

# **The Perception of Social Distance of Foreign Migrants in a Multiethnic Society:**

## **The Case of Taiwan**

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### **ABSTRACT**

Since the late 1980s, Taiwan has been an important destination for many labor and marriage migrants from Mainland China and Southeast Asian countries. But, if Taiwan is to build a friendly environment for foreigners in an era of globalization, it is necessary to investigate public attitudes toward accepting migrants into Taiwanese society. Using data from the 2008 Taiwan Social Change Survey, this paper examines the receptivity of Taiwanese society to migrants by using social distance as an index to compare various attitudes expressed toward foreign migrants from different countries. Our results point out that among six countries of origin—Japan, South Korea, Mainland China, Southeast Asia, Europe and North America—Taiwanese tend to be friendlier toward those from Japan, Europe and North America. The results of multinomial logistic regression models suggest that the net effects of socio-demographic characteristics, both cultural contact and cultural ideology, are crucial determinants in forming a largely positive attitude toward foreign migrants. We conclude that social exposure is indeed a significant mechanism accounting for positive attitudes, however, findings on occurrences of xenophobia and antagonism towards people from less-developed countries imply that both cultural proximity and economic developmental status contribute to the social distance between the Taiwanese and migrants.

## INTRODUCTION

To thrive in an era of globalization, many countries are trying to attract a variety of talented individuals, investors, and skilled workers to contribute to their development. Over the last two decades, Taiwan has become a net receiver of migrants, but the influx has consisted largely of blue-collar guest workers, domestic helpers, and marriage migrants. 2009 official statistics show that guest workers in the fields of manufacturing and construction accounted for about 75.9 percent of the total foreign population in Taiwan. Due to the nuclearization of households and rapid aging of the population, policies have been loosened to allow in domestic workers to meet the growing demand for housekeeping and personal care services. Also, there has been a remarkable increase in the number of cross-border marriages since the late 1990s, with marriages between Taiwanese citizens and foreigners accounting for one-in-five marriages, with 60.7 percent of foreign spouses coming from Mainland China (including Hong Kong and Macau), 16.7 percent from Vietnam, 4.1 percent from Japan, and 3.7 percent from the United States (GIO, 2011).

Inward migration presents many challenges to Taiwanese society, not only with regards to social and political issues, but there are potential economic consequences. Some studies have indicated that there is some hostility towards foreign spouses—most of whom come from Mainland China and Southeast Asia (Yi and Chang, 2006; Chang, 2011)—and towards their children (Chen, 2008). Although migrant workers either fill skill niches in the service economy, or do work regarded as socially inappropriate or undesirable by Taiwanese (Lee, 2002), it is sometimes claimed that migrant labor exerts a strongly negative pressure on the unemployment rate of the local labor force (Tsay and Lin, 2001). Many sensationalistic headlines claim the costs associated with foreign migrant labor are greater than the rewards, and urge the government to reconsider a more restrictive policy for allowing in people from less-developed countries. Consequently, stereotypes and prejudice are transmitted through negative portrayals of specific migrants in the media.

Despite increasing public anxiety about inward migration, few studies have investigated the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics that shape perceptions of the impact of migrants on Taiwanese society—particularly guest workers and marriage immigrants from Southeast Asian countries and Mainland China. To explore how open Taiwanese society is, it is our intention to explore more deeply migrants' origins, looking at the linkages of their societies to Taiwan in historical, cultural, economic and geographic contexts so as to make meaningful comparisons. Drawing on Bogardus' concept of social distance (1959), we evaluate how the Taiwanese perceive and differentiate their relationships with migrants.

Thus, the first purpose of this study is to investigate variations in Taiwanese attitudes toward acceptance of migrants as co-workers, neighbors, and relatives by marriage. By constructing a typology to represent different attitudes towards immigration, it should also be possible to identify the most crucial and effective determinants, as proposed by previous studies and theoretical explanations, in predicting Taiwanese attitudes toward migrants from specific countries or regions. And thirdly, based on empirical results, we evaluate the utility of self-reported measures in studying attitudes toward migrants and the social context of ethnicity within Taiwanese society.

In the following section, we review major theoretical perspectives and empirical results explaining variations in perceptions of migrant workers and immigrants. Section Three provides a detailed description of the data, measurements and methods used in the analysis. Then we present our results from multinomial logistic regressions of the determinants of attitudes towards people from different countries or regions. In the final section, we summarize major findings and discuss our results and limitations.

## **BORGADUS' SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE**

Some people easily accept foreigners, but others are highly suspicious or even hostile to people who are not like *us*. Having been a destination for migration at different time periods, Taiwan presents a suitable environment for studying people's perceptions of social distance and exploring what forms their attitudes toward foreign migrants. Proposed by Emory S. Bogardus (1959), the concept of social distance was a construct thought to reflect the degrees of emotional intimacy or social prejudice to outsiders. It has been defined as a willingness to be associated with a certain group or individuals, or with a particular concern in situations of racial integration and equality.

