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CHAPTER 2 ON THE ORIGINS AND TRANSFORMATION OF TAIWANESE NATIONAL IDENTITY

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This chapter intends to explain the many sources of and historical changes in Taiwanese identity (*Taiwanren rendong*). But first it is important to explain what the word identity means in this chapter. The term national identity is usually referred to as feelings, sentiments, and bonds that people feel for their own country, or nation. But this emphasis on sentiment could be misleading in our understanding of the problem of nationalism or nationalistic conflict as mainly a reflection of emotional or primordial conflicts—or conflicts caused by the human need for belonging. In fact, national identity arises, or emerges for reasons that are much broader than sentiment and the need for belonging; and it is always constituted with normative discourse, argued and supported with forceful moral-political claims. This is the reason for people of nationalistic thinking genuinely believing that they are the "righteous" people with a justifiable moral base. The question of nationalistic identity, therefore, becomes the question of the moral horizons of the group of individuals who are considered to be nationalistic.

National identity is also interpreted by some as the consequence of the indoctrination of nationalism, which is nothing but a strategically created ideology. They believe that nationalism is a tool employed by nationalistic elite for the purposes of industrialization, the advancement of class power, the hegemonic domination of the populace, or the suppression of the "others."¹ It is very true that nationalism does have instrumental values, which could even lead to atrocities in extreme. People in such situations often call upon national identity to coordinate their actions. Consequently, it is crucial for scholars to be sensitive to

the conflation between nationalistic claims and its analysis.² Not only should scholars be against the stereotypes and the bias people might have when making nationalistic claims, but they should also be faithful to the interpretation of the past that the nationalists usually want to appropriate for their purposes.

However, seeing nationalism merely as a political doctrine or an engineered nation-building project does not help us to understand the compelling moral force that more than often obliges people to undertake this doctrine. Nor can this help us to understand the significant meanings of existence that many people attribute to their nationalistic standing. For our study of Taiwanese identity, I think that Charles Taylor's recent works on the formation of the identity and the making of self in the modern era are helpful. For instance, Taylor argued in his book titled *The Sources of the Self* that first, an individual's "self" can be understood only in terms of its "narratives," the stories that can be told about oneself. And the "self" can never be understood in its abstract meaning.³ Second, the answer people have for the question "who am I" cannot escape from the moral domain of that person. The answer for "who am I," or "what is my identity" can never be understood as a mere description of a static "fact." The answer actually "provides the frame within which they can determine where they stand on questions of what is good, worthwhile, admirable, or of value."⁴ For Taylor, self-identity is understood as a moral framework, a horizon of meanings through which people make out the significance of things that they have experienced, and things that have surrounded and constituted them. Taylor believes this is so because the fundamental quality of human agency cannot but "orient to the good." Only under conditions of humiliation or suppression, do we find people forced to compromise their integrity with self-denial and self-mutilation. To situate one's past experience in relation to "the good" thus provides meaning for one's life, and determines the direction of one's life as well.⁵

Taylor asks us to study the moral aspect of nationalism and national identity. We cannot limit our understanding of nationalism to just its instrumental value or to its ideological nature. A fuller understanding of national identity requires the recognition of this normative orientation. Only by recognizing it, can we understand the collectively compelling aspect of national identity. The research question of national identity in this chapter is similar. It is shifted away from both the study of primordial feelings or political ideologies, to the study of the ontology people have for themselves in relation to the national question under different historical conditions.

The second term we need to clarify is the term "nation." We all know that it is an elusive term with many meanings in various Western languages. Its Chinese equivalent *minzu* is the same. Chinese nationalists first borrowed the term *minzu* from the Japanese modernists during the late nineteenth century when the Social Darwinism was still prevalent. But the term has been attributed to with different meanings. In its early usage it contained the notion of people from the same lineage (or "race," *zhongzu*). And this meaning is still remembered occasionally, when used by ordinary people, especially among the older generation, in their political discussions. The term can also mean state-nation (*guozu*), the people as a whole consisting of many subnational groups in a multinational state, as many contemporary social scientists would prefer. It can also refer to a culturally or supposedly "racially" distinctive people, such as a minority or an indigenous people as it is used in mainland China now. On the other hand, it can mean the compatriots in general or "all" of the citizens. Or, it can refer to the political entity that governs the people (the sovereign country, or a synonym when referring to *the* government). As the historical context shifts, or the situation changes, the use of the same word can have different meanings. It is unfortunate that we will have to bear with these ambiguities from time to time as this discussion develops. This is so because discourses of what constitutes a nation (whether that is a Chinese or Taiwanese nation) have taken on so many forms and directions. People in Taiwan don't necessarily agree with each other about what the term means for them. And, surely, it can be used just for making different political claims. I don't think there is any way that we can get around this ambiguity when exploring the origins and development of Taiwanese national identity.

In short, this chapter suggests that the study of Taiwanese identity should be about the study of the origins and changes of the meaning of existence, the normative discourse, and the "correct" directions or strategic actions people believe they should take to define themselves. When we ask what it means to be a nationalistic Taiwanese, we are actually asking what the moral horizons are for a nationalistic Taiwanese. As I have said earlier, since there is always an intention involved when people try to argue for a distinctive and categorical identity, we must also recognize and explore the divergences of the origins, such as who were the leaders, and what were their class and ethnic backgrounds. In this chapter I will argue that the origin of Taiwanese nationalistic ideas can be traced back to at least the 1920s. But the "maturation" of Taiwanese identity, or the convergence of many sources, did not take place until the late 1980s, and it is still not a fully grown nationalism in the present day.

I hope I can show also that this convergence and development is not an inevitable consequence of ethno-conflicts nor an asymmetrical ethnic relation between the mainlanders and Taiwanese, although it is now generally interpreted as such.

Being Han-Chinese Settlers in Taiwan

It is important to note in the beginning that before any of the settlers, Taiwan was inhabited by different aboriginal peoples.⁶ They are the "real" natives who have lived in Taiwan beginning from approximately 6,000 years ago. According to Taiwan's civic registration, still there are about 340,000 indigenous people in Taiwan, equivalent to 1.6 percent of the total population. It is unfortunate that the people who are normally addressed as the "native Taiwanese" by foreign press and political scientists does not refer to the indigenous population but to the descendants of early Han-Chinese settlers in Taiwan. The early settlers migrated to Taiwan beginning from the late sixteenth century from Hokkien and Canton Provinces in southeast China. In 1684, Emperor Kangxi of the Manchu Dynasty made portions of central and southern Taiwan a prefecture under the jurisdiction of the Hokkien Province.

Two studies about the Han settlers in late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Taiwan are important for our understanding of how people were organized and what their identities were. One study was done by Li Kuo-ch'i about the "*neidihua*" of Taiwan around the 1880s.⁷ *Neidihua* refers to the process by which Taiwan was elevated by the Manchu government from its low priority and low-level ranking in the Empire to become like the more "civilized" or established part (the "in-land") of the mainland, or to become like other "normal" provinces in the mainland. At that time, able Manchu officials explored natural resources, infrastructure and industry, explore natural resources, acquire aboriginal territory, and promote the "pacification" and "culturalization" of the aboriginal populations. The political goal of the government was to build a stronger national defense of this island to fence off foreigners' encroachment along the southern and eastern coast of China.

The other study was done by Chen Chi-nan about "*bentuhua*" or the localization and indigenization of the Han settlers.⁸ Citing evidence of changing patterns of intergroup rivalries or conflicts (*xiehdou*), he was able to demonstrate that after settling in Taiwan for more than one century, people gradually developed new territorial identities rooted in Taiwan. They were now less divided by their differences in ancestral lineage linked to different hometowns in the mainland, than by their

pragmatic interests around their territorial and local bases, whether that was a village, alliances of several villages, or a regional township. In short, the settlers began to identify with their settlements in Taiwan and make their settlements their new homeland.

What can we derive from these two studies in relation to the later development of Taiwanese identity? The answer is, without a doubt, that the Chinese and Han civilization was the ruling culture that prevailed on top of the settlers' society. As Li guochi argues, Taiwan was becoming more "civilized," abandoning its "aboriginality" and frontier status, so to speak, from the viewpoint of high culture and the political authorities. Chen Chi-nan depiction that social attachment to regional community in Taiwan was already developed among the settlers was also true. Li looked at the changing politics from above, while Chen looked at the changing of social organization and the formation of local identities from below.

Today, some Taiwanese nationalistic historians and politicians claim that the concept of "being Taiwanese" or "defining one's self as Taiwanese" is about "four-hundred-years" old (since the late sixteenth century). This cannot be true since the collective imagination of "being Taiwanese" cannot be found before 1895. Before 1895, both the first settlers and their descendants were all looking at China as their place of origin, as the political center, and as their source of cultural practices and ancestral lineage. They were, rather, the *Hanren*, descendants of the Han, who practiced Han ancestor worship and other folk (or "popular," *minjian*) religious practices. Social communication was very limited due to the lack of modern transportation systems. The great majority of the settlers were confined to an agrarian economy that depended on the fertility of the land and wide-spread use of irrigation systems. Their identities were, therefore, very regional, bonded to the here-and-now, to their land and their villages in Taiwan. As for the better-off families, they were eager for imperial titles and official recognition. They pushed their children to study for the official examination of Han classical (*guwen*) literature and Chinese/Confucian moral classics (the *Sishu*, or *Four Books*), in order to gain power and high status. They used generous donations as means to obtain titles. In conclusion, the settlers as a whole could not perceive themselves as one larger "imagined community," or one larger group called "Taiwanese" that could be conceived of as substantially different from the Han-Chinese.

