many non-Chinese, non-Taiwanese, and critical-minded scholars of diverse national backgrounds, participate in the same field of knowledge production. In reality, there are many Western institutions for China Studies in many disciplines which follow their own geopolitical interests and institutional logic, and which still hold on to the idea that places Taiwan Studies as a special part of, or a minor variation of, China Studies.⁷⁰ The influences of overseas institutions has been much greater in the 1990s than in the 1970s because of increasing scholarly exchange across boundaries, partially due to the invention of new communication technologies and the increasing number of multilingual and transnational scholars.

Three Indigenization Models

Beginning from the mid-1990s, the dominant cultural and political discourse in Taiwan has moved toward embracing globalization

and strengthening competitiveness in the global “market.” The early Sinicization movement has already lost its appeal and dissipated into many strands. As in other countries and regions, however, increasing globalization has not made indigenization or localization disappear; rather, indigenization/localization has become “transformed,” either by including the global into the local context (i.e., localizing the global), or simply by making the local “globalized” (i.e., globalizing the local).

In the following paragraphs, I provide three typical “models” of the indigenization movement that have emerged in Taiwan. The first model can be represented as the “transnational indigenization model.” This model can be regarded as a direct continuation of the Sinicization movement led by Yang Guoshu, Li Yiyuan, Qiao Jian, and some of their students, and is now joined by counterparts in mainland China. Although Sinicization has gradually lost favor in Taiwan during the 1990s as a consequence of a changing nationalistic landscape, during the same period it has found support among anthropologists and psychologists in the mainland. It is principally mainland scholars who now use the terms indigenization and Sinicization interchangeably.⁷¹ In Taiwan, Yang Guoshu himself now uses the term indigenization more often than Sinicization, and founded the journal titled *Bentu xinlixue yanjiu* 本土心理學研究 (Indigenous Psychology Journal) in 1993.⁷² Yang also agreed to substitute use of the term *Zhongguoren* 中國人 with the less politicized term *Huaren* 華人, although he was reluctant to do so at first.⁷³ Despite these changes, Yang’s strategy to achieve indigenization (formerly Sinicization) has changed little, except that he has now linked indigenization to a broader and more general phenomenon evident in many non-Western countries or cultures. He is less committed to building an essentialized Chinese (nation-bounded) psychology—a notion that has come under heavy criticism—preferring to develop a transnational psychology within *Huaren* communities. He has also abandoned his original goal of developing an “alternative” paradigm to Western psychology (premised on the belief that a deep chasm separates China and the “West”) proposing instead the goal of achieving “local correlation” (*bentu qihexing* 本土契合性). This means that the fundamental issue of indigenization is to determine “whether correspondence (*xiangyingxing* 相應性), compatibility (*peihexing* 配合性), and reconciliation (*tiaohexing* 調和性) can be achieved between research activities and findings, and the behavior of local subjects.”⁷⁴ Yang added strong qualifications to the dichotomy of “the local verses the West” (or the national versus the global) because he began to regard “Western psychology” not as a nomological

science but just another kind of “indigenous psychology” that may have attained the goal of “local correlation” in the localized context of Western societies. Therefore, he recently clarified that it is not *Western* psychology he opposes, but the “*Westernization* of psychological studies in non-Western societies,” or the blind application of Western psychology to non-Western societies.⁷⁵ Moreover, in advocating the goal of local correlation he maintains that although indigenous scholars may have certain advantages when it comes to determining local relevance, this would not always be the case because some local researchers could still be functioning as vassals of the West. On the other hand, a nonlocal or a foreign scholar can obtain the goal of local correlation as long as local particularity and context are given proper consideration. He is therefore moving further away from his previous advocacy of “a native psychology proposed by native researchers acquiring ‘emic’ views from within.” He is now more open to cross-cultural or comparative studies involving researchers of all backgrounds, Western and non-Western, although from time to time his main priority has not changed—that is, native scholars should undertake native study from an emic point of view, first and primarily, since nonnative scholars will not have the same interests as native scholars.⁷⁶

It is clear that Yang has moved beyond the confinement of the nation-state’s borders, by making indigenization an issue relevant to psychologists from other Asian countries, even though his primary influence has always been in *Huaren* communities. His flexibility makes him less prone to cultural nationalism and more attuned to regionalization. By doing so he has been able to bring his indigenous psychology to a wider audience as part of the predominant discourse of globalization that surged in the 1990s.

At the same time, Li Yiyuan and Qiao Jian have maintained their indigenization movement through a series of “Modernization and Chinese Culture” conferences rotated among Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the mainland, and involving interdisciplinary participation.⁷⁷ Since the changes of 1979, when China began to revive the discipline of sociology, scholars from the mainland have gradually become more involved with the themes of indigenization along with their deepening “Westernization” and the growing need for professional representation in the domestic environment.⁷⁸ Analysis of these developments is, however, beyond the scope of this chapter.

The second model can be described as the “theoretical-reasoning model.” This model has its origin in the humanistic critique of empirical sociology in the 1980s, of which Ye Qizheng is a representative.