The original social distance scale was designed as a 7-point Guttman scale concerning seven ordinal conditions (marriage, close friend, neighbor, co-worker, citizen, visitor to my country, and excluded from my country). The lower the score, the higher the degree of intimacy a respondent would grant to a particular racial/ethnic group. It was implied that a respondent who agreed with any particular item also agreed with all of the preceding items. As a simple but effective research tool, this scale was replicated by Bogardus himself in four nationwide surveys of American college students from 1926 to 1966, and later by Owen and her colleagues in 1977 (Owen, Eisne and McFaul, 1981). The latest national survey was conducted in 2001, with a few invisible ethnic groups replaced by increasing ones in the list of questionnaire. These studies suggest a growing level of acceptance by an increasingly diverse American society, but race remains the most significant factor in determining personal attitudes toward other racial groups, especially when it comes to intermarriage across a racial boundary (Parrillo and Donoghue, 2005). The Bogardus' concept was also utilized to measure attitudes toward groups varying by religion, occupation and nationality (Triandis et al., 1965). Scholars have recognized the applicability of social distance to communities with intellectual disabilities and the scale has been used as an estimate of discrimination against persons with different (Ouellette-Kuntz et al., 2010).

Nevertheless, the ordinal and cumulative nature of social distance scale has been criticized as too simple to detect the intimacy of intergroup relations. Social interactions and attitudes may differ substantially from close family or friendship relations, to symbolic cultural contacts that occur within and beyond the boundary of one's own country (Sherif, 1973). Since the Guttman scale claims there is a cumulative pattern resulting from the social construction of agreement and disagreement, it is an open question whether the ordered situations chosen in Bogardus' original scale indeed represent individuals' perceptions of social distance. Furthermore, as a self-reported attitudinal design, the social distance scale has the potential to be biased by social desirability or political correctness, which in turn may threaten the validity of measurements (Kleg and Yamamoto, 1998).

In response to these criticisms, the Borgadus' scale has been modified from its original version to fit different social contexts and research purposes. Adopting the concept of social distance, the 2008 Taiwan Social Change Survey focused only on three social situations within which Taiwanese were more likely to interact with foreign immigrants. Using a dichotomous response design, all respondents were asked to answer whether they "approve" or "disapprove" of a foreigner from the six specified countries and regions "being close kin by marriage," "being neighbors in the same street," and "being co-workers in your workplace."

## **DETERMINANTS OF SOCIAL DISTANCE TOWARD FOREIGN MIGRANTS**

Previous studies have been devoted to investigating how the degrees of social distance can vary in ascribed attributes such as age, gender as well as racial/ethnic background. While many scholars argue that younger people and women tend to express less social distance toward immigrants, empirical studies have produced mixed results with respect to the impacts of age and gender on immigration attitudes (Chandler and Tsai, 2001; Tsai, 2011; Yi and Chang, 2006). The lack of consistency implies that, with reference to a particular social occasion, the degree of intimacy can be interpreted differently depending on the cultural background of respondents (Sherif, 1973) and their perception of threat aroused by the size of particular immigrants (Meuleman et al., 2009). Taiwan, as a society with a relatively long history of immigration, provides a fascinating case study for further explores of the variation in attitudes toward foreigners.

### **A Brief Note on the Taiwanese Immigration Related Background**

Both anthropologists and sociologists have long been interested in the boundaries and relations within and between the Han population and aboriginals. Aboriginals have inhabited the island for long, but constitute less than five percent of the total population. The majority of Taiwanese are the descendants of immigrants that arrived in two main waves—the first wave in the 17th century consisted of people of Fujian and Hakka origins, and the other in 1949, when the Nationalist government relocated to the island. As they occupied different social positions and resources, the possibility of intermarriage across ethnic boundaries was often used to reflect the degree of closeness of ethnic relationship in these studies (Chen et al., 1994; Chuang, 1994; Tsai, 1996; Wang, 1993). It is worth noting that recent studies have demonstrated the effects of frequent social contacts (within family, at school and workplace) in contributing to boundary-crossing marriages among Han ethnic groups (Hsieh and Chen, 2009; Tsay and Wu, 2006; Wang, 2001).

Since the 1990s, an increasing number of marriages between Taiwanese and foreign nationals, including many from Southeast Asia and Mainland China, has added to the diversity Taiwan's ethnic make up. Nevertheless, locals have explicitly expressed anxiety in response to a changing social context and less restrictive immigration policy. Concerning human capital, marriage immigrants from less developed countries were generally disfavored by Taiwanese. Referring to Mainland Chinese brides, scholars have emphasized the significance of 'ethnic politics' in explaining the differential attitudes between Han ethnic groups (Tsai, 2011). Given pre-existing family and kinship relations, Mainlanders who moved to Taiwan after the Civil War are more likely to accept marriage immigrants from China than are their Fujian and Hakka counterparts

(Chen and Yu, 2005; Yi and Chang, 2006). However, anxiety is also raised by the importation of less skilled workers from the same regions. Several empirical studies have attempted to explore whether occupation-based competition exists in the local labor market and did find some evidence of a heightened unemployment rate among less skilled Taiwanese workers, but not professional and managerial workers (Tsay and Lin, 2001). The potential economic competition might not only lead to negative attitudes toward guest workers, but worsen the ethnic politics mentioned above (Tsai and Chang, 2010).

### **The Economic Explanation**

As a society becomes ethnically diverse, the political, economic and social powers of locals might be threatened by foreign migrants. Many scholars have concluded that education is the most consistent characteristic in explaining individual attitudes toward immigrants under such circumstances (Rustenbach, 2010). There are two major arguments that attempt to take account of this relationship. The first—based on the split labor market theory, or economic competition perspective—argues that less educated natives are more likely to feel antagonistic because they have lost, or fear to lose, their jobs at the bottom of labor hierarchy—a position in which immigrants are generally overrepresented (Bonacich, 1972; Chandler and Tsai, 2001; Fetzer, 2000; Mayda, 2006; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2004). Whether or not foreign migrants contribute to lowering wages and employment is still inconclusive, but a general feeling that migrants are to blame for economic hardship is prevalent in Taiwanese society (Chang, 2011). Since the concentration of foreign migrants in particular occupations also depends on their countries of origin, respondents who are laborers or have lower social status may exhibit antagonism toward immigrants from Southeast Asia. In contrast, those in professional or technical jobs may express negative attitudes toward foreigners from the developed world.