By any measure, Taiwanese nationalistic identity was not forged during that time, nor could it be called as such. The historical and socio-cultural conditions were just not there. It is arguably true that even in

were sent to Taiwan

mainland China there was no significant Chinese nationalistic project until the early twentieth century. There were, in place, many ideas and discourses about saving China from foreign encroachment, and the ways to build China into a "wealthy" and "strong" nation since the late nineteenth century. But the Chinese intellectuals, in general, were at the most only in a process of defining themselves as a "coherent national intelligentsia," and not yet awakened to the Chinese Nationalistic call before 1895, the year of defeat and humiliation at the loss of war with Japan.⁹

The Awakening to Alien Power and Identity Crisis

China and Japan went to war in 1895 because of disputes over a political crisis in Korea. China was defeated convincingly by the new rising power in Asia. Taiwan was ceded to Japan in the *Treaty of Shimonoseki* as Japan's first major trophy on its way to imperialism.

The Han agricultural settlers, who were tied to their land and their territories, had responded with bloody resistance to the invasion of Japanese troops in the first two years. They were referred to as "the righteous army" (*yichun*) consisting of mainly ordinary people, led and supported by gentry and landlords from the same region, or from some regional alliances.¹⁰ And yet their resistance was anything but nationalistic. As one famous Taiwanese writer, the late Wu Chuo-liu, has suggested, these desperate, nearly hopeless, and yet very brave people were not guided by modern national consciousness, but rather, by traditional Han folk consciousness when defending their own hometowns. They had no escape but to do the "right" thing, to go to war against foreign invaders. Their defensive actions were not different from their ancestors in the past when confronted by intruding bandits or rebels.¹¹ And they were not armed with demands for dignity, respect, or self-determination of the type that Taylor had theorized would fit a situation of this type. Their resistance actions "become" nationalistic only after such actions were interpreted as such by present-day nationalists.

The frequency and scale of armed resistance dwindled in the following years but continued to take place until 1915. After the gentry and peasant rebellion had been subdued, a more "marginal sector" of the society, such as people lacking property, continued to maintain the anti-imperialist struggle when pressed by the Japanese police. They originated from groups with strong solidarity and, sometimes, of devotees to one or another of the Han popular religious sects. In general, however, this kind of resistance was non-nationalistic except for one special case, when

its leader was actually inspired by the Republican Revolution of 1911 and the actions of Kuomintang in southern China.¹²

The Japanese looked down upon the backwardness and the lack of a modern outlook of the Chinese settlers who had been abandoned by the Qing government. Within the new Japanese Empire, Chinese in Taiwan was regarded as a different "race." Japanese had employed brutal measures to crack down resistance, and had built a system that was protected and sponsored by the colonial government for the exploitation of both the Taiwanese farmers and the aboriginal tribal peoples in the interests of Japanese conglomerates. Armed with the special provision of the notorious "Bill no. 63" (1896–1920), and the "3-1 Bill" which followed, the Governor General of Taiwan (*Taiwan Sotoku*) was largely free from any of the accountability to the Imperial Diet in Tokyo. The Governor General, the supreme commander of the military and police, was the highest administrator, and the sole lawmaker for the new colony and thus was, virtually, the "emperor" of Taiwan. Ordinary Taiwanese people were organized according to the civic registration system—the *baojia* system—and under that system (one that had been adopted from the Chinese system of the Qing), neighbors were held accountable for each other's unlawful activities. Death sentences were given, except for a few exceptions, to anyone who was found to be involved with armed resistance under the terms of the infamous *Decree against the Bandits*.

But from 1914 to 1918, progressive minded Japanese political activist *Itagaki Taisuke* spoke for the assimilation of the Taiwanese "race" into the Japanese "race," and for the eventual "normalization" of Taiwan's status as a "natural extension" of the more established part of Japan. It was argued that both the Taiwanese and Japanese shared many "racial" similarities. Once the Taiwanese would have achieved "an appropriate civilization level like the Japanese" (through some nationalistic educational program, perhaps), and learned the civic virtues and loyalty to the emperor, Taiwan and the Taiwanese could eventually become no different from, or become equal to the rest of Japan and the Japanese.

It was attractive for the colonized Taiwanese but only until the early 1920s. About five hundred people (mainly Taiwanese but also some Japanese) joined together to organize the first modern Taiwanese political organization—*Taiwan Dokakai* (or *Taiwan Tonghuahui*, the Taiwan Association for Assimilation)—to promote these ideas. These Taiwanese had hoped to work with those Japanese who were sympathetic to Taiwanese desires to achieve equality under the new circumstances. Of course, the assimilation argument the Japanese presented could not possibly offer

asking the Taiwanese to admit their deficiencies and to accept their backward status. Like assimilation strategies everywhere, the Japanese policy of assimilation was inevitably hypocritical: It pre-supposed the existence of a long-term hierarchical relationship under the pretense of achieving eventual equality. The desire for assimilation actually reflected the humiliation of the first-generation Taiwanese elites under the Japanese. It was the consequence of their self-denial and fear of condemnation from their conqueror. Segregated from their cultural and political roots—China, their traditional Han civilization, as it existed on Taiwan, and their larger worldview—their sense of being “Chinese”—were smashed and could not be rejuvenated in the face of such a total defeat. Though ordinary people still maintained Han traditions and morality for their basic group identification, this traditional knowledge and social sensibility now could not help the elite classes to re-orient themselves to the unprecedented colonial situation that had been created by such a powerful intruder.

Contemporaries tended to interpret the Taiwanese elite's shortlived fantasy for assimilation into Japan, and for the desire to become equal citizens of the Japanese Empire as these elites' first strategy of resistance. But it can be better understood as a sign of a collective identity crisis among the Taiwanese elite under the Japanese. These elites that were trying to get hold of themselves—to recover their dignity and sense of honor in the face of a massive defeat that was so humiliating that it placed pressure upon them to deny their own past.

Different Paths to Home Rule

If we look at the decade from 1918 to 1928, we can find that from the youthful to the urban middle-class, from the great metropolises of Tokyo, Shanghai, and Peking to cities in Taiwan like Taichung and Taipei, Taiwanese elite were eager to look for new means for self-organization, and to a new language to help them understand and deal with their past humiliations and their existing set of depressing every day realities. This decade thus became a time of new ideas and new political thinking not only for the Han-Chinese in Taiwan, but also for those in China and in the heart of the colonial empire that was Japan.

Without any doubt the Taiwanese still considered themselves as basically Hanren, but the Han-Chinese tradition they used to cherish was no longer useful to them within the new colonial context that they found themselves in. And as they were all too well aware, on the other side of Taiwan Straits, the Chinese people had begun transforming

themselves in the fluid political and social conditions of a China under the successive regimes created by the 1911 Republican Revolution. China was now taking on a historical trajectory that was vastly different from Taiwan's existence as Japanese colony and a part of an evolving Japanese sociocultural order: It was struggling to become a “modern” nation-state. Taiwan's situation was seen as impossible to reverse by both Chinese and Taiwanese at that moment in time: Thus the Taiwanese people, the new elites believed, had no other choice but to accept the status of being a Japanese nationality, and being a different “racial” group, but one of Chinese origin under, the Japanese Empire.

Although from many different places in Taiwan and in Japan, and with diverse ideological and class backgrounds, Taiwanese activists involved in resistance to the Japanese shared both common sets of knowledge and commonly shared sets of beliefs. These can be summed up as follows: (1) for the first time there was the general understanding of the fact that Taiwan was a colony and of the harsh reality that the Taiwanese people were being oppressed as a *colonized people*, or nation; (2) it was also understood that the Taiwanese people needed to struggle for “home-rule,” whether it meant the creation of a representative council (as suggested by the right-wing reformists), or the total independence and liberation of the Taiwanese Minzu (as suggested by the communists); and (3) in order to accomplish “home-rule,” these movements needed the involvement of ordinary people (or the masses). It should be clear that both the origins of the idea of Taiwanese nationalism and the ways of turning that idea into substantive reality were conceived during this period. This process can thus be seen as a search for a defined meaning of existence by many Taiwanese activists who were attempting to re-orient the “self” to the common good of a group of people—or polity—now called the “Taiwanese nation.” Their efforts coincided with Taiwan's colonial conditions and anticolonial ideas developing in this region, as well as in the larger global context of the 1920s, which I will discuss in the next section.

Resisting Colonialism and Taiwanese Identity

Many Taiwanese activists of the 1920s and 1930s were from a younger generation of Taiwanese intellectuals, who were fortunate enough to go to the metropolis to learn about modern ideas and Western thinking through Japan's mediation. In the year 1920, there were about 400 young Taiwanese students in Japan, and the number increased very quickly to 2,000.¹³ Tokyo became a major source of ideas for the Taiwanese

home-rule movement. It is important to recognize the significance of the expansion of the horizons of young Taiwanese intellectuals who were not just looking back to Chinese traditionalism like the older generation.

In the metropolis, they were able to discover that the oppression that Taiwanese suffered as a result of colonialism was not an isolated phenomenon. Rather, they discovered that it was a part of the situation common to that experienced by those in many of the colonized nations that were found in the world of the 1920s throughout the world. And the solution to this problem was found in the most prominent philosophy for ending colonialism after World War I—the Wilsonian principle of self-determination. Further, it was thought that the League of Nations (nation-states) would become the international forum for the maintenance of the peace in the new world. In fact, it was an era of the dissolution of many of the old empires in Europe. By coincidence, it was also a democratic era in Japan, the era of *Taisho Minshu* (democracy in the Taisho years). Japan was trying to transform itself from a centralized bureaucratic state, forged in the Meiji period, into a system of parliamentary party politics and democracy. Progressive and democratic Japanese figures had also entertained the idea of equal rule or self-governance for their colonies when questioning the government's colonial policy.