According to Ye, the fundamental problem with Western sociology is that it is no different from the problem of Western civilization: the expansion and penetration of instrumentalist rationality into every aspect of social life and the prevalence of utilitarian individualism. Since the social sciences in the West have their roots in their mother culture, empirical research is necessarily influenced by this relationship, and so the resulting “sociological knowledge” cannot be applied to other cultures with the same validity. Ye proposes that the indigenization movement should abandon positivism and empirical research in favor of alternative interpretative and critical approaches. What Ye proposes for an indigenized sociology is the kind of knowledge that can grasp the existential meaning and underlying principles of the social actions of ordinary people, and the fundamental social structures of indigenous society. However, much of his writing has been directed at pointing out the “problems” inherited from the West—its basic cultural assumptions. In doing so, he also relies on the critical and humanistic traditions from the West to make his criticisms. Other sociologists have dubbed Ye and his followers as belonging to the “theoretical camp” as distinct from the “research-camp.” In this sense, their indigenization movement is better understood as more concerned with sociocultural critique than engaging in “scientific” data gathering and empirical analysis. This critique is designed to challenge the dominance of empiricism and mainstream sociology in Taiwan, and to oppose the capitalist tendency, in general, and its dominance in Taiwan, in particular.

The third model can be termed the “grounded indigenization” model. It emphasizes the importance of grounded research with careful fieldwork, constructing (sometimes, also deconstructing) the “taken-for-granted” and “naturalized” social world. Xie Guoxiong 謝國雄 (b. 1957) is a good example of a scholar who has adopted this approach. His 1997 book, *Chun laodong: Taiwan laodong tizhi zhulun* 純勞動—台灣勞動體制諸論 (Labor Only: Essays on the Labor Regime in Taiwan), was well received for its thorough fieldwork and observations from the bottom, as well for the author’s use of the theories of Western sociologists from the left tradition, such as Pierre Bourdieu and Michael Burroway. In the final chapter, Xie presented his thoughts on what sociology should be like along with his personal reflections and a passionate call for indigenous sociology.

Being a Taiwanese sociologist who studies Taiwan, my ultimate wish is to be able to answer the question: “What kind of society is Taiwanese society?” (and “What are its characteristics?”). . . . A sociologist . . . should

be able to distinguish three layers of knowledge. First, to know precisely how Taiwan's social system functions; second, what makes it unique; and third, innovation in sociological theory. . . . Only when we can have the insight to grasp the uniqueness of Taiwanese society we can have innovation in theory. . . . "Taiwan flavor" (*Taiwan wei* 台灣味) and "theoretical innovation" are inseparable.⁷⁹

Although Xie admitted that he is an admirer of Chen Shaoxin, he also has his own points to make. First, he is not an empiricist in his methodological preferences. He relies on interpretative and critical ethnography as the primary method to collect data. Second, he manages to escape falling into the same trap as his Sinicization predecessors. Influenced by Pierre Bourdieu, he always "engages" the notion of Taiwan (represented as the local) by "bracketing" it and situating it in a larger context so as to avoid "naturalizing" it. Like Ye Qizheng, he also advocates study of the underlying organization and systems or patterns of the "practices" of people. The difference between Xie's and Ye's theorizing model is that Xie relies heavily on ethnography data collecting and its interpretation. Indigenous scholars should, and could, develop their own *problematiques* or research agendas that will be more relevant to indigenous society, rather than just blindly following the West. Unlike Sinicization scholars, his ultimate criterion for "good" sociology is not just its relevance to the local, but the "coming-out" of local study, as Yang suggested in the first Sinicization conference but neglected later. Local sociological works should be measured by theoretical innovations (of profession and academic interest) in the discipline grounded in a careful understanding of the local, with meaningful *problematiques* originating from the local.

Conclusion

Recently, Björn Kjellgren lashed out against the Sinicization trend in Chinese anthropology and Yang Guoshu's early Sinicization movement in Taiwan.⁸⁰ He suggests that the danger of Sinicization and indigenization discourse—in mainland China today, and in Taiwan since the 1980s—has been the tendency toward "cultural nationalism" and its naïve assumptions concerning the putative chasm between Chinese culture and Western culture.⁸¹ He was also concerned about the Chinese bias in favor of "native" scholars over foreign scholars, coming from the false and essentialized dichotomization of the "Western tradition" and the "Grand Chinese tradition," and the alleged "incomprehensibility"

that native culture poses to foreign scholars. These narrow-minded and ungrounded methodological assumptions threaten to bring more harm than benefit to the work of Chinese academics if the "native advantage" is defined in primordial or ethno-national terms, not in organizational and resource terms.

His criticism of Sinicization psychologist Huang Guangguo's cultural essentialism, as well as of the more widespread naivety and misconceptions concerning Western culture and Western scholars are also very well taken: claims about the "uniqueness" of Chinese culture or society, or the stereotypes about the tradition of the West are dubious.⁸² Moreover, the pitfalls of emphasizing "native research" cannot be overemphasized.

On the other hand, I think Kjellgren might have unfairly constructed a negative image of many of the critical-minded Sinicization and indigenization scholars already discussed in this chapter. His criticisms completely ignore the diversity and processes of differentiation that can be linked to the distinct historical trajectories, and the differing positions of influence, interest, and conflict in the academic, cultural, and political fields of Taiwan and mainland China, respectively. When Kjellgren marshaled evidence against indigenization advocates by drawing from a mixed bag of discourse taken out of place, time, and context, not only did he decontextualize the movement, but he also failed to differentiate the distinct and various paths of development that individual social science disciplines underwent in different Chinese societies. In short, the Sinicization movement in Taiwan in the 1980s led by Yang and his colleagues and its spread to mainland China after the 1980s, as well as the call for native anthropology at the end of the 1990s in China, vary significantly in significance, aims, and strategies, relating as they do to the perception of individual and professional interests in both the domestic and international spheres.