### **The Cultural Explanation: Contact and Ideology**

Despite the importance of economic motives, the cultural exposure and contacts explanation has received more attention in recent years. Proponents of this view posit that higher education creates a social environment in which individuals have more opportunities to contact people from different cultures and racial/ethnic groups. As a result, more educated people are more likely to have a cosmopolitanism view which contributes to greater tolerance of outsiders and immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Haubert and Fussell, 2006). While previous studies have taken holding a college degree as a measure of cosmopolitanism (Chandler and Tsai, 2001; Haubert and Fussell, 2006), we tend to use the years of education to build a more parsimonious model, for two reasons. First, colleges in Taiwan are relatively diverse, and vocational colleges are hardly expected to offer students a multicultural education. Second, based on the descriptive statistics, there is a linear positive relationship between years of education and acceptance of foreigners.

In addition to education, the empirical evidence suggests that social distance can be conceptualized on the basis of other parameters, such as the frequency of interaction between different groups, or normative social distinctions about who should be considered as an *insider* or *outsider* (Karakayali, 2009). Drawn from Allport's contact hypothesis (1954), also known as intergroup contact theory, interpersonal contact is one of the most effective ways of reducing

prejudice and conflicts between groups. Allport distinguishes between several kinds of social contact such as casual contact, acquaintance, and contact in pursuit of common objectives. He concludes that mutual prejudice could be reduced through true or sustained acquaintance (i.e., friends, colleagues, and co-workers), but posited that superficial casual contact cannot decrease prejudice toward other groups. The empirical evidence following the contact hypothesis shows that the level of perceived threat is likely to decrease or even diminish as groups have more opportunities to interact and become familiar with an unknown culture. Studies have found that, in some cases, the positive effect of intergroup contact extends to other groups not involved in the particular two-group contact (Pettigrew, 2009; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). In this study, using “travel experience” and “have acquaintances” in each specified country or region, we test the effects of two types of intergroup contact on acceptance of six particular nationalities.

A variety of ideas, values, and courses of action are spreading from society to society through the process of cultural diffusion. Globalization generally promotes indirect diffusion, which results in cultural changes that are embedded in societies even when the two cultures do not have direct geographical contact. Thus, it is reasonable to propose that an individual who is interested in discussing, exploring and sharing one’s understanding and knowledge of global issues would be more likely to have a positive attitude toward immigrants.

Unlike the socio-demographic characteristics and intergroup contact hypothesis, for which more empirical evidence has been accumulated, the normative and structural aspects of social distance were less well explored in previous studies. While researchers are optimistic about cosmopolitanism emerging from global civil society, the existence of xenophobia remains evident in some opinion polls and news headlines. In the Europe, public polls have found that prejudice may be more about society than individuals. The anxieties expressed by respondents seemed to result not so much from the actual presence of minority groups but from the perception as to the ability of the host country to accommodate these newcomers (European Commission, 1998). Concerning both the size and density of the Taiwan population, some people tend to blame that the increase in foreign immigrants, regardless of nationality, would worsen employment opportunities in the local labor market and the progress of industrial restructuring. In addition to xenophobia and prejudice toward foreigners in general, the in-group bias is the other social phenomenon used to explain an overall negative attitudes toward acceptance of outsiders in the society. It is understandable that people tend to hold positive attitudes toward members of their own groups. However, in-group bias is the tendency for people to give preferential treatment to others when they are perceived as belonging to similar groups. In particular, in- and out-groups are often divided by cultures, genders, and languages. Studies have shown that out-group members are more likely to be discriminated against than in-group members, due to favoritism displayed towards those most like oneself (Ahmed, 2007). Additional research has shown that in-group bias is stronger when social identity is salient (Giannakakis and Fritsche, 2011).

In short, applying the concept of Borgadus’ social distance, we first estimate the perceived social distance of Taiwanese toward immigrants from six countries/regions with regard to being co-workers, neighbors, or close kin. Next, the multinomial logistic regression is used to examine the effectiveness of determinants discussed above. To explore the effects of higher education and social status on the attitudes of Taiwanese toward immigrants, we include only the socio-

demographic characteristics in the baseline model. Then, we consider the predictive power of cultural contact hypothesis and cultural ideology within the model, and examine whether these determinants significantly mediate the impacts of education and social status on attitudes toward foreigners.

## **DATA, MEASUREMENT, AND METHOD**

### ***Data***

This study used data from the culture and globalization module of the 2008 Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS). In the mid-1980s, the TSCS was launched to collect data on public attitudes on social, economic, political and moral issues for tracking long-term trends of social changes in Taiwan. To investigate cultural homogeneity and heterogeneity in East Asian, the 2008 survey was a collaborative project of four national surveys in the region: the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS), Japanese General Social Survey (JGSS), Korean General Social Survey (KGSS), and TSCS.

The 2008 TSCS survey included a variety of measures on values, attitudes, and behaviors with regard to migration and citizenship. Based on the three-stage stratified random sampling scheme, 4,604 Taiwanese aged 18 years and older were selected and face-to-face interviews were conducted in summer. The final sample consisted of 2,067 respondents, with a response rate of 53 percent.