It is clear that since the 1920s, people had already begun to define the Taiwanese people as a collectivity, a distinct "nation" ruled by the Japanese colonial government. "Taiwan," as a signifier for the place and the people as a whole, had been widely adopted. It appeared in the names of many social and political organizations, study groups, and in the political analyses of Taiwan's colonial conditions. The term "Taiwanese" appeared in their writings, their arguments, their feelings for, and in their plans for collective actions. The image of the Taiwanese as a whole, a people with distinctive national qualities, was surely conceived in their minds at this point in time.

But when arguing for the distinctiveness of the Taiwanese, these activists were also very clear and quick to resort to Han-Chinese tradition, their basic roots. The term "nation" in their minds was like a cultural-racial category providing the "natural" and the "real" meanings of existence under the Japanese. The term was much less like the "created" or "man-made" political notion calling for Taiwan independence, which took place later in the post-World War II period. And this call for distinctiveness was definitely not relevant to the calling for an unequivocal separation from China and the Chinese.¹⁴ As lifelong Taiwanese nationalist and sociologist, Huang Zhaotang, wrote about the resistance groups back then: "even if they promoted the idea of Taiwanese independence,

and their notion of Taiwanese Nation was clearly distinct from the Japanese Nation, the Taiwanese Nation was not to be different from, and were mixed up with the Chinese Nation."¹⁵

The call for the collective existence of the Taiwanese at that time could be understood not just as an inspiration for a distinctive national identity, but could also be seen in putting them in an ethno-national "sandwich." People were stuck between their Chinese heritage on the one hand, and their institutional Japanese nationality on the other. They could not feel comfortable being Chinese, because they were cutoff from China, and were despised for having Chinese roots. On the other hand, they could not be Japanese either, for they were treated as unqualified colonial subjects pressed into assimilation.

The consciousness of this dilemma was articulated succinctly by renowned resistance activist and medical doctor Jiang Weishui during the founding of the first Taiwanese movement organization, the *Taiwan Cultural Association* (*Taiwan Wenhu xiehui*) in 1921, itself an epoch-making gathering of Taiwanese intellectuals and middle-class professionals. Jiang and his peers felt that the condition of the people in Taiwan originated from the defeat of China in 1895, and the continuing hostility between the Chinese and Japanese. The Taiwanese were a branch of the Chinese nation forced to take on Japanese nationality with lower status in Taiwan because of the conflict between the two large nations. Since then the Taiwanese were trapped in the middle and were thus victimized; If Japan and China could become friendly toward each other, not only the Taiwanese, but also Asia and the entire world would have benefited.¹⁶

One of the most noted and lasting home-rule movement was the Petition Movement for Taiwan Council (*yihui qingyuan yundong*). It lasted from 1921 till 1935. It was begun by groups of Taiwanese youth in Tokyo. The movement was then pushed forward by the Taiwanese gentry and by those members of the new middle class who had received a Japanese education and who then had become white-collar professionals—bankers, doctors, teachers, and writers—in both Taiwan's urban zones and in the rural townships. Constrained by their class origins, they often distanced themselves from the more radical socio-political movements of the left-wing Taiwanese. Famous leaders among them were Lin Xsiatang, Yang zhaojia, and Jiang Weishui, all individuals who first participated in this movement before moving into the leftist camp. They had engaged in activities like opposing the exclusive and the discriminative "Bill no. 63," lobbying and petitioning the Imperial Diet and the Governor General for the establishment of an elected council

representing the Taiwanese. Such a council would have served the government and allowed the Taiwanese leaders to speak for the Taiwanese majority and balance *Taiwan Sotoku's* supreme authority. They had also published newspapers, magazines, and organized lectures and drama tours around the island to promote the idea and the necessity of a Taiwan Council to the public. In general, their resistance strategies had been modest and elitist and their activities had been undertaken with sympathetic support from more progressive Japanese intellectuals and Diet members.

This movement fell apart soon after the escalation of the second Sino-Japan War in 1937. Pressure from rising fascism in Japan and the *Kominka* movement (cf. later) in Taiwan was too heavy for them to carry on any social or political reform or a form of negotiation with their Japanese masters. The colonial government managed to appoint leaders of the movement to symbolic council positions and tried to win their endorsement for Taiwanese assimilation with honorable status. But the Japanese never granted their wishes for a genuine Taiwan Council. To entice Taiwanese assimilation, the Japanese authorities were willing to offer Taiwanese elites only limited local political participation through various appointments and through indirect election in the last two years of its rule in Taiwan.

We need to take note that Japan was not the only place where the search of Taiwanese national identity was taking place. Taiwanese people were also inspired by the Republican Revolution in China since it had begun in 1911 and the movements that evolved out of that event such as Sun Yat-sun's development and promotion of an ideology of a quasi-Western-style Chinese nationalism, and the *May Fourth Movement*, with its stress upon a new Chinese culture oriented toward Western values and structures and its promotion of a more sophisticated, elite-led nationalism. The spread of Stalinism and Communist internationalism after World War I in Shanghai and Tokyo also influenced Taiwanese leftists like Xie Xuehong. These impacts on the entire Taiwanese resistance camp, now often played down by Taiwanese nationalists, were very significant.

This was especially true for the Taiwanese Communist Party established in Shanghai in 1927. The party had adopted an internationalist platform—a united front of all oppressed and colonized nations to overthrow feudalism and imperialism. Its ultimate goal was to strive for Taiwanese national independence (*Taiwan minzu duli*) and overthrow the Japanese. It was actually the first political program that advocated an unequivocal Taiwanese nation and independence. As Chen Fangming¹⁷ has written convincingly, the Taiwanese Communist Party and their

secret network were very active in penetrating many of the sociocultural movements in Taiwan, ranging from the farmers' association, workers' strikes, and other cultural and political resistance groups.¹⁸ It should not be a surprise to us that the early Taiwanese leftists and the modest opposition who opted for the system reform with a Taiwan Council were often at fierce competition and at odds with each other.¹⁹ But the conservative wing appeared to have more visibility and enjoyed wider claims at that time because their petition activities were often within the tolerance limit prescribed by the colonial government.

Reaching Out to the Populace: A Language Hurdle

For those who have had the privilege of access to metropolitan ideas, plus some others in the newly emerging middle strata of society, the notion of a Taiwanese people struggling to obtain control of its own destiny has gradually become significant. They acquired the necessary level of linguistic sophistication to promote strategies redefining their own existence under the colonial situation, and the ability to work on their identity problems in relation to China and Japan. But the general public found it much more difficult to comprehend. The worldviews or the sociocultural perspectives of the majority of Taiwanese before 1915, were not very different from those of people in China. More than 80 percent of the adult population were poorly educated farmers. They were living in poverty with little opportunity for education. They were also exploited by both Japanese colonial economic interests and large Taiwanese landlords. The greatest obstacle to reach these illiterate masses was, of course, the suppression of political activities in Taiwan by the Japanese police. The other problem was the language gap between the elite and the masses.

Very few studies have asked this question: How did or could the more enlightened class spread their interpretation of the meaning of being Taiwanese and their ideas about home rule to the majority of Taiwanese, who ranged from rural gentry and small landlords, to traditional Han literati, to the illiterate masses of farm workers and peasants? Only one newspaper, published by activists in Taipei, and with the largest daily circulation being around 2,000 copies, could be thought of as a major forum for public discourses. And, after 1937, the Taiwanese were completely forbidden to use Chinese characters. Before 1937, the major hurdle for the diffusion of ideas was the problem of finding an adequate writing system that could be easily comprehended by the less educated.

Except for the aboriginal groups, the two common dialects used most in Taiwan were the southern Hokkien (or the *Hoklo* dialect) and the Hakka. These two dialects (with many accent variations) were mutually unintelligible and were without written form. And the traditional writing system used in Taiwan had been classical Chinese, which was accessible only to the literati minority and not comprehensible to the masses. Encouraged by the *May Fourth Movement* in China, young repatriating Taiwanese writers were eager to follow suit. They started a shortlived yet blossoming vernacular movement (*xin baihuawen yundong*) in Taiwan in the mid-1920s, hoping to revolutionize the way of writing and change feudalistic thinking in Taiwan. They did succeed in some aspects such as forcing the classical form of Chinese to a retreat and introducing more cosmopolitan ideas and writing styles to the younger generation writers. But still they could not succeed in reaching out to the populace directly. This was because the new vernacular writing system was based on Mandarin Chinese, originated from northern China. It was neither based on the southern Hokkien nor on the Hakka.