One of the key points Kjellgren makes concerns the alleged advantage associated with being native in doing native research. Yet, in the entirety of indigenization discourse in Taiwan, this matter has remained trivial and unimportant. It was certainly not a "hidden agenda" of the indigenization movement. In Taiwan, indigenization discourse was addressed to a domestic audience, not a foreign one. "Foreign" scholars and their works on China or the Chinese were not the "targets" of the indigenization movement. The targets were mainly the overly Westernized native social scientists who lacked "self-identity," and who failed to grasp the relevant and meaningful *problematiques* from a "indigenous-point-of-view" or to achieve "local correlation."⁸³

In this chapter I have presented the Sinicization/indigenization movement in the social sciences, with particular reference to sociology, in Taiwan. I have examined its origin and the larger contexts in the 1970s and the 1980s that were conducive to the emergence of the movement; its spread outside of Taiwan; and its evolution as the transnational indigenization model, theoretical-reasoning indigenization model, and the grounded indigenization model. I have argued that the indigenization process in the social sciences is better understood in the light of its intricate relations to the external environment and the historical trajectory of local society. In doing so, I pointed out that this movement has been consistent with the efforts made by social scientists to enhance the social status of their respective profession—be it sociology, psychology, or anthropology—in their own eyes, as well as in the eyes of the authorities, the general public, and, sometimes, their Western counterparts. The movement thus reflects the professional interests of intellectuals, as a group(s) or as individual scholars, to raise their influence nationally and globally, through deciphering the West and the local, so as to construct a dichotomy.

As long as competing interests are involved, it will be difficult to find a unified position. When people have different interests because of their relative social position, whether those interests are theoretical or practical, academic or political, it becomes difficult to maintain similar goals, directions, and strategies for the movement. As noted, the competition between the old and the young (seniority difference), theoretical schools and political standings (interest difference), ethnic background differences in relation to nationalism,⁸⁴ and relative distances from the dominant position at the center (global hierarchy difference), have rendered a “unified” cultural nationalism—which constitutes the basis of Kjellgren’s critique—a secondary issue.⁸⁵

The maturation and expansion of various social science disciplines and the emerging demands to become “more global” in the late 1990s will continue to affect internal struggles within academic communities. More resources will continue to be allocated to other “practical” sciences than to the humanities and social sciences. As the number of scholars with exposure to the West increases, there will be more diversified interests, more competition for local centers, *Huaren* centers, and regional centers, and also, the academic hierarchy will be influenced by outside struggles such as those between globalization and anti-globalization. Be it Sinicization, Taiwanization, or indigenization in general, all will have to face new challenges in these emerging realities.

Indeed, many assumptions or claims about the uniqueness of indigenous society may prove to be merely rhetorical or even unsustainable

when subjected even to mild scrutiny. Nor will it be the case that local studies, conducted by so-called native scholars, will naturally or automatically prove to be more valid or truthful. Such studies must be properly recognized within their particular disciplines, which are part of a larger social science community. Although this community was staunchly Euro-America-centric before the 1960s, it has become increasingly pluralistic and self-critical since then, just as national and disciplinary boundaries have become less tenable given the tremendous growth in the transnational flow of ideas and the numbers of multilingual scholars.

We must, however, acknowledge the larger significance and social consequences of the indigenization movement, which extends beyond the review we have presented here about the case of Taiwan and other places. Our claims that the Sinicization/indigenization movement in the social sciences in Taiwan is *not* unique, when compared to other non-Western countries,⁸⁶ and, moreover, that it has many problems which parallel the development of the social sciences in western Europe and the United States, will come as a surprise to many indigenous scholars and their critics. When “opening” the history of the social sciences, Wallerstein and others⁸⁷ found that since the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries there have been problems of assumed “spatiality” (defined by national borders or by groups of “people”); problems of social disruption associated with rapid social-political change; the state’s need for new knowledge to govern and for state expansion, and so on, that led to the differentiation and institutionalization of many disciplines known today as “social sciences.” Historically, sociology, like other social science disciplines, has been an indigenous enterprise almost from its beginning. This indigenized and “border-bound” character was historically important in the legitimating process required to establish the institutional infrastructure of academic departments, journals, national associations, and, above all, national resources. Wallerstein would probably agree that the indigenization of the social sciences in Taiwan and in other non-Western countries is similar. Moreover, it would have been an inevitable process because of the surging skepticism regarding the assumed “universality” of the social sciences since the 1950s among the many who have been excluded or marginalized by previously biased social science research. The demand for Sinicization in Taiwan, after all, was not all that different from the demands for feminization, ethnicization, internationalization, or decolonization, that emerged within the establishment of Western social sciences in the context of social and political change since the 1970s, except that it occurred outside of, even though it was

“influenced by,” the “West.” In short, as long as issues of “universality” and “particularity” remain unresolved in the social sciences, indigenization movements will continue.