In this study, 132 cases were excluded due to incomplete data on attitudes toward immigrants from different countries and regions. The relatively small number of aboriginals (33 respondents) and recent immigrants (11 respondents) were also eliminated. This is because the anti-immigrant attitude prevails among socioeconomically disadvantaged aboriginals, who tend to treat immigrants as a threat in the labor market competition (Fetzer, 2000). Those reporting the most positive attitudes toward immigrants from different countries and regions are themselves recent immigrants (*see* Appendix for details). Excluding missing data, the final sample size available for analysis was 1,867.

### ***Dependent Variable***

To estimate the perceived social distance between Taiwanese and foreigners, six major regions were pre-selected and respondents were asked to answer a series of questions: “Do you accept having foreigners from the following six countries or regions, Japan, South Korea, China, Southeast Asia, Europe, and North America: (1) working alongside with you, (2) living in your neighborhood, and (3) being your close kin by marriage?” Participants were required to indicate that they “approve” or “disapprove” of each specified relationship with foreigners from each country or region. Figure 1 shows the distribution of attitudes toward acceptance of immigrants from six different countries/regions in the specified circumstances.




Figure 1. Acceptance of Immigrants from Six Countries or Regions

Each statement presents a situation indicating a certain level of acceptance of the specified relationship as well as the country/region. Answers gathered are regarded as indicative of the degree of social distance expressed by respondents. Unlike the original ordered items proposed by Borgardus (1954), regardless of the nationality of immigrants, “being neighbors on the same street” are most likely to be accepted by Taiwanese. 87 percent of Taiwanese feel positive toward Japanese as neighbors, followed by North Americans and Europeans. For South Koreans, Chinese, and Southeast Asians, the corresponding positive figures are 70 percent, 68 percent, and 71 percent, respectively. In terms of “being co-workers,” Japanese, Europeans and North Americans were, again, more accepted than others. Surprisingly, the lowest acceptance goes to South Koreans (61 percent), which may reflect the potential competition between South Korea and Taiwan in high tech and other industries. The situation least likely to be accepted is “being close kin by marriage”. Owing to similarities in culture and language, more respondents expressed approval of Chinese individuals (67 percent). The above pattern suggests that Taiwanese tend to differentiate between foreigners not only according to the level of economic development, as social or cultural concerns also matter.

As the social distance between Taiwanese and foreigners differs considerably depending on the specified relationship and from the country origin, multivariate analyses are performed for each country or region separately. Based on answers given to these three situation, the dependent variable was reconstructed as an integrated measure, and four typological attitudes toward acceptance of immigrants from a specified country or region were generated. The four types used for analyses are “willing to accept immigrants in all situations,” “willing to accept immigrants as co-workers and either as neighbors or as relatives,” “willing to accept immigrants either as

neighbors or as relatives, but not as co-workers,” and “rejecting immigrants in any situation.” As shown in Table 1, 70 percent of Taiwanese expressed a willingness to accept Japanese as co-workers, neighbors, and relatives. In comparison with other countries or regions, it is obvious that Taiwanese feel the least social distance with Japanese. Only 9 percent of Taiwanese reject any Japanese immigrants, the lowest figure across six countries or regions. Immigrants from Europe and North America are accepted moderately by Taiwanese. In contrast, South Koreans, Mainland Chinese and Southeast Asians are less approved of, with nearly one-fifth of Taiwanese report strongly negative feelings. Given the discrete nature of the dependent variable, multinomial logistic regression is performed to analyze the effects of determinants of four typological attitudes toward immigrants from each country and region separately. Those “willing to accept immigrants in all situations” are used as the reference category.

Table 1. Distribution of Typological Attitudes toward Acceptance of Migrants from Six Countries or Regions

	Japan	South Korea	China	S.E. Asia	Europe	North America
Accept immigrants in all situations *	70.2	49.6	52.6	52.2	63.1	65.1
Accept immigrants as co-workers, and as neighbors or relatives	10.4	11.4	11.1	15.7	10.4	10.5
Accept immigrants as neighbors and/or relatives, but not co-workers	10.5	17.3	14.3	12.2	11.3	10.0
Reject immigrants in any situations	8.9	21.7	22.0	19.9	15.2	14.4

\* Reference category in the multinomial logistic regression analysis.

### *Independent Variables*

Three sets of independent variables were used in the multivariate analysis to examine their effects on social distance or attitudes toward migrants. As previous studies have identified the effects of personal attributes such as age, gender, marital status, and ethnicity, place of residence, education, and employment pattern on public attitudes toward immigrants, we include these standard socioeconomic and demographic control variables in the baseline model. Respondent’s AGE was coded in years and GENDER was recoded as a dichotomous variable, with female taken as the reference group. MARITAL STATUS was divided into single and other (reference group). With respect to the multiethnic nature of Taiwan’s society, we include the ETHNIC BACKGROUND of respondents, broken down into three categories: Fujian, Hakka, and Mainlanders. Two dummy variables were generated with Mainlanders as the reference group. Place of residence was divided into rural and urban areas, with the latter taken as the reference group.

Levels of education and years of education are two popular measures for reflecting people's human capital. Recent migration studies have shown a linear effect of education on the attitude toward immigrants (Rustenbach, 2010; Tasi, 2011). To make the multivariate analysis more parsimonious, YEARS OF EDUCATION was used to represent respondent's educational attainment. While employment status and income per capita are better indicators for the economic situation of individuals, the lack of data (i.e., currently unemployed and non-workers) to some extent produces less powerful or biased prediction. Therefore, the economic security was measured by a subjective evaluation, SOCIAL STATUS. Respondents were asked, "In our society, some may occupy higher social positions and others may be at lower positions. Given 10 points as the highest status and 1 point as the lowest status, would you say which score is more likely to represent your current social status?" 24 respondents were excluded from the analysis due to data missing. The descriptive statistics of independent variables are presented in Table 2.