It was a time when a small number of Taiwanese intellectuals began to experiment with Romanization systems for writing down the Taiwanese dialect (*Taiyu*, referring to the southern Hokkien). A Romanization system developed by the English Presbyterians was being used by the members of the Presbyterian Church on Taiwan but this church was relatively small and had limited influence at that time. Thus the larger Romanization effort did not succeed. The gentry, the literati, and the new class might have been content with the use of Chinese and Japanese characters which the youth began to acquire in the Japanese primary school from the 1920s. Some Taiwanese had called this younger generation as the "Taishou Men," or the young man who grew up in the years of Taishou Emperor. There was a vested institutional and class interest or bias in favor of the status quo. In any case, by the 1930s, Japanese had ironically become the *lingua franca* for educated people across all dialect groups in Taiwan.²⁰

Writings about and for the masses—for the less privileged—was the main goal of a new wave of Taiwanese literature from 1930 to 1937 (*xin wenxue yundong*). Lai He and Yang Kui were two renowned Taiwanese writers widely commemorated even today by many. Lai He, credited as the founding father of Taiwan new literature, wrote in vernacular Mandarin in his early years and received much acclaim. But he was frustrated that the people he wrote about could not understand what was written about them. He stopped writing for a while and then began again, this time experimenting with varied combinations of the

southern Hokkien vernacular. But then even less people understood. He then adopted the use of *Zhu-zhi-diao* (a folk rhythm easy for recital) for writing. Yang Qui was another example. He is remembered as the most stubborn of the anticolonial writers in the 1930s and 1940s. But all of his best works were written in Japanese without exception, and he was highly praised in the Japanese leftist literature circle before the escalation of the second Sino-Japan War. The language hurdle was never fully overcome, since the use of Chinese characters and dialects were outlawed as the *Kominka* movement intensified after 1937. Since then, all Chinese books and newspapers were banned from publication in Taiwan, as well as imports from China.

The activists and intellectuals had also organized many lecture or drama tours to promote their ideas and political agenda before the ban on Chinese. They were probably well received by the audience, but they were also under constant surveillance by Japanese police. It is not difficult for us to imagine the pressure on the speakers, performers, and the audience. It was impossible to inspire the general public to rally around an independent national identity for Taiwanese. In fact, it was never even discussed in public. The most often discussed theme was, rather, to awaken the Taiwanese to their own rights to gain a proper status of respectful citizenship (of Chinese-Taiwanese origin) in the Japanese Empire.

What is the importance of the language hurdle for this discussion? It helps us to understand that the newly emerged Taiwanese identity could not reach a very large audience. And there were few alternatives to Japanese education and Japanese language to "enlighten" the general population. It was ironic that the cultural awakening of the Taiwanese had to rely on the use of the colonial language, and not their mother tongues. This would also help us appreciate why the Japanese education was successful in nurturing Japanese patriotism and Japanese inclinations without any serious challenge from the Taiwanese general public in the later decade.

Factional Competition and Class Origins

Taiwanese activists were further divided along class origins and differences about what the Taiwanese needed to change and to coordinate for their collective good. This was marked by the split of the *Taiwan Cultural Association* in 1927, and the split of the *Taiwan Min-Chung Tang* (People's Party)²¹ in 1930. Both splits were similar in nature. The leftists, inspired by communist ideas from Shanghai and Tokyo, or by the southern

revolution in China, went for social, economic, and national reform at the same time. The communists had attempted to mobilize the peasants and the workers very discretely but not with large-scale success. Yet, the right-wing reformists, consisting of a well-educated middle class and gentry, inclined toward more conservative political programs for reform, such as petitioning for local rule from within the system. They competed intensely for the support from the Taiwanese. The left-wing openly criticized the right-wing for selling out the interests of the Taiwanese masses in exchange for personal gains and government recognition. According to Japanese police records, the right-wing lecture gatherings were often disrupted or broken up by the left-wing hectors.²²

A comparison of this conflict with the development history of different roads of Chinese nationalism before 1937, reveals that Taiwan's situation was somewhat parallel. Simply put, in mainland China, there was bourgeois nationalism led by the Nationalist Party and socialist nationalism led by the Chinese Communist Party.²³ There had been periods for cooperation and overlapping of ideologies and personnel, but they inevitably ended in conflict and breakup. The intra-conflicts were about what were the just choices to make for class alliances and about what class was to lead China to confront imperialism. But the differences within the Taiwanese resistance were more. They were more to do with just choices to make, but were also about the question of national identity under the Japanese, or the question "to be or not to be." On the other hand, the Chinese had less identity crisis than the Taiwanese. The Chinese had few doubts about their meaning of existence as one large nation, the Chinese "race" (*zhong*), because their past and lineage had never been forcefully erased by powerful foreign rule. The Taiwanese, on the other hand, were less lucky. Their past was discriminated against by alien colonization; they had to deny and to compromise themselves to regain meager recognition from the dominant Japanese. They were in fact "sandwiched" people of some unknown destiny, which they could not even discuss freely in public.

On the other hand, the competition and division among Taiwanese activists from the late 1920s to the early 1930s demonstrated well that a common enemy alone was not enough to create a unified national image of Taiwan. Taiwanese identities were thus articulated through different paths of political actions and strategies, and were, therefore, given different meanings. It seemed that not any one of these factions from the resisting camps could win enough support to arrive at a consensual Taiwanese identity under the Japanese system. If they were not silenced by the Japanese in the 1930s, and if they were not

suppressed by the right-wing Chinese Nationalistic government after 1949, Taiwanese nationalism might have gone either way: the bourgeois nationalistic road or the communist nationalistic road. Its future was by no means "destined" in the 1930s and 1940s. The discourse and narrative of the Taiwanese nation would have steered through many possible courses if not for the later political developments.

Becoming "Japanese-Taiwanese" or "Taiwanese-Japanese"?

In 1994, in an interview titled "The Sadness of Being Taiwanese" by the late Japanese writer Shiba Ryotaro, Taiwanese President Lee Denghui was quoted as saying "I thought that I was a Japanese until I was twenty-years-old." Lee believed that he was speaking for his generation as a whole. He was certainly right. The Japanese were very serious about promoting assimilation and patriotism when modern national education was institutionalized in Taiwan in the 1920s. In competing for Taiwanese' minds, the Taiwanese resistance did not seem to have had the upper hand.

Taiwan under Japan had achieved the highest industrialization level in Asia except for Japan by 1920. North-south roads, railways, telecommunications, electricity, radio, museums, unified monetary and measurement systems had helped to develop an image of the islanders and the Taiwanese as a larger existence. Common people were no longer confined to their local or regional identities. The development of tap water, modern medicine and professions, public schools, agricultural inventions, sciences, and so on had helped to improve the living standards of the Taiwanese. The scientific knowledge employed by the government for administration, the discipline of tough but able bureaucrats and police, the institution of law and order, the introduction of the new concept of duty to the emperor, and the elaborately designed political rituals for patriotism, and the like, had left deep impressions on the minds of the Taiwanese.

Two Taiwanese nationalist intellectuals exiled to Japan in the 1950s, also shared similar ambivalent feelings about their former colonial master. The late Dr. Ong Jok-tik iterated that the most abhorring part of Japanese education was the indoctrination of patriotism and the loyalty to the Emperor. But Japanese education also lifted Taiwan from a superstitious and feudalistic society to modernity. In his assessment, the Taiwanese became learned and modernized people because of Japanese education.²⁴ Dr. Huang Zhaotang, now a university professor in Japan, wrote that the Taiwanese had a bloody hatred for the Japanese,

and he personally could never forget the shame that the Japanese had brought upon Taiwan through racial colonialism. But he was also quick to point out that the Taiwanese were much better off materially under Japan.²⁵ He also believes in the possibility that being an assimilated and educated Japanese-Taiwanese, and being a part of the great empire gave the Taiwanese a chance to feel proud of themselves by abandoning their old, low status of Chinese identity.²⁶

Being pragmatic and cooperative would have been just passive compromises of individuals in the face of great adversaries. But it is another matter when some Taiwanese began to identify with the Japanese eagerly. Why was it so? The Japanese had managed to achieve a certain degree of success through its *Kominka* movement in 1935. The movement was prompted by the ambition of the Empire to advance to southeastern Asia. Taiwan was regarded as a springboard of this advancement. The assimilation and loyalty of the Taiwanese (more than 5 million at that time) were needed for this strategy to be successful. The movement included social, cultural, and linguistic policies to facilitate the rapid learning of Japanese, the sciences, and Japanese virtues. Chinese was forbidden in public occasions, and banned entirely in print. People were persuaded to abandon their traditional cultural religious practices as "un-scientific" or "un-patriotic," and they were also encouraged to change their Chinese surnames into Japanese and abandon their ancestor worship for Japanese Shintoism.²⁷ The government had set up "exemplary Japanese-speaking families" to honor the cooperatives with social recognition. The assimilating elites were also given honorable status, and appointed to positions to lead the movement. Huang Zhaotang said that the streets were full of true believers that were proud to forget Taiyu and to speak the "national" language.²⁸

After 1937, Japan began to prepare the Taiwanese to join the War. For the Taiwanese to join the Imperial Forces, risking one's life for Japan, became the ultimate test of their loyalty and assimilation. As for the Japanese, to allow the Taiwanese to fight side by side with them became the ultimate test but also for their trust in and equal treatment of the Taiwanese people. The hegemonic success of the *Kominka* movement had readied some Taiwanese to do just that but not the Japanese. Hesitant to trust the Taiwanese or offer them equal status, Japan did not institute an all-out draft system until the last year of the War, despite the rising pressure for new recruits from the battlefields. Taiwanese youth were admitted into the Imperial Forces on a voluntary basis only after 1942. And they were admitted by their degree of assimilation, level of civility, loyalty, and physical condition. Otherwise, they might be

qualified only as auxiliary military workers or interpreters on a contractual basis. The Japanese government reported that about 17,000 young Taiwanese men joined the rank of voluntary soldier out of fierce competition. And about 120,000 men were hired as auxiliary laborers to work for the military.²⁹

Taiwanese intelligentsia and modern artists were also encouraged to take on a Japanese mentality to serve the Empire. A large body of *Kominka* literature and fine arts was encouraged and produced to praise the war and the nobility of sacrifice, as well as the immense glories and privileges some Taiwanese had gained through participation in the "holy" warfare. Japan awarded collaborative writers with great recognition and honor. It became the indisputable high culture of the society against which people were measured for their merits. It was, in fact, the most influential institutional force in shaping the moral horizons of the Taiwanese people.