In Taiwan, indigenization has become much less of an issue than in the 1980s when the development of the sociology was first considered. Today, it has gradually shifted from the “production” of indigenous knowledge to the “reproduction” of indigenous scholars and knowledge. Strengthening existing sociology institutions and emphasizing the training of the next generation of sociologists have proceeded apace with the “indigenization process.”⁸⁸ The publication of the first “indigenous sociology textbook” in 1999, mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, is but one sign of this long process.

Finally, we need to comment on the general meaning of indigenization. First, it is concerned with the construction of an “us–them” dichotomy. Second, it is concerned with the existing hierarchical relation between “us” and “them,” with them perceived to be dominant. Indigenization has often arisen from calls to overcome that perception of inequality. Contemporary indigenization movements are thus either third world or postcolonial phenomena. Indigenization strives to achieve not only self-recognition, but also other-recognition. The essentializing tendency in the construction of the opposing groups of “peoples,” however, can lead to nationalistic and ethnocentric pitfalls that are harmful to knowledge production even though essentialism may assist indigenous scholars to promote themselves in the short-term. To avoid this problem, indigenization should not be regarded as a vehicle to construct a unique “national” discipline but should be pursued as “grounded” research rooted in the “local” context, or the “trans-local” in its configuration and formation. Any of the many forms of spatiality involved in the discourse of the indigenization movement should be viewed as a construct and subjected to close scrutiny. And lastly, indigenization of the social sciences should rely on comparative perspectives and multilingual researchers. They are useful in forcing “native” or “spatial-bound” scholars to problematize the limiting ontology of the “native versus foreign” dichotomy.

Notes

1. The government started the first sociology and social welfare department by promoting its training classes for civic administration at Zhongxing 中興 University in 1955. Christian missionaries from the United States and the Asia Foundation of the United States helped in promoting the foundation

- of the three major sociology-related undergraduate courses at National Taiwan University and Donghai 東海 University. See Xiao Xinhuang 蕭新煌, “Sanshi nian lai Taiwan de shehuixue: Lishi yu jiegou de tantao 三十年來台灣的社會學：歷史與結構的探討” (Taiwan’s Sociology over the Past Thirty Years: A Historical and Structural Exploration), in Lai Zehan 賴澤涵 (ed.), *Sanshi nian lai woguo renwen ji shehuixue zhi huigu yu zhanwang 三十年來我國人文及社會科學之回顧與展望* (Human and Social Sciences in Our Country over the Last Thirty Years in Retrospect and Prospect), Taipei: Dongda tushu gongsi, 1987, 341.
2. Zhang Yinghua 章英華 estimates that about 200 sociologists hold doctoral degrees in Taiwan. See “Shehuixue zai Taiwan: Cong bentuhua de huyu dao zhiduhua de suqiu 社會學在台灣：從本土化的呼籲到制度化的訴求” (Sociology in Taiwan: From Calls to Indigenization to Requests for Institutionalization), in Qiao Jian 喬健 et al. (eds.), *21 shiji de Zhongguo shehuixue yu renleixue 二十一世紀的中國社會學與人類學* (Chinese Sociology and Anthropology in the 21st Century), Kaohsiung: Liwen chubanshe, 2001, 106.
 3. See Immanuel Wallerstein et al., *Open the Social Sciences: Report of the Gulbehkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996; Peter Wagner, *A History and Theory of the Social Sciences*, London: Sage Publications, 2001.
 4. For instance, American scholars have also wondered as to what should be taught to undergraduate students and the American Sociological Association began to promote “internationalization” in their undergraduate teachings. See J. M. Armer (ed.), *Syllabi and Resources for Internationalizing Courses in Sociology*, Washington DC: American Sociological Association Teaching Resources Center, 1983.
 5. Wang Zhenhuan 王振寰 and Qu Haiyuan 瞿海源 (eds.), *Shehuixue yu Taiwan shehui 社會學與台灣社會*, Taipei: Juliu tushu gongsi, 1999. Each of the two editors served as the president of the Taiwanese Sociological Association (TSA). The book was originally proposed as a collective project by the TSA. Wang Zhenhuan is a professor at Donghai University and Qu Haiyuan teaches at National Taiwan University and is a research fellow at the Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica.
 6. The term Sinicization was the preferred term in the 1980s, while indigenization has gained more prominence in use in the 1990s. The reasons for this, and the respective meanings of the two terms, are explained later in this chapter.
 7. The forum was organized and moderated by the then president of the CSA, Wen Chongyi 文崇一. See *Zhongguo shehui xuekan*, 7 (1983): 233–321.
 8. The conference was held at the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, December 21–24, 1981.
 9. Yang Guoshu 楊國樞 and Wen Chongyi 文崇一 (eds.), *Shehui ji xingwei kexue yanjiu de Zhongguohua 社會結構與行為科學研究的中國化*, Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, 1981.
 10. Both “Zhongguoren 中國人” and “Huaren” are usually translated as “Chinese” in English, but have different connotations and are used in different contexts. “Zhongguoren” has more emphasis on the Chinese motherland, or the Chinese nation-state, whereas “Huaren” has a connotation of the connectedness with Chinese cultural heritage, not necessarily with the political motherland. The group boundary of “Huaren” is thus more flexible, and is often preferred when