The concept of cultural contact includes three measures. Respondents were asked, "Have you ever been to this country or region?" and "Do you have acquaintances from this country or region?" Travel experience is used to represent the CASUAL CONTACT with foreigners, with the latter offering information on REAL CONTACT with foreigners. Referring to six targeted countries and regions, all that applied to respondent's experience were recoded. Table 2 shows that Taiwanese are more likely to travel to Japan, China, and Southeast Asia. 31.3 percent of respondents have acquaintances in China, followed by 19.8 percent in Southeast Asia. Fewer respondents have acquaintances in Japan or North America. The 2008 survey shows that Taiwanese are least likely to have substantial contact with people in South Koreans and Europeans. The third measure of GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE was generated from answers to the question: "How often do you talk about international issues with your family members, friends, or other people?" Seven categories ranging from never (1 point) to almost everyday (7 points) were recoded.

The third group of explanatory variables, cultural ideology, includes two measures to denote one's conservative ideology and preference. XENOPHOBIA measures an overall evaluation by respondents with regards to economic and environmental threats resulting from immigration. Three questions were asked: "Mobility of people, goods, and capital etc. has been increasing among countries and regions; do you think it good or bad for the economy, opportunities in the local labor market, and the environment in general?" Respondents were required to indicate, on a 7-point Likert-like scale, their level of approval of or disapproval of the three statements. The mean scores range from 1 to 7 points. Xenophobia is represented by the higher score. The other variable, the IN-GROUP ORIENTATION, was recoded from the question: "When hiring someone at a private company, even if a person with whom you are unacquainted is the more qualified, it will be better to give the opportunity to relatives or friends." A 7-point Likert-like scale was also used to reflect the level of agreement, ranging from strongly disagree (1 point) to strongly agree (7 points). A higher score indicates a stronger in-group orientation held by the respondent.

### *Analysis*

In the next section, we use multinomial logistic regression method to assess separately the proposed independent variables on four typological attitudes toward migrants from six countries

and regions. Since four attitudes toward migrants are not ordered measures, it is inappropriate to use ordered logistic regression. Two models are provided for evaluating whether the influence of education and economic condition on attitudes toward migration could be mediated by cultural contact, values, and preferences. The first baseline model includes only socio-demographic attributes, and the other model adds all explanatory variables for predicting attitudes toward migrants from different countries and regions.

## **DETERMINANTS OF ATTITUDES TOWARD ACCEPTANCE OF MIGRANTS**

Applying the multinomial logistic regression model, the effects of explanatory determinants on four types of attitudes toward migrants from six targeting countries or regions were examined separately. To explore the most critical characteristics associated with anti-immigrant attitudes held by Taiwanese, the category of “willing to accept migrants in all situations” was chosen as the reference group. As a result, three equations including “reject migrants in all situations,” “willing to accept migrants as neighbors or relatives, but not co-workers,” “willing to accept migrants as co-workers, and as neighbors or relatives” versus “willing to accept migrants in all situations” were compared.

### *Japan*

The log odds of typological attitudes toward Japanese are regressed on age, gender, ethnicity, marital status, years of education, social status, and place of residence and the results are shown in Model A in Table 3. Overall, Taiwanese hold a relatively positive attitude toward Japanese migrants, as co-workers, neighbors, and relatives. The increase in years of education leads to significantly lower log odds of disapproving of Japanese, net of the effects of other socio-demographic attributes. A higher subjectively reported social status is also associated with positive attitudes toward Japanese. In comparison to Mainlanders, both Fujian and Hakka people are more likely to accept Japanese migrants. For other control variables, rural residents are less likely to welcome migrants from Japan than their urban counterparts. In terms of the effect of marital status, we find that single Taiwanese are less likely to entirely disapprove of Japanese migrants. The effects of age and gender on attitudes toward Japanese are not significant in the baseline model.

(Table 3 about here)

Next, we add other predicting variables into Model B, examining whether the effects of education and socioeconomic condition on Taiwanese attitudes toward Japanese immigrants are mediated by cultural contact and/or less conservative values and preferences. While ethnicity and marital status show a similar pattern in shaping Taiwanese attitudes toward Japanese migrants in the full model, the effects of education and social status become statistically insignificant, as predicted. Cultural contact and value variables are significantly associated with attitudes toward Japanese immigrants in the anticipated direction, except the effect of general contact through travel. Having acquaintances in Japan and being interested in global issues are positively associated with acceptance of Japanese migrants. Concerns that immigration might worsen the local labor market or the environment are associated with opposition to migrants from Japan. Nevertheless, there is an unexpected effect that results from the sense of in-group preference

reported by respondents. We assume that those who have stronger perception of group differences are more likely to favor their own group and to penalize outsiders. The result shows in-group oriented respondents are actually more willing to accept people from Japan, regardless of the situation. Do Taiwanese view Japanese migrants as in-group members due to the past colonial experience or cultural diffusion? It is worth exploring this social phenomenon in greater detail.

### ***South Korea***

Table 4 presents the results regarding the determinants of Taiwanese attitudes toward the acceptance of migrants from South Korea. The baseline model (Model A) shows that older people and men are more likely to oppose Korean migrants than are their younger counterparts and women, but ethnic background, marital status, social status, and place of residence do not have significant impacts upon attitudes toward Korean migrants. Examining the effect of human capital, the increase in years of education does not reduce negative attitudes toward Korean people. In particular, more educated Taiwanese are less likely to welcome Koreans as co-workers.