The *Kominka* movement, in effect, created a colonial society based on extreme "duty-morality" and hegemony. The premises of duty-morality were to obligate the Taiwanese to their masters without any reservation. The Taiwanese had neither self-esteem nor any meaningful political rights under this circumstance. But they were recognized and rewarded for adopting this duty-morality by their colonial master. The Japanese officials were supposed to be the examples to the Taiwanese, leading them to be dutifully faithful to the Emperor and the Empire. They were austere and despised the Taiwanese in general, but were committed and disciplined nationalists. It is fair to say that the Taiwanese were observing and practicing (not without any reluctance) some new codes of honor and virtue based on this colonial hierarchy from the late 1930s onward. The hierarchical and reciprocal relations between the colonial citizens and their rulers became "the way should be." This worldview was almost completely shattered on the eve of the "228 incident" in 1947.

It is estimated that from 1937 to 1944, the Japanese-speaking population increased from 38 to 71 percent.³⁰ To adopt Japanese style and morality, and to become a Japanese-speaking family gave some Taiwanese an illusion of being equal to the Japanese and perhaps superior to their Taiwanese neighbors. The resisting intellectuals in the past had asked the Taiwanese to "wake up" and resist colonial rule to regain their pride. The Japanese, however, soon succeeded in providing a "better" livelihood through modernization along with a new sense of social recognition and honor for ordinary Taiwanese through national education and institutionally encouraged identification with the Empire. All forms of resistance were almost completely silenced after 1935. The most respected Taiwanese

leader Lin Xiatang was also forced to take on some *Kominka* activities and an honorable position to collaborate with the Japanese, even though his reluctance and passivity were noticeable.

The assessment of *Kominka* and Japanese rule in Taiwan, in general, has been at the center of heated debate between the Chinese and the Taiwanese nationalists in recent time. The Taiwanese nationalists have been by and large sympathetic toward the situation the Taiwanese had experienced, and have refused to pass harsh judgments for past cooperation with the Japanese. Some even praise the Japanese, using the "good-old-days" to judge the corruption of the Chinese government that succeeded the Japanese in 1945. Some even suggested that the Chinese government and military were neither competent nor qualified to rule the Taiwanese because the latter had become more advanced and civilized.³¹ On the other hand, the Chinese nationalists have strongly resented Japanese imperialism and Taiwanese condolence of their "lost past" under the Japanese. The fact that the Taiwanese could not see the evils the Japanese had done to the Taiwanese and the Chinese was simply abhorrent to them. They are often outraged if the Taiwanese should compare the "backwardness" of Chinese to the "modernity" of the Japanized Taiwan. They criticize Taiwanese nationalists for not knowing the suffering that the "Ancestor's Country" (*zhuguo*) had gone through because of Japanese imperialism. These differences in national identity, orientations about what is right or wrong regarding oneself, or good or bad regarding the past, always generate a lot of emotion on both sides in contemporary Taiwan.³² Why are they so different? I will address this in the following section.

De-colonizing or Re-colonizing? The Tragedy of Unification

The Nanking government sent one of its most able generals Chen Yi to head the "take-over" government in Taiwan in October, 1945, three months after the Japanese surrendered. Taiwan was reunited with the Ancestor's Country again. And it is widely known that "the *er-er-pa shijian*" (or the "228 incident") that took place on February 28, 1947, marked the watershed of Taiwanese nationalism. The incident is actually better described as an "uprising" against the Chinese takeover government instead of being merely an "incident." The uprising was triggered by the arrest of a Taiwanese woman in a street of Taipei City for selling smuggled cigarettes, and the police shooting at a crowd who were attempting to protect the woman. The story spread out quickly and overnight the whole island was boiling with rage. Angry Taiwanese

stormed police stations, government agencies and sought out and beat up mainlanders. Taiwanese elite and activists became united and organized after the uprising. They presented demands for stopping government corruption and abuses, and for autonomous government to Chen Yi and the central government in Nanking. The central government retaliated with military enforcement one month later. The subsequent crack down nearly caused the entire elimination of prewar Taiwanese leftists, and scores of death of Taiwanese activists and middle-class professionals who were suspected to support the uprising.³³ The survivors were silenced, put in prison, or forced into exile abroad.

Before the uprising, the Taiwanese welcomed the reunification with the Ancestor's Country though with a lot of uncertainty. The welcome was genuine for it meant the end of war and Japanese colonization.³⁴ The uncertainty about unification was partly caused by feelings of guilt for not resisting the Japanese and fighting for their own liberation, and partly by lack of knowledge about what would happen to them next. But after the suppression and the killings of Taiwanese following the uprising, people became very disillusioned and silenced out of fear. For many Taiwanese who escaped abroad becoming expatriates, Taiwanese nationalism entered a new era: now Taiwan must be an independent country. Taiwan should be for and of Taiwanese, and the Taiwanese for and of Taiwan. Dissident exiles first used Tokyo, and then later the United States as their home base to regroup and launch the present-day Taiwanese Independent Movement. Self-determination and national independence had been the political platform of the Taiwanese Communist Party in the late 1920s, but they had little chance to promote it among the public. Now, it became a popular idea among Taiwanese exiles around the world because of the tragedy surrounding the reunification and the rebellion. Though the exiles' movement was also divided into the Left and Right and other kinds of factional differences, overall the call for self-determination, for a categorical Taiwanese identity completely opposed to Chinese identity, was clearly conceived.³⁵

This is not the place to discuss fully the reasons and background of the "228 incident." We can only focus on the identity issues central to this chapter. The differences between the Chinese and Taiwanese when they became united in 1945 were not outrightly racial or ethnic issues as argued by the contemporaries. Rather, the Taiwanese and Chinese were peoples with supposedly the same origin but forced to follow different historical trajectories, and subjected to different historical forces of self-transformation and identity formation.

We first have to realize that politically the Taiwanese were no longer traditional Han-Chinese in the 1940s. They had changed under colonization, through the national education and modernization promoted by the Japanese. The activists and their many followers had already acquired the necessary articulacy for self-definition and of a national community, named and imagined as Taiwan and Taiwanese. They had not succeeded during the Japanese period and were obligated to cooperate with the Japanese, but the notion of being Taiwanese who had the "right" to home rule was not erased, and the activists were ready to rise again after the War was over.

Though the Japanese Emperor surrendered and the Empire dissolved disgracefully, the underlying duty-morality of the citizens and government prevailed, and a sense of law and order persisted during the three-month transient period in Taiwan between the surrender of the Japanese and the official take-over by the Chinese. By and large, the Japanese were very depressed, scared, and waiting for deportation while the Taiwanese were celebrating though with a lot of uncertainty. But it was amazing that the Japanese did not suffer any retaliation from the Taiwanese. The Japanese government during the transition had allowed Taiwanese elites and civic associations to take more responsibilities of maintaining social order, and there was little sign of chaos and deterioration of social order despite the rapid down turn of the economy and the power vacuum.³⁶ This peaceful and cooperative relation after the War between the Taiwanese and the Japanese, or between the colonial subjects and their masters, has distinguished Taiwan from other places in the postcolonial period. Even today, President Lee of Taiwan believes that the Taiwanese might have been the friendliest people toward Japan in contemporary Asia.

Second, the Chinese themselves were no longer traditional Han-Chinese in 1945. Since the late nineteenth century, they had been involved in the transformation of the Chinese through nationalistic revolution. And the eight-year's Resistance-War against Japan had awakened the rather diversified and regional populations to the nationalistic and patriotic mission of *the* Chinese. The final victory in 1945 was sweet but bitter because millions of Chinese were killed, and its infant industry was almost completely destroyed during the War. Thus an extreme duty-morality of Chinese patriotism and nationalism was riding with the anti-Japanese sentiments. But this national transformation was taking place outside Taiwan. In sum, Taiwan and China had been on their respective paths of change in two different political fields with different moral horizons. Each had little contact with the other since the seceding of Taiwan to Japan in 1895.

The Chinese in general and the government did not know what to expect in Taiwan, and was certainly not ready to accept the possibility of the Taiwanese wish for home rule. Instead, a takeover government with a centralized administrative unit and exclusive and absolute power privileged by Chiang Kai-shek was set up in Taiwan, just like the former *Taiwan Sotoku* under Imperial Japan. In retrospect, the Taiwanese compared the new government to that of the Japanese, and found that the new government was just like the old colonial government, only more "backward," "poorer," and worse.³⁷

Third, the Taiwanese bourgeoisie and middle class had their own aspirations for the reconstruction of Taiwan. This included not only the right to self-rule, but also normalization of the market and the economy from austere regulations during the War, and the replacement of Japanese with Taiwanese talents in many areas. They were inspired by the hope to ascend to a higher social status without being discriminated against by any outsiders. On the other hand, the Taiwanese leftists were also eager to educate and mobilize the underclass for both democracy and large-scale social reform. But they were having closer contacts with the Chinese communists instead of the Kuomintang. And very soon, they all realized that the Chinese takeover government did not recognize these aspirations at all.

In the beginning, the Chinese officials were thinking of building Taiwan as a "model province" for the rest of China. After all Taiwan had the infrastructure, from the education system to power plants that were built and left by the Japanese. In reality, however, this soon changed and Taiwan was used to support the reconstruction of the war-torn Ancestor's Country. Taiwan existed as a part of the larger national picture, not merely for itself. The Taiwanese were told that it was the time to "pay back" the Ancestor's Country. Shortly after, young Taiwanese men were drafted and Taiwan's economic resources were appropriated to support the civil war against communist insurgency on the Chinese mainland. This was equivalent of reimplementing of the extreme duty-morality, except that the new master was thought to be more abusive and corrupt. It was at this historical juncture that the Taiwanese and the Ancestor's Country diverged. The Taiwanese wanted to regain their "rights" to rebuild their own home and bring back their "normal" life, but the Chinese gave them more nationalistic "duties" and asked them to make more sacrifices. The respective moral horizons of the Chinese and Taiwanese were so different that they could not understand or respect each other despite their common origin.