- people want to de-emphasize the political connotations, or to avoid political confrontations among many people with “common” Chinese origin.
11. See, for instance, Xu Jieshun 徐杰舜 (ed.), *Bentuhua: Renleixue de da qushi* 本土化：人類學的大趨勢 (Indigenization: The Main Trend in Anthropology), Guangxi: Minzu chubanshe, 2001. Also, Yang Guoshu was successful in organizing the third Conference for the Asian Association of Social Psychology in Taipei, 1999, which adopted “indigenization of social psychology” as the plenary theme of the conference.
 12. Arif Dirlik, “Theory, History, Culture: Cultural Identity and the Politics of Theory in Twentieth-Century China,” *Development and Society*, 29.2 (2000): 73–104. I am grateful to John Makeham for this reference.
 13. As the most Westernized and the most “natural science”-like of the many social science disciplines, economics has little problem with its legitimation and has never been part of the movement. On the other hand, political science played a small part in this movement initially, and began to reengage with this issue only in 1999, having “lagged behind” for about 20 years. This occurred partly because of the need of Taiwanese Chinese and overseas Chinese scholars to participate in the recent development of the discipline’s “market” in mainland China. See Zhu Yunhan 朱雲漢 et al. (eds.), *Huaren shehui zhengzhixue bentuhua yanjiu de lilun yu shijian* 華人社會政治學本土化研究的理論與實踐 (The Theory and Practice of Indigenous Political Science Research in Sinitic Societies), Taipei: Guiguan tushu gongsi, 2000.
 14. For instance, anthropology is often practiced as the study of the “other culture” by a nonnative scholar; whereas sociology is often practiced as the study of a particular “society” by a so-called native scholar. Therefore, indigenization for anthropologists and for sociologists can have very different meanings, strategies, as well as problems.
 15. The most recent conference was held at Nanhua University, Jiayi, Taiwan, in April 2002. It was the third of a series of three conferences called “Symposia on Social Science Theories and Indigenization.” Recently, Ye Qizheng, one of the most influential sociologists in Taiwan, published *Shehuixue yu bentuhua* 社會學與本土化 (Sociology and Indigenization), Taipei: Juliu tushu gongsi, 2002.
 16. For examples in anthropology, see Frank Pieke, Stephan Feuchtwang, and others in Xu Jieshun, *Bentuhua*. For a recent example in social psychology, see Björn Kjellgren, “The Predicament of Indigenization: Constructions and Methodological Consequences of Otherness in Chinese Ethnography,” *Taiwan Journal of Anthropology*, 1.1 (2003): 147–178, and Dirlik, “Theory, History, Culture.”
 17. Yang seems to have wanted to include Singaporean Chinese but did not succeed. Possibly this was due to the Singapore government’s sensitivity about Chinese cultural nationalism as well as to political nationalism, thus making Singaporean scholars apprehensive about participating. As a result, Yang suggested that contributions from Singapore should be for “supplementary” purposes. One obvious reason that Yang did not include mainland China in the framework of the Sinicization campaign at this stage was because of the political bans on all exchanges between Taiwan and mainland China at that time. It should, however, also be borne in mind that Yang, being a modernist and trained in the West, did not think that mainland Chinese scholars were “Westernized or modernized” enough to grasp the complicated issues, given their long isolation from Western social and behavioral studies. Yang later changed his mind, becoming a strong supporter and participant of mainland China’s own indigenization movement beginning in the early 1990s.
 18. Yang and Wen, *Shehuiji xingwei* . . . , i–ii.
 19. *Ibid.*, ii, v.
 20. *Ibid.*, v.
 21. *Ibid.*, vi.
 22. Li Yiyuan and Yang Guoshu (eds.), *Zhongguoren de xingge: Keji zonghexing de taolun* 中國人的性格：科際綜合性的討論 (The Chinese Character: An Interdisciplinary Discussion), Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 1972.
 23. Here my account draws principally on Fu Dawei, “Lishi jiangou, bianchui celiie, yu ‘Zhongguohua’ 歷史建構、邊陲策略、與「中國化」 (Historical Construction, Peripheral Strategies, and “Sinicization”), *Daoyu bianyuan*, 1.1 (1991), 103–127.
 24. Fu’s view is a commonly held analysis of the political situation in 1970s Taiwan. See, e.g., Xiao Aqin 蕭阿勤, “Minzuzhuyi yu Taiwan 1970 niandai de ‘xiangtu wenxue’: Yige wenhua (jiti) jiyi bianqian de tantao 民族主義與台灣一九七〇年代的「鄉土文學」：一個文化(集體)記憶變遷的探討” (Nationalism and Taiwan’s 1970s “Xiangtu Literature”: An Exploration of the Change in Cultural [Collective] Memory), *Taiwan shi yanjiu*, 6.2 (2000): 77–138. At the time, the Republic of China (ROC) not only lost its seat in the United Nations to the People’s Republic of China in 1971, but also lost most of its diplomatic relations with all major countries except for the United States. There was also a territorial dispute over the Diaoyutai 釣魚台 islands (off the northeast coast of Taiwan) with Japan that triggered very strong nationalistic sentiments among students and conscientious intellectuals.
 25. Fu did not define these terms specifically in the paper quoted. I interpret “rule with predatory power” (*tunshizhe quanli* 吞食者權力) to imply the use of brutality and harsh forms of coercion and suppression when confronted by opposition; the second term “harsh yet delicate rule” (*yansu er jingzhi tongzhi* 嚴肅而精緻統治) implies the use of more subtle power, such as persuasion, co-optation, and propaganda education.
 26. Fu, “Lishi jiangou,” 3.
 27. In fact, Fu admitted that he was deliberately preparing to attack this group of liberal-minded positivist scholars in the late 1980s because he wanted to justify his own “radical” movement—a leftist and a deconstructive one by nature—by contrasting it to the position represented by the Sinicization and modernization advocates. See Fu Daiwei, “Wo yu ‘Taishe’ shinian 我與「台社」十年” (My Involvement with “Taishe” over a Decade), http://sts.nthu.edu.tw/dwfu/miscellaneous/taiwan_society.pdf, accessed on January 15, 2004.
 28. This should not be self-contradictory since one’s own “value” can be increased or redeemed through self-analysis or self-criticism.