(Table 4 about here)

Examining Model B in Table 4, higher education is still associated with an anti-immigrant sentiment toward Koreans, holding other independent variables constant. Although real cultural contact (having acquaintances in South Korea) and global knowledge might decrease the level of antagonism, Taiwanese remain least likely to accept any type of migrant from South Korea. Again, in-group orientation, economic and environmental threats negatively impact the likelihood of acceptance of Korean migrants. Unlike attitudes toward Japanese, in which the variation is effectively explained by independent variables, Taiwanese attitudes toward Korean migrants remain puzzling and a fit subject for further research.

### ***China***

Due to the controversial relationship across the Taiwan Strait, it is important to investigate how Taiwanese express their feelings and report their attitudes toward acceptance of Mainland Chinese with regards to being co-workers, neighbors, or close relatives by marriage. According to Model A in Table 5, more educated Taiwanese are less likely to accept a variety of Chinese migrants. In contrast, respondents of higher social status are more willing to accept people from China. For other control variables, women and rural residents are less likely to accept Chinese migrants than are their counterparts. Respondents' age is not associated with attitudes toward Chinese migrants. It is worth noting that, compared to Mainlanders, who themselves, or whose parents, moved to Taiwan after the Civil War, Fujian and Hakka people are more likely to disapprove of Chinese migrants.

(Table 5 about here)

After adding other predicting variables, respondents' socio-demographic attributes – including gender, ethnicity, years of education, and social status – are still significantly related to attitudes, and show similar patterns of influence derived from the baseline model. In terms of type and

frequency of cultural contact, however, no significant effect is found in Model B for predicting Taiwanese attitudes toward Chinese migrants. On the contrary, people who negatively associate economic or environmental threats with immigration are more likely to disapprove of Chinese migrants. Despite sharing the same cultural origins, the effects of an in-group orientation on attitudes toward Chinese migrants remain statistically significant.

### ***Southeast Asia***

Examining the regression coefficients in Model A of Table 6, only the age, years of education, and marital status of respondents are associated with acceptance of migrants from Southeast Asian countries. Older and married Taiwanese are less likely to support migrants from this region than are their younger and single counterparts. The results also indicate that more educated Taiwanese only partially approve of migrants in general, and guest workers in particular. Other control variables do not show a significant impact on the attitudes of respondents.

(Table 6 about here)

In the full model, regardless of the status of the migrant, an increase in years of education does not reduce the likelihood of disapproving of migrants from Southeast Asia. The effect of age becomes insignificant in Model B, but single Taiwanese are still less likely to reject all migrants from this region. Concerning the impact of cultural contact, Taiwanese who have acquaintances in Southeast Asian countries, or who have more global knowledge, are less likely to reject people from this region. Consistent with our prediction, xenophobia and an in-group orientation are negatively associated with acceptance of Southeast Asian migrants.

### ***Europe and North America***

According to our descriptive statistics, shown in Figure 1, in comparison with other countries or regions, fewer Taiwanese disapprove of migrants from Europe and North America. Since determinants of respondents' attitudes toward migrants from these two regions show similar patterns of influence, we decided to jointly present and evaluate both sets of major findings (Table 7 and Table 8). Several of the socio-demographic attributes of respondents are predictive of a tendency to be accepting of migrants. For instance, Taiwanese who are younger, female, and single, are more willing to approve of people from Western societies than are their older, male, and married counterparts, but regionally significant determinants (ethnic background in particular) have failed to show any significant influence on attitudes toward migrants. Our study suggests that Taiwanese with more education and higher social status are least likely to absolutely disapprove of migrants from Europe and North America.

(Table 7 about here)

(Table 8 about here)

Similar to results discussed above, the xenophobia and in-group orientation expressed by respondents are again associated with negative attitudes toward migrants from Western societies, regardless of the reasons for migration. In terms of the effects of various types and frequencies of

cultural contact, it is important to note that Taiwanese who have acquaintances in North America are less likely to disapprove of people from this region, but this relationship has no significant impact on attitudes toward Europeans. Respondents who are more interested in global issues also reveal more positive attitudes toward people from these two regions.

## CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Against the background of rising numbers of foreign workers and cross-border marriages over the last two decades, this study explores general attitudes toward migrants in Taiwan. Based on historical, cultural, economic and geographic similarities and differences, migrants are categorized as belonging to one of six sources of migrants: Japan, South Korea, China, Southeast Asia, Europe and North America. Using data from the 2008 Taiwan Social Change Survey, we investigate how Taiwanese perceive different types of social distance between themselves and migrants, and what are the crucial determinants of their attitudes toward acceptance of migrants from a specified country or region, whether they are co-workers, neighbors or close kin.

Unlike the original order of Borgadus' social distance scale, our results indicate that residential segregation between groups is not significant in Taiwan, however Taiwanese pay much attention to who is allowed to work in the local labor market, and to who will marry Taiwanese. Regardless of the situation, Japanese, Europeans and North Americans are most likely to be accepted by Taiwanese, as was expected. In terms of the kinship relationship by marriage, Mainland Chinese are more approved of than are immigrants from South Korea or Southeast Asia. We suspect that while economic development may explain the positive attitudes toward migrants from Japan, Europe and North America, and negative attitudes toward China and Southeast Asia, the perception of economic competition likely results in the expression of greater social distance with Korean immigrants.