Scholars have attributed the cause of the "228 incident" to factors including corruption, bureaucratic mismanagement, collapse of the economy (high unemployment, food scarcity, and high inflation), Chinese officials' nepotism, and so on. The incident followed by the persecution and killing of Taiwanese people are cited as the reasons that prompted Taiwanese nationalism. But critiques say that parallel incidents with similar backgrounds had also occurred in other former Japanese colonies in China, in cities such as Qingdao, Shanghai, and Harbin. Why should this particular tragedy become a watershed for national independence, when similar tragedies in China did not create other independent movements? The answer is not difficult to find if we look at the change and the transformation of the Taiwanese under the Japanese.

The de-colonization of the Taiwanese would imply replacing the legacy of Japanese high culture with proper Chinese codes. And, it would imply the replacement of Taiwanese moral horizons with more appropriate Chinese nationalistic ones. But this was carried out without the recognition and the incorporation of neither Taiwanese leftists nor the resistance elite. The Taiwanese were experiencing distrust and exclusion during this early period of reunification. As some of the Taiwanese tried to raise voices of disagreement or to criticize the abuses of Chinese officials, they were quickly criticized for being "poisoned by the mindset of being Japanese slave" (*riben nuluwa sixiang*). The greatest irony was Taiwan, after the War, entering into another kind of humiliating situation through its reunification with the motherland. The Taiwanese were obligated to compromise their own integrity, to accept the inferior and new dutiful status assigned by the Ancestor's Country and its officials, who claimed to be the liberators. This kind of postcolonial situation sets Taiwan apart from the other major cities in mainland China.

Today many people are puzzled. They ask, how could the Ancestor's Country be foreign? And they argue: Chineseness was, and still is in the Taiwanese "blood." And "blood is always thicker than water." They do not understand the identity-transformations of both the Taiwanese and the Chinese since the twentieth century. Neither do they understand that the Taiwanese were deeply hurt by the way they were treated by the Chinese after the national unification. As Peng Mingmin, a prominent Taiwanese independence activist and the first presidential candidate representing the Democratic Progressive Party in 1996, recalled that after the "228 incident," his father (a physician practicing in southern Taiwan) felt so shameful for having Chinese "blood" (lineage) that he denounced his Chinese "blood." He even wanted his descendants to marry foreigners, so that they could never be Chinese again.³⁸

The notion of a categorical Taiwanese in opposition to the Chinese was seeded in the minds of many members of this generation and their families. However, they could not speak their feelings out under the authoritarianism until the 1980s. This sentiment and morality became the basis for the Taiwanese Independence Movement in Japan and other places beyond the reach of the authoritarian rule of the Republic of China. Taiwanese feelings of being victimized by the mainlanders and the Ancestor's Country also became the underlying morality for Taiwanese mobilization inside Taiwan, later becoming a milder form of democratic movement.

National High Culture and the Authoritarian Rule

The Kuomintang government retreated to Taiwan in 1949, and one and a half million nationalistic mainlanders followed. The government was determined to maintain its claim to be the sole legitimate ruler of all China, which had been "stolen" by communist "bandits." It desperately needed patriotism and loyalty from both the Taiwanese and mainlanders for its mission to retake the Chinese mainland and for its own survival in Taiwan. The fundamental goal of nationalistic teaching in Taiwan was to educate all citizens, despite his or her origins, and instill loyalty to undertake this anticommunist and reunification mission. Mandarin and the reinvoking of traditional values and Confucianism became the dominant civic virtues. New citizen etiquette from proper manners to lifestyles was prescribed by Chiang Kai-shek personally and his *Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement*.³⁹

At the same time, not only was the legacy of the Japanese culture such as language and popular music disappearing very quickly in Taiwan, but so too were the Taiwanese dialects (of all sorts), traditional customs, folk religious practices, opera and music that were soon systematically defined as local, backward, superstitious, either harmful for national unification and/or national modernization. The Chinese official Mandarin traditions (of the ruling class) were upheld as the high culture of Taiwan. This was followed by "learning modernization values" from the United States and the rest of the "free world," associated with economic pragmatism in the years when the United States was Taiwan's strongest supporter, as a military ally and a "friendly" country that provided economic aid. The United States has replaced Japan as the country that the Taiwanese youth sought to receive postgraduate education since the late 1950s. The ruling class and nationalistic high culture were exemplified by upholding standard Mandarin as the means for

education, official use, printing materials such as novels and newspapers, and also as the performance language of popular culture after television became popular in the 1960s. American English became the cosmopolitan language taught in the middle school (the seventh grade). As a consequence, a humiliating condition were created for many Taiwanese, of all dialect groups, for their language and accents, daily manners, tastes and styles, or more plainly put, for what they were, in the eyes of those from the high culture.

Charles Taylor argues that a strong unifying national high culture is likely to bring out a defensive reaction from minority groups, in the modern era when dignity and being recognized becomes a prevalent morality. And the elite will be especially aware of problems relating to respect and dignity in this imposed nationalistic assimilation.⁴⁰ This seems to be the situation in Taiwan since the 1970s. Ascending to its hegemony, the Mandarin-U.S. high culture experienced strong opposition from people of various origins in the late 1970s. People resisted being pushed backwards and began to reassert themselves as a reaction to this process. There have been many examples of this kind of resistance; for instance, (1) the *Home and Land Literature* (*Xiangtu Wenxue*) submitted by some leftists (who became pro-PRC nationalists later) and Taiwanese writers, in the early 1970s, (2) the aboriginal movement that has demanded de-stigmatization (known as the "Name Rectification Movement" in Taiwan) and the return of their traditional lands since 1984, and (3) the Hakka movement that has demanded recognition and the right to preserve their cultural identity and language, since 1989. These have been reactions against a nationalistic and nationalizing project that is seen as ultra-assimilationist in its objectives. Due to space constraints, I will focus on the identity issues surrounding *Taiyu* as an illustration of this kind of resistance against the nationalistic Chinese high culture.

The *Taiyu*-speaking population has been at least around 75 percent of the general population since the 1950s. But speaking *Taiyu* has been strongly discouraged and even punished by educators and public institutions because it is thought to be local, backward, and harmful for national unification. But for the same reason, speaking *Taiyu* in public, especially in front of mainland officials, has become a defiant gesture since the 1980s. It has been an important vehicle in political rallies to arouse feelings and resentment against the high culture and the government in the past, and even today. I will explain how this came about in the following pages.

Though the Kuomintang government was at one time considered to be just an "outsider's regime" or another "colonial" regime by many

Taiwanese nationalists, it is indeed different from the Japanese. For instance, there were few barriers to those many Taiwanese attempting to obtain upward mobility through national education and economic growth. In a sense, other than setting up a national culture of domination, and suppressing local differences, the nationalistic ethos was genuinely "equal" in its attempt to make all people uniformly patriotic and loyal Chinese. Political persecution of dissidents were also "equal," in general, without any intentional bias against the Taiwanese; the same level of suppression was also used against dissident mainlanders in Taiwan, in particular against the leftists.

But the consequences of and reactions to this kind of "equal" domination varied among people of different origins. The majority of the Mandarin-speaking mainlanders did not find this pursuit of high culture to be a problem. They, in general, had a higher education level and had been part of that culture. They supported national unification and modernization with strong national duty-morality. Unless they were suspected to be associated with the communists or the leftists, or sought out by the right-wing regime for political differences, they were comfortable in sharing the nationalistic worldview. But it was humiliating for members from *Taiyu*-speaking and other groups, who could not master the language or the nationalistic etiquette as easily as the mainlanders. In general, the *Taiyu*-speaking population had a lower level of education, and were constantly frustrated and felt humiliated just for being themselves. An internal division between the two peoples was thus created, despite attempts at nationalistic assimilation.

On the other hand, since the Kuomintang regime allowed some degree of political participation for the Taiwanese, in the late 1970s, the postwar and post-228 generation of Taiwanese activists began to reemerge from the previous silent period. Eventually, the Taiwanese have been able to develop a "right-morality" as opposed to just "duty-morality" through large-scale political mobilization. Different from the "duty-morality", the "right-morality" argues for self-rule and political and civic rights, including the right to form an opposition party, to have freedom of expression, and the right to demand an end to martial law rule, to lift the policy of checking whether citizens thought—and acted in the proper way, to revise the militaristic tendency found in national education, and to allow the use of *Taiyu* in public. It would be fair to argue that the democratic movement in Taiwan since the 1980s has meant self-integrity and self-respect, much more so for the Taiwanese than for the mainlanders. Besides, the movement also put the mainlanders on the defensive for their support for the national (Mandarin-centered) high culture.