29. Yang has spent most of his career at the Department of Psychology, National Taiwan University. He served as the head of the department, and is now an honorary emeritus professor. Because of Yang's seemingly incessant attacks on the "blind westernized tendency" that existed within the profession of psychology in Taiwan, his major contributions to the "indigenization of psychology" were not welcomed by the department. The department's official website has no reference to the indigenization of psychology and Yang, along with several other members of the department, is listed as belonging to a small section called "Social and Personality Psychology" of the department.
30. See Yang and Wen, *Shehui ji xingwei* . . . , 209–254.
31. Of course, his resolution to this problem drew little response from his peers in Taiwan in the early 1980s because Taiwan had just begun to pride itself for its "economic miracle" and advances in material prosperity. Taiwan, as the model for China, was not to be regarded as a member of the third world.
32. Although Yang Guoshu had this "degree of Westernization" in mind to separate mainland China from Taiwan and Hong Kong, it meant only that mainland China was irrelevant to this movement, not that there were essentially different "kinds" of Chinese.
33. One should be aware that by international standards Hong Kong academics have been generally very well paid, and privileged by their pro-Western attitudes under the rule of British colonialism. Sincicization thus was really not in their best interests even at the Chinese University of Hong Kong which had a stronger tendency to teach Chinese classics and culture. Also, presumably the conference's American sponsor, the Rockefeller Foundation preferred to see China adopt a more open position toward Western ideas rather than become more "nationalistically" anti-Western.
34. *Peasant Life in China: A Field Study of Country Life in the Yangtze Valley*, London: Routledge, 1937. The later Chinese translation was titled *Jiangcun jingji* 江村經濟 (The Economy of Jiangcun), Hong Kong: Zhonghua shuju, 1987. *From the Soil: The Foundation of Chinese Society*, Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1992 (translation of *Xiangtu Zhongguo* 鄉土中國, Hong Kong: Sanlian shudian, 1985).
35. Qiao Jian (ed.), *Xiandaihua yu Zhongguo wenhua yantaohui lunwen huibian* 現代化與中國文化研討會論文彙編 (Proceedings of the Conference on Modernization and Chinese Culture), Hong Kong: Faculty of Social Science and Institute for Social Research, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1985, v–vi.
36. See Dirlik, "Theory, History, Culture."
37. Li Yiyuan et al. (eds.), *Xiandaihua yu Zhongguohua lunji*, Taipei: Guiguan tushu gongsi, 1984.
38. In any case, in 1984, papers by mainland scholars were not allowed to be published in Taiwan, regardless of quality and suitability.
39. Since the early 1990s, even Yang Guoshu, Huang Guangguo, and Ye Qizheng have felt the obligation and need to travel to China to teach their respective disciplines. Li Yiyuan was also invited to the mainland several times as a leading international promoter of the study of China and pioneer in the Sincicization of Anthropology.