Examining three social situations separately, like previous studies, we find the social distance toward foreign co-workers is somewhat greater than that toward neighbors or close kin. However, it is by no means easy to identify how an individual distinguishes his/her attitudes pertaining to the public versus private spheres. To create an integrative measure of social distance for the purpose of comparative study, four attitudinal types following a sequential order from pro-immigrants to anti-immigrants are re-constructed. They are "willing to accept migrants in all situations," "willing to accept migrants as co-workers and either as neighbors or as relatives," "willing to accept migrants either as neighbors or as relatives, but not as co-workers" and "reject migrants in all situations." With this constructed social distance, the majority of Taiwanese (49.6%-70.2%) fall into the total acceptance category, at some point, depending on the nationality and origin of the migrants in question.

Our research not only shows that a majority of Taiwanese hold positive attitudes toward migrants, it also contributes to the existing literature on the perception of migrants by demonstrating that socio-demographic attributes, cultural contact as well as cultural ideology are empirically relevant to what attitudes are expressed by Taiwanese. To evaluate the predictive power of competing theoretical explanations, Table 9 presents a summary of major results from the multinomial logistic regression analyses conducted for each specified country and region.

(Table 9 about here)

It is obvious that positive attitudes toward migrants are generally associated with socio-demographic attributes of respondents: age, gender, marital status and place of residence. The only exception is found in the survey of opinions concerning Mainland Chinese, with more men expressing acceptance of migrants from the Mainland, regardless of the social situation. The decisive influence of ethnic background shows sharply different attitudes toward migrants from Japan and China. Compared with Fujian and Hakka, who have settled in Taiwan for several generations, Mainlanders are more likely to endorse Chinese immigrants the rights to work with or marry Taiwanese, but not Japanese immigrants. The anti-Japanese sentiment of Mainlanders is related to Japan's long history of invasions and war crimes in China between 1894 and 1945. The effect of education is apparent in two patterns, with a positive relationship found with regards to migrants from the more advanced regions, and a negative relationship with regards to migrants from South Korea and Southeast Asia. In terms of economic competition theory, it is evident that higher status Taiwanese are less likely to reject migrants regardless of their origins.

For those behaviors related to cultural contact, casual cultural contact (i.e. travel experience) does not change or affect the social distance reported. In contrast, Taiwanese who have real cultural contact, or who have acquaintances in other countries, are more likely to accept migrants, except for those from China or Europe. The complicated relationship between China and Taiwan makes it more difficult to predict Taiwanese feeling toward Mainland Chinese. The cultural differences and geographic segregation between Taiwan and European countries also create a greater social distance. Hence, the cultural explanation fails to exhibit predictive effects.

Overall, both attitude and behavior related to the globalization are found to be significant predictors. As expected, a weak in-group orientation is positively associated with Taiwanese's acceptance of people from other countries. The only exception is that Taiwanese who are more in-group oriented seem to be more willing to accept Japanese. Perhaps this is a historical consequence of Japanese colonialization in Taiwan, which has resulted in greater cultural familiarity. In other words, the cultural contact and cultural ideology in a multi-ethnicity society are important in explaining reported social distance toward various groups of foreign migrants.

Our empirical findings suggest that hostility toward foreign migrants is more likely to be associated with economic rather than with racial motives. Given economic insecurity, a worsening the economy and environment, some Taiwanese may have developed negative attitudes toward immigrants whom they consider potential competitors in the global market, for instance South Koreans, or towards those they consider likely to compete for low-skill employment, for instance people from Southeast Asian countries.

In brief, our study is able to document social distance as a valid indicator of attitudes reflecting the acceptance of foreign migrants in various spheres of one's life. Among six countries or regions from which migrants originate, over half of Taiwanese respondents report a positive impression, with Japanese being the most favored group. In the comparison between having migrants as co-workers, neighbors, or kin, our analyses point out that in addition to expected demographic effects, cultural aspects also need to be taken into account. In particular, the experience of real contact with migrants, frequent discussions of global affairs, as well as

generally favorable attitudes towards globalization contribute to a positive perception of foreign migrants in Taiwan.

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**APPENDIX: Attitudes toward Acceptance of Migrants from Six Countries and Regions:  
Difference between Three Ethnic Groups**

	<b>Japan</b>	<b>S. Korea</b>	<b>China</b>	<b>S.E. Asia</b>	<b>Europe</b>	<b>N. America</b>
% of approval to “working alongside me in my job”						
Han	80.6	61.2	63.8	68.0	73.6	75.6
Aboriginal	60.6	51.5	54.6	51.5	51.5	54.6
Immigrant	72.7	72.7	63.6	81.8	90.9	100.0
% of approval to “on my street as neighbors”						
Han	86.7	69.6	68.2	70.5	80.4	80.9
Aboriginal	66.7	54.6	57.6	57.6	54.6	57.6
Immigrant	72.7	81.8	63.6	100.0	81.8	100.0
% of approval to “as close kin by marriage”						
Han	79.2	63.9	66.6	62.7	72.6	73.6
Aboriginal	50.6	48.5	51.5	45.5	48.5	51.5
Immigrant	72.7	72.7	81.8	90.9	81.8	90.9

Note: The sample consists of 1891 Han people (97.7%), 33 aboriginal people (1.7%) and 11 non-Taiwanese respondents (0.6%). Referring to *The Republic of China Yearbook 2010*, over 95% of Taiwanese are of Han Chinese ancestry and the remainder composed of indigenous Austronesian people and recent immigrants (GIO, 2011).