Under authoritarianism, younger and newly educated Taiwanese activists were able to articulate their discontent and rights as citizens against the government, during what is generally known today as "election holidays." The "holidays" are periods during which the regime did not exercise the stern suppression it normally would have during ordinary (or the non-election) times.⁴¹

Although neither *Taiyu* nor Hakka ever developed widely accepted writing-forms, the hurdle for a writing language to reach the general public was overcome completely in the late 1970s, when the Chinese literacy rate went over 90 percent. The opposition activists could publish dissident magazines in Chinese, and play a mouse-and-cat game (sometimes at a very high personal price) with the "thought police" of the Garrison Command by printing out their ideas and critiques.⁴² These publications paved the way to mobilize the Taiwanese public against the pressure of assimilation from the high culture circles and the very biased mass-media influenced by the Kuomintang. The pervasive feeling of unfairness or frustration among the postwar generation of Taiwanese was generally articulated by the opposition under these adversarial conditions: (1) the authoritarian rule which suppressed people's liberty and basic human rights, (2) the imposition of official high culture, which was exemplified by the exclusive use of Mandarin in public, (3) the creation of a culturally advantaged mainlander group vis-à-vis the less advantaged Taiwanese group, (4) the opportunity to use "election holidays" to use *Taiyu* in political rallies, and (5) the publishing and spreading of dissident ideas to the general public. The cultural gap between the opposition elite and the populace was greatly narrowed after the 1970s. A larger consensus of the meaning of being Taiwanese, the more established "natives," was constructed in this period through the expansion of political participation by the general public and the attribution of suppression to "outsiders" regimes dominated by the mainlander group. Their efforts have helped to crystallize what we know today as the "ethnic politics" in Taiwan, the politics of the mainlanders versus the Taiwanese.

The Pragmatic Aspect of Taiwanese Identity

There have been many studies of the current development in "ethnic politics," in Taiwan. I will not repeat their findings here. It has been argued that the Taiwanese are much more likely to support the Democratic Progressive Party and Taiwan independence, whereas the mainlanders are much more likely to support unification, and the nationalistic

Chinese New Party and the Kuomintang. This chapter is different from these studies because I push for the understanding of what it means to be Taiwanese in history, and the changes in its meaning. I have also focused on the moral aspects of national identity, the role of high culture, and the importance of recognition and respect. The general theme I have argued so far is that the recent meaning of Taiwanese as a national group did not exist until the 1920s, and its current meaning as having the "right" to be distinctively Taiwanese did not become popular until the democratic movement between the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Nevertheless, Taiwanese nationalism seems to have taken another significant turn during the 1990s. Since then many Taiwanese have chosen to side with the Kuomintang, and support the institutional arrangement of the ROC. The name and the symbols of the previous "outsiders' regime" continue to exist, and many people still vote for the Kuomintang despite the rising tide of Taiwanese nationalistic thinking. Supporters of Taiwanese nationalism have explained this in terms of the "indoctrination" of nationalistic education and ideology. They argue that the Taiwanese people were not awakened to the fate of an "authentic" Taiwanese (the expression of "*jiang-gang Tai-wan lang*" in *Taiyu*). But the success of indoctrination cannot explain why even after political liberalization the support for unequivocal Taiwanese independence has not exceeded a low 15 percent margin. And it cannot explain why the DPP, the champion of Taiwanese independence since it incorporated "people's self-determination" in its party platform in 1991, has so far never won over 30 percent of the votes in various kinds of national elections. Its support was even lower than 20 percent when longtime Taiwanese dissident Peng Mingmin represented the party as presidential candidate in 1996. And, neither can it explain the softening of the DPP on issues of Taiwanese independence since 1994, its turning to the "middle-of-the-road"; an act that provoked the spinning-off of the more militant Taiwanese Nation Building Party (*jianguodang*).⁴³

This later development of Taiwanese nationalism has moved beyond the call for "dignity" and "recognition" from the mainlander's regime. The most significant phenomenon has been the "indigenization" of the Kuomintang, or the change in the ruling elite from mainlanders to Taiwanese. The pattern of power sharing within the Kuomintang under its current leader Li Denghui changed significantly after 1989. Lee successfully promoted himself and his supporters of Taiwanese origin from the marginal to the central inside the Kuomintang. Sometimes he made use of the support of Taiwanese nationalistic ideas and of active assistance of DPP members when he attacked his mainlander enemies in

the KMT. He also crafted the basic tone of nationalistic rhetoric by asserting concepts that have abstract and vague meanings such as "Community of Fate," "Taiwan first," "new Taiwanese," and of course, the "two-State theory." He has also discredited the Republic of China as an "outsider's regime"; the new era of the Kuomintang started from his ascension as its indisputable leader in 1992.⁴⁴ This "indigenization" of Kuomintang is not only a source of pride and dignity for the Taiwanese who used to work for the Kuomintang, but also a legitimization process for the status quo interests and the ruling party. Consequently, by promoting the Taiwanese identity and toeing the line of the mainland elite inside the party, the Kuomintang was able to sustain itself in the post-authoritarian era.

We must know that politics is also a form of action for the extraction and redistribution of economic resources and material well being. And there is always a potential for loss in pursuing hasty and complete Taiwanese independence, regardless of its alleged nobility associated with self-determination. When under authoritarian pressure, the potential loss could even mean death sentence or long prison-time for dissidents. Therefore, except for Taiwanese expatriates, most Taiwanese activist movement, in Taiwan did not, in effect, advocate Taiwan independence, not to mention ordinary Taiwanese before the political liberalization between 1986 and 1987. After liberalization and the final assurance of freedom of expression in 1991, the potential personal loss was about economic and other utilitarian gains. The Kuomintang was still the ruling party at the time when this chapter was first written. It had the advantage of the incumbent in administration, and in the daily management of extracting and redistributing resources. It was and still is one of the largest conglomerates in Taiwan, wielding enormous economic clout. Though the majority of people felt skeptical toward Kuomintang's overwhelming economic resources, the party could and still can play with people's needs for economic gains and manageable social and political changes with relatively moderate rhetoric, thereby maintaining the status quo by rejecting an outright Taiwanese independence.

Another factor that prevents the Taiwanese from pursuing an all-out nationalistic political position has been the PRC since 1995. The PRC had repeatedly criticized the tendency of Li and Taiwan for moving dangerously toward Taiwan independence with hostile words and intense military threats, such as testing ballistic missiles near Taiwan's waters, or holding large-scale amphibious exercises along its eastern coast. It can be said to be the first time that the Taiwanese nationalism faced the immediate danger of having to confront a Chinese invasion

since the "228 incident" in 1947. The nature of the risk of Taiwanese independence is thus shifting from provoking internal unrest between the Taiwanese and mainlanders to provoking a showdown between Taiwan as a whole and the PRC.

Many recent opinion polls have indicated that the bullying attitude of the PRC has actually increased the consciousness of being Taiwanese, the morality of self-rule, and self-constraint. The price of abandoning this symbolic Chinese nation-ness completely in current political institutions would include not only stirring up resistance from mainland Chinese in Taiwan, but also, and more seriously, could provoke invasion from the PRC.

At the same time, the increasing economic exchange and personal visits between the two places since 1989, has further complicated nationalistic politics. To the displeasure of many Taiwanese politicians, Taiwan's economic growth has increased its dependence on investment in and trade with China recently. The negative impacts on Taiwan's economy because of the instability of cross-strait relations and domestic politics have been observed and widely debated. Taiwanese people are not unaware of the danger of pursuing Taiwanese nationalism too far. Even different presidential candidates of the DPP have shown their understanding of the consequences. The general opinion stated by the DPP and its presidential candidate Chen Shuibian, in the election year of 2000, was that Taiwan has been an independent country (or state) already, and thus there is no need to declare independence, and, they said, the name of this country is the Republic of China.⁴⁵

From another point of view, the dignity of the Taiwanese also comes from the improvement in their economic conditions and material well being in the last fifty years or so. Contemporary narratives of being a Taiwanese are also about Taiwan's economic success. In spite of many internal differences, to preserve these economic gains and the democratic rights in Taiwan, make everyone necessarily have stakes in the status quo. There is no doubt that people in Taiwan may have very strong and different opinions about their own identities. Some are ethnic-cultural while some are national-political. However, the democratic political institution of the ROC, regardless of its infancy and awkwardness, seems to hold the differences together successfully so far. It has given people room to work out their strong feelings and dignity issues originating from the past, within its framework.

It is arguably true that since the late 1990s, the most agreed-on collective belief in Taiwan is neither Taiwanese independence nor Chinese nationalism. It is, rather, the belief in the importance and the

"good" of continuous economic prosperity and development. Prosperity is not completely independent from the problem of pursuing a categorical and a respectful Taiwanese identity, since economic success and modernization have been significant in the story of being Taiwanese. Thus, to ask people to give up economic prosperity or to endanger them as a price for the independence of Taiwan is not a popular idea among the general public. The people in Taiwan are indeed very vocal about their differences, and with very conflicting identity attachments, but they have been pragmatic and rational, in general, in pursuing their nationalistic claims. The legacy of the political institutions of the ROC, thus, can remain with incremental reforms for consolidation of democracy and self-rule.

Some Concluding Remarks

I have tried, in this chapter, to present the zigzag course of the development of Taiwanese national identity. The story being told about a distinctive Taiwanese nation goes back to at least the 1920s. But it did not evolve into a full-fledged nationalistic movement overnight. The painful and lingering memories of the "228 incident" in 1947, and the overwhelming pressure for assimilation and the opposition movement against authoritarianism since the 1970s, have helped to crystallize the meaning of "authentic" Taiwanese in opposition to the Nationalist Chinese. When the reunification of Taiwan and the Ancestor's Country took place in 1945, the Taiwanese and the Nationalistic Chinese were actually standing on different historical trajectories that were forcefully created by imperialism from the outside. They became different "peoples" consequently. The identity stories continued to be different for them after the 1950s. The imposition of the Chinese high culture has made many Taiwanese feel "humiliated" and led to the creation of an "ethnic" division between the mainlander Chinese and the Taiwanese. But what really matters are their respective identity stories and their different moral horizons, which have been in opposition to each other in the past. It is acceptable to think of them as two different ethno-national groups, as today we find them defining themselves and also believing in themselves. But it would be wrong to think that their differences were in fact caused by *a priori* ethno-national differences.