40. This group also included one Taiwan sociologist, Xiao Xinhuang, who was a visiting scholar at Boston University at the time.
41. Cai was then a professor of sociology at the Texas Technology University at Lubbock, a remote city in Texas. When describing the genesis of the meeting, he recalled how, one evening in March, 1983, he had awakened from a nightmare and could not go back to sleep. He began to have flashbacks of his whole life, from his time in Taiwan until he became a sociologist in the United States. He was startled by the progress of sociology in Taiwan and the revival of sociology in China. He was puzzled by the universality claim of sociology, modernization, and Westernization, and the value or meaning of his own work (or his life?). Inner feelings of doubt became "so vivid, so compelling, just like a long resting volcano that was about to erupt." Cai Yongmei and Xiao Xinhuang (eds.), *Shehuixue Zhongguohua* 社會學中國化 (Sincicization of Sociology), Taipei: Jiulu chubanshe, 1985, 2.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., 330. Because of the small number of Chinese sociologists of Chinese origin, then resident in the United States, and the even smaller number who actually participated, this meeting was conducted as a colloquium of acquaintances and friends, rather than a serious conference. Its English title was somewhat different: "Sincicization of Sociology: A Collective Portrait of Some American Trained Chinese Sociologists," but its Chinese title was: "Shehuixue Zhongguohua: Lü Mei Zhongguo shehuixuejia de ruogan guandian" 社會學中國化：旅美中國社會學家的若干觀點 (Sincicizing Sociology: Some Views of Chinese Sociologists Residing in the United States).
44. The volume under discussion was used as the primary source for Arif Dirlik's analysis of the Sincicization movement of sociology in Dirlik, "Theory, History, Culture." Apparently he failed to recognize the multiple facets of the movement and the significance of this go-between phenomenon for Chinese-American sociologists, a group that should be distinguished from other "native" sociologists working in their "native" country.
45. In fact, the paper he wrote was intended for a broader and different audience: the Western Division Conference of the Association for Asian Studies; it was not intended for Chinese readers. It was first written in English and then translated into Chinese by Tu Zhaoqing 涂肇慶.
46. Lin was very active in the North American Chinese Sociologists Association that he founded in 1982. He also served as chair for the Department of Sociology, State University of New York at Albany between 1979 and 1982. Since the early 1980s he has also helped to educate many mainland Chinese sociologists at Nankai University, Tianjin, and in the United States.
47. Lin was relatively more successful and active than his Chinese sociologist peers based in the United States at that time. His viewpoint does not represent the views of other contributors to the book. I have selected Lin for particular discussion because of his relatively prominent position among his peers.
48. Cai Yongmei, in Cai and Xiao, *Shehuixue Zhongguohua*, 14–15.
49. Li was a professor at the Catholic University of America, and was one of the few Chinese-American scholars who spent some time teaching at Nankai

- University in Tianjin in the early 1980s to revive Western-oriented sociology in China. This section of dialogue is titled "Toushi sanshi nianlai haixia liang'an shehuixue de fazhan 透視三十年來海峽兩岸社會學的發展" (Penetrating the Fundamentals of the Developments of Sociology over the Past Thirty Years on Both Sides of the Taiwan Strait).
50. Cai and Xiao, *Shehuixue Zhongguohua*, 316.
 51. Unlike two years later, this was, of course, an exaggeration of the state of political freedom that existed in 1984.
 52. See chapter 2 by Fu-chang Wang in this volume for a discussion on this topic.
 53. Wen Chongyi, "Zhongguo de shehuixue: Guojihua huo guojiahua: 中國的社會學：國際化或國家化" (Chinese Sociology: Internationalization or Nationalization), *Zhongguo shehuixue kan*, 15 (1991): 1-28.
 54. *Ibid.*, 18, 19, 20.
 55. Wen Chongyi's evasiveness on the sensitive issue of choosing appropriate wording can be found in his comments in the forum on "Sociology in China: Problems and Prospects," *Zhongguo shehuixue kan*, 7 (1983): 319. He said: "This term, *Zhongguohua*, can stir up some emotional reactions. But we have not been able to find an appropriate substitute word for it over the sixty-nine years of the Republic. This is to say that we cannot find a better term to express our emphasis on the things (*dongxi* 東西) inside our own culture. We hope that no one will react emotionally to this term."
 56. Wen Chongyi, *ibid.*, 21, fn. 2.
 57. Xu Zhengguang 徐正光 "Yige yanjiu dianfan de xingcheng yu bianqian: Chen Shaoxin 'Zhongguo shehui wenhua yanjiu de shiyanshi: Taiwan' yiwen de chongtan 一個研究典範的形成與變遷：陳紹馨 '中國社會文化研究的實驗室——台灣' 一文的 重探" (The Formation and Vicissitudes of a Research Paradigm: A Re-Evaluation of "A Laboratory for the Study of Chinese Society and Culture: Taiwan" by Chen Shaoxin), *Zhongguo shehuixue kan*, 15 (1991): 29-40.
 58. Chen Shaoxin, "Zhongguo shehui wenhua yanjiu de shiyanshi: Taiwan 中國社會文化研究的實驗室：台灣" (A Laboratory for the Study of Chinese Society and Culture: Taiwan), *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan minzusuo jikan*, 22 (1966): 1-14.
 59. The word "*zhutixing* 主體性" is difficult to translate into English. Ostensibly it is a synonym for the English word "subjectivity," but it can also have the meanings of being a "desirable," "unspoiled," "autonomous," or "authentic" subjectivity.
 60. Xu Zhengguang, "Yige yanjiu dianfan . . .," 31.
 61. *Ibid.*, 31-32.
 62. *Ibid.*, 34.
 63. *Ibid.*, 35.
 64. The leaders of the Sinicization movement, however, had always wanted to connect themselves to the "greater" intellectual tradition in China associated with either the May Fourth Movement of 1919 or with the early founders of sociology in China.
 65. Xu Zhengguang, "Yige yanjiu dianfan . . .," 36.
 66. *Ibid.*, 38.
 67. *Ibid.*, 38.
 68. *Ibid.*, 37.
 69. On this topic, A-chin Hsiao, *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism*, London: Routledge, 2000, provides an in-depth analysis.
 70. Ardent Taiwanese scholars can do very little about the international state of the "China Studies" field that boasts so many reputable and well-funded establishments and programs outside of Taiwan; many more than are devoted to Taiwan Studies.
 71. See, for instance, Qiao Jian et al., *21 shiji de Zhongguo . . .*, and Xu Jiashun, *Bentuhua*.
 72. The journal publishes articles written in Chinese, and although based in Taiwan it has many contributors from other *Huaren* communities. The journal has been surprisingly open to the critics of indigenization and does not take an exclusive stand in supporting Yang and the movement.
 73. See Yang Guoshu, "Women weishenme yao jianli Zhongguoren de bentu xinlixue 我們為什麼要建立中國人的本土心理學" (Why We Want to Establish Indigenous Chinese Psychology), *Bentu xinlixue yanjiu*, 1 (1993): 63, fn. 1.
 74. Yang Guoshu, "Bentu qihexing jiqi xiangguan wenti de lunzheng 本土契合性及其相關問題的論證" (Arguments for "Local Correlation" and Other Related Issues), *Bentu xinlixue yanjiu*, 8 (1997): 85.
 75. *Ibid.*, 231-233.
 76. Yang Guoshu, "Women weishenme yao jianli Zhongguoren de bentu xinlixue," 113-114.
 77. One of the recent examples was the conference in Hong Kong, which resulted in the publication of Qiao Jian et al., *21 shiji de Zhongguo . . .*, 2001.
 78. See, e.g., Xu Jiashun, *Bentuhua*.
 79. Xie Guoxiong, *Chun laodong: Taiwan laodong tizhi zhulun*, Taipei: Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, 1997, 347.
 80. Kjellgren, "The Predicament of Indigenization." However, Kjellgren's main argument against Sinicization in Taiwan was limited since he relied narrowly on an analytical reading of Yang and his former student, Huang Guangguo, now also a well-known advocate for cultural conservatism. He is especially critical of Huang's essentializing tendency regarding the uniqueness of Chinese culture and his misconceptualization of the West. See pages 154-155, in particular.
 81. In fact, as I have shown, Ye Qizheng and Xu Zhengguang were both critical of naïve attempts to essentialize Chinese culture and society. Ye Qizheng, "Bianchuxing yu xueshu fazhan: Zailun kexue Zhongguohua 邊陲性與學術發展：再論科學中國化" (Peripherality and Academic Development: Further Discussion of Scientific Sinicization), in Li, Yang, and Wen, *Xiandaihua yu . . .*, 221-262; Xu Zhengguang, "Yige yanjiu . . ." In advancing Sinicization, Yang Guoshu himself cautioned against becoming ignorant of the West, although he cannot be said to be well versed in either the philosophy of social science or the historical formation of the West.
 82. In fact, in 1991, Xu Zhengguang had already made similar criticisms of other Sinicization advocates, even though he also advocated indigenization, but in the name of "Taiwanese identity and subjectivity."

83. Kjellgren, "The Predicament of Indigenization," 157–158, made another mistake by lumping the Academia Sinica (Taiwan) and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (China) together by saying: "neither has a tradition of sending anthropologists overseas to conduct research," and hence, "in this respect, China is like most other third world countries." The truth is that both institutions, supported by their respective governments, have been keen to provide funds for researchers—albeit relatively less compared to the funding available to their Western counterparts—to study the "outside world" when deemed important for national interests.
84. In our review of the indigenization movement, the gender difference has not been broached since all of the advocates are male. Yet this is not to say that gender is not a factor in social and academic power struggles.
85. For instance, in the special issue of *Bentü xinlixue yanjiu*, 8 (1997), one finds how critical Yang's most loyal followers—such as Huang Guangguo, Ye Qizheng, and Yu Dehui 余德惠—are. Sometimes they are unreasonably critical of each other through misrepresentation and misunderstanding.
86. This is best illustrated by the journal, *International Sociology*, launched by the International Sociological Association in 1986. In the Foreword of the first issue of its publication, the then president of the ISA, Fernando H. Cardoso, articulated the need to go beyond "provincial" perspectives that are limited to the Western cultural and American functionalistic traditions. Against an imagination of a normal science of sociology, he advocated the need: "to increase our knowledge about contemporary societies and sociologies, by showing pluralistic paths of concern in sociology rooted in different historical and cultural traditions." See *International Sociology*, 1.1 (1987): 2. Also, Frederick Garreau contributed a very lengthy essay in *Current Sociology* to address the issue of cultural–regional/local–national concerns versus general theory concerns in sociology. See his "The Multinational Version of Social Science with Emphasis upon the Discipline of Sociology," *Current Sociology*, 33.3 (1985): 1–169. For discussions of indigenization concerns in India and in South Korea, see T. K. Oommen, "The Nature of Sociological Research and Practice Worldwide: A Perspective from India," *International Sociology*, 3.3 (1988): 309–312, and Myoung-kyu Park and Chang Kyung-sup "Sociology between Western Theory and Korean Reality: Accommodation, Tension and a Search for Alternatives," *International Sociology*, 14.2 (1999): 139–156.
87. Wallerstein et al., *Open the Social Sciences*.
88. The publication of the first "indigenized textbook" is an illustration of this "reproduction effort." For a general analysis, see Zhang Yinghua, "Shehuixue zai Taiwan," 97–116; see also Qu Haiyuan, "Shehuixue kecheng neirong yu Taiwan shehui yanjiu 社會學課程內容與台灣社會研究" (The Curriculum Content of Sociology and the Study of Taiwan Society), *Taiwan shehui xuekan*, 21 (1998): 1–20.