Respect, dignity, and recognition are important as we seek to understand the moral aspects of identity formation in history. But "real" politics is also about gains and losses. The indigenization of the Kuomintang

since the 1990s has helped the existing political institution of the ROC continue to serve as the only viable framework that can hold all the differences together. This is possible only when many people also believe in the importance of political stability and national security for economic prosperity, civil liberty, and freedom, not only in terms of the absolute value of national dignity, which can generate strong nationalistic fervor.

Nowadays, Peking officials tend to make a mistake insisting that Taiwan needs to be reunified with China, the Ancestor's Country. It is ironic that Taiwan has already been unified with China since 1945. And the unification has made many Taiwanese pay a great price. The legacy of the political institution of the ROC and the political discords between the Mandarin-speaking mainlander and the *Taiyu*-speaking population can testify to the existence of this "unification" reality. Peking officials sometimes make another mistake by saying "Taiwan and China have been separated from each other for about fifty years." From the Taiwanese perspective, Taiwan and the rest of China have been, in fact, separated for more than one hundred years. Indeed, a lot of significant events and historical happenings have impacted profoundly on the common folks in both mainland and Taiwan without the participation of the others. The identity differences need to be recognized and respected, not only for those between the mainlanders and the Taiwanese in Taiwan, but also for those between the peoples in Taiwan and in mainland China. Not knowing properly the historical and fundamental sources of these differences can only lead to extreme patriotism and jingoism. In the current situation, any pressuring tactics toward hasty independence or unification is bound to be disastrous for all involved.

Notes

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1. For instance, Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, and Eric Hobsbawm's *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programs, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, are the two prominent books holding this position.
2. As Eric Hobsbawm has said about the ideological nature of nationalism "... that no serious historian of nations and nationalism can be a committed political nationalist ... nationalism requires too much belief in what is patently not so." Hobsbawm, *ibid.*, p. 12.
3. Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern Identity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989, p. 35.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

6. Anthropologists believe that Taiwan aborigines are members of the Austronesian family.
7. Li Guoqi, "Qingji taiwan de zhengzhi xiandaihua-kaishan fufan yu jiansheng (1875-1894)" (The Political Modernization of Taiwan in Qing Dynasty—Open Mountain Territories, Cultivating Savages and Establishing the Province) in *Zhonghua wenhua faxing yuekan*, vol. 8, no. 12, 1975, pp. 4-16.
8. Chen Qinan "Tuzhuhua yu neidihua: luen qingdai taiwan hanren shehui de fazhan." (Become Native and Become Inland: On the Development of the Society of the Taiwan Han Folks). In *Zhongguo haiyang fazhan luenwenji*. Taipei: Institute of the People's Three Principles, Academia Sinica, 1984, pp. 335-366.
9. As one of the most famous Chinese nationalistic intellectuals during the early twentieth century, Liang Qichao, once put it, it was only after the loss of this first Sino-Japan War and the signing of the *Shimonoseki Treaty* that Chinese intellectuals became finally awakened by their national crisis.
10. About 14,000 Taiwanese were killed in the first year of Japanese advancement in Taiwan. And about 12,000 were killed from 1898 to 1902. See Huang Zhaotang, *Taiwan na xiang na li si wen (Taiwan Nationalism)*. Taipei: Qianwei, 1998, p. 9.
11. See Wu Zhulin's widely acclaimed novel, *Yasiya de guer (The Orphan of Asia)*.
12. Luo Fuxing was a Hakka who became involved with the Kuomintang and Hakka nationalistic Qiu Fengjia. His plan was to organize a rebel to drive out the Japanese. This incident sent more than one thousand Taiwanese to execution by Japanese police.
13. See Wang Yude (or Ong Jok-rik) *Tai-wan-kumen de lishi (The Suffocating History of Taiwan)*. Taipei: Qianwei, 1999, p. 129.
14. Huang, *Taiwan na xiang na li si wen*, p. 13.
15. Huang, *ibid.*, p. 14.
16. Wang, *Tai-wan-kumen de lishi*, p. 132.
17. He has been the Secretary of the Propaganda of the DPP in the early 1990s, and now is a college professor of Taiwanese history.
18. Chen Fangming, "zhimindi geming yu taiwan minzu luen-taiwan gonchandang de 1928 nian gangling yu 1931 nian gangling" (Revolution in Colony and Taiwan Nationalism, the 1928's and 1931's Outlines of Taiwan Communist Party). In Shi Zhengfeng, ed., *Taiwan minzu zhuyi*. Taipei: Qianwei, 1994, pp. 287-320.
19. The left-wing activists feared that a representative Taiwan Council, supposed to be elected indirectly from regional elite, would be dominated and manipulated by the elite's interests, whereas the poor masses would still left exploited by the landlords.
20. Huang, *Taiwan na xiang na li si wen*, pp. 49-50.
21. Taiwan minzhong dang (the People's Party) was the first political party formed by the Taiwanese and Dr. Jiang weishui in 1927. It was closed down by the Japanese in 1932. Jiang weishui was inspired by the southern revolution and the northern expedition led by the Kuomintang in China. *Minzhong dang's* party flag actually resembles that of the Kuomintang's.

22. See Douglas Fix, *Taiwanese Nationalism and its Late Colonial Context*. Ann Arbor: UMI Dissertation Service, 1993, pp. 76-77.
23. Huang *Taiwan na xiang na li si wen*, (note 10) p. 139
24. For instance, see Wang, *Tai-wan-kumen de lishi*, pp. 127-138.
25. Huang, *Taiwan na xiang na li si wen*, pp. 48-50.
26. Huang, *ibid.*, pp.10-11, 17.
27. But for these last measures, especially giving up ancestor's tablet for the Emperor, many had drawn the line by refusing to do so or by doing so only under force.
28. Huang, *Taiwan na xiang na li si wen*, p. 17.
29. The total number of Taiwanese in the Japanese military was about two hundred thousands or more. During the last year of the War, more than forty thousand Taiwanese were also drafted (involuntarily) to join the military.
30. Wang, *Tai-wan-kumen de lishi*, p. 148.
31. For instance, both Huang Zhaotang and Wang Yude have refused to pass easy judgment on Taiwanese collaborators in their books.
32. And this difference in people's moral horizons, in effect, has contributed to the repercussion, inside the Chinese Nationalists and Kuomintang in 1994, after the interview of President Lee by Shiba Ryotaro, mentioned earlier. Lee was criticized by the Nationalistic Chinese for sympathizing with the *Kominka* movement and Japan's rule in Taiwan, and hence supporting the opposition; on the other hand, Lee was also highly praised by many Taiwanese for voicing their feelings.
33. The estimates of the killings of Taiwanese range from 8,000 to 22,000, depending on the sources. The entire population of Taiwan at that time was about six million.
34. Some argued that the postwar Independence movement idea began from the proposal made by a small number of mid-ranking Japanese officers and collaborating Taiwanese elite during the first few weeks of Japanese surrender (see, for example, Hsu Jieliu, *Taiwan zhanhou shiji*, or *The Historical Notes on Post-War Taiwan*, vol. 1, ch. 7, and the net edition at http://aff.law.ntu.edu.tw/after_war/content.html,12/10/99). But it was just a bubble conspiracy with support from neither the Japanese high official nor the general public. Its importance should not be over-emphasized.
35. Huang, *Taiwan na xiang na li si wen*, pp. 17-18, 74-76.
36. See Douglas Fix, *Taiwanese Nationalism*, chapter 5.
37. Wang, *Tai-wan-kumen de lishi*, (note 13) p. 157. Dr. Wang lost his elder brother during the 228 incident when he was still a student. He was forced into exile to Japan in 1949. He commented angrily in his book: "only now (referring to the abusiveness of Chinese officials in Taiwan), Taiwanese began to miss the Japanese period. Taiwanese despised Japanese and had called them 'dogs.' 'Dogs' bark, but 'dogs' will watch the door for you. Chinese are 'pigs.' 'Pigs' have no worth except for glutting themselves."
38. Peng Mingmin "Peng mingmin huiyilu—the Taste of Freedom." Taipei: Qianwei Publishing Co., 1988, p. 80.

39. Allen Chun, "From Nationalism to Nationalizing: Cultural Imagination and State Formation in Postwar Taiwan," in Jonathan Unger, *Chinese Nationalism*. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996, pp. 126-147.
40. Charles Taylor, "Nationalism and Modernity." In Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan, *The Morality of Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 31-55.
41. The government thought it had many other ways to win elections despite a small number of "agitators." It might have been under pressure of American human rights' foreign policy since Jimmy Carter. The "holiday" was therefore allowed to win recognition of the legitimacy of the elections.
42. An extreme case was the suicidal protest by Zheng Nanrong who set himself on fire in 1989 when the Garrison Command attempted to arrest him for printing the Draft of the New Constitution of the Republic of Taiwan in his magazine, *Ziyoushidai* (Time for Freedom).
43. For DPP's crisis during self-transforming, from a champion of Taiwan independence to a more moderate political party, see Guo Zhengliang, *Minjindang zhuanxing zhi tong* (The Pains of DPP's Transformation). Taipei: Tianxia, 1998.
44. This can also be found in the same interview called "the Sadness of Being Taiwanese" reported by Shiba Ryotaro in 1994.
45. On this matter, the DPP and President Lee concur with each other after the submission of the "Two-States Position" by Lee in 1999.