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables (N=1867)

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>S.D</b>	<b>Range</b>
<i><u>Sociodemographic Attributes</u></i>				
Age		44.2	16.5	19~95
Gender				
Male	49.9			
Female	50.1			
Ethnic background				
Fujian (Holo)	75.5			
Hakka	12.7			
Mainlander	11.8			
Marital status				
Single	29.5			
Married, divorced, widowed	70.5			
Place of residence				
Urban area	54.3			
Rural area	45.7			
Year of education		11.6	4.6	0~25
Social status		5.1	1.7	1~10
<i><u>Cultural Contact</u></i>				
Ever travel in Japan (%)	34.9	Having acquaintance in Japan (%)		16.7
China	36.3	China		31.3
S. Korea	15.2	S. Korea		7.2
S.E. Asia	43.1	S.E. Asia		19.8
Europe	13.2	Europe		7.2
N. America	17.3	N. America		15.1
Global knowledge		3.8	2.2	1~7
<i><u>Cultural Ideology</u></i>				
Xenophobia		3.2	1.4	1~7
In-group orientation		3.2	1.8	1~7

Table 3. Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Taiwanese's Acceptance of Migrants from **Japan**

Independent variable	Model A			Model B		
	Rejection All b (s.e.)	No Co-worker b (s.e.)	Co-worker b (s.e.)	Rejection All b (s.e.)	No Co-worker b (s.e.)	Co-worker b (s.e.)
<i>Socio-demographic</i>						
Age	.01 (.01)	.003 (.01)	.0003 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.001 (.01)	-.002 (.01)
Male	.28 (.18)	-.15 (.16)	-.21 (.16)	.26 (.18)	-.13 (.16)	-.15 (.16)
Ethnic background						
Fujian	-1.14 (.24) <sup>***</sup>	-.58 (.23) <sup>*</sup>	-.49 (.23) <sup>*</sup>	-1.27 (.26) <sup>***</sup>	-.65 (.23) <sup>**</sup>	-.56 (.24) <sup>*</sup>
Hakka	-.75 (.32) <sup>*</sup>	-.46 (.30)	-.29 (.30)	-.99 (.33) <sup>**</sup>	-.60 (.31) <sup>*</sup>	-.33 (.30)
Mainlander (r.)						
Single	-.58 (.28) <sup>*</sup>	-.32 (.23)	.12 (.21)	-.66 (.29) <sup>*</sup>	-.38 (.23)	.15 (.22)
Rural residence	.52 (.18) <sup>**</sup>	-.03 (.16)	.31 (.16) <sup>*</sup>	.35 (.18) <sup>*</sup>	-.12 (.16)	.30 (.16) <sup>*</sup>
Year of education	-.11 (.03) <sup>***</sup>	-.04 (.02) <sup>*</sup>	-.02 (.02)	-.04 (.03)	-.01 (.03)	-.02 (.03)
Social status	-.12 (.05) <sup>*</sup>	-.10 (.05) <sup>*</sup>	.02 (.05)	-.06 (.05)	-.08 (.05)	.03 (.05)
<i>Cultural Contact</i>						
Travel				-.40 (.22)	-.16 (.18)	.07 (.18)
Acquaintance				-1.05 (.41) <sup>*</sup>	-.58 (.26) <sup>*</sup>	.36 (.20)
Global knowledge				-.22 (.05) <sup>***</sup>	-.14 (.04) <sup>**</sup>	-.02 (.04)
<i>Cultural Ideology</i>						
Xenophobia				.22 (.06) <sup>***</sup>	.09 (.06)	.25 (.06) <sup>***</sup>
In-group orientation				.03 (.05)	.06 (.04)	-.11 (.05) <sup>*</sup>
Intercept	-.12 (.69)	-.36 (.63)	-1.46 (.64) <sup>*</sup>	-.88 (.79)	-.65 (.70)	-1.94 (.71) <sup>**</sup>

Notes: The reference category for the equations is "willing to accept migrants in all situations."

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$

Table 4. Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Taiwanese's Acceptance of Migrants from **South Korea**

Independent variable	Model A			Model B		
	Rejection All b (s.e.)	No Co-worker b (s.e.)	Co-worker b (s.e.)	Rejection All b (s.e.)	No Co-worker b (s.e.)	Co-worker b (s.e.)
<i>Socio-demographic</i>						
Age	.03 (.01) <sup>***</sup>	.01 (.01) <sup>*</sup>	-.004 (.01)	.02 (.01) <sup>***</sup>	.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)
Male	.35 (.12) <sup>**</sup>	.08 (.13)	-.27 (.16)	.37 (.13) <sup>**</sup>	.08 (.13)	-.22 (.16)
Ethnic background						
Fujian	.03 (.20)	.11 (.21)	-.48 (.22)	-.03 (.20)	.10 (.21)	-.54 (.23)
Hakka	.23 (.25)	.02 (.28)	-.19 (.28)	.14 (.25)	-.01 (.28)	-.21 (.29)
Mainlander (r.)						
Single	.04 (.17)	-.13 (.18)	.17 (.21)	.01 (.18)	-.14 (.18)	.19 (.21)
Rural residence	-.20 (.13)	-.25 (.13)	.08 (.16)	-.26 (.13)	-.26 (.14)	.05 (.16)
Year of education	.03 (.02)	.04 (.02) <sup>*</sup>	.04 (.02)	.06 (.02) <sup>**</sup>	.05 (.02) <sup>*</sup>	.03 (.03)
Social status	-.03 (.04)	-.02 (.04)	.04 (.05)	-.02 (.04)	-.01 (.04)	.05 (.05)
<i>Cultural Contact</i>						
Travel				.16 (.17)	.06 (.19)	.25 (.22)
Acquaintance				-.58 (.30) <sup>*</sup>	-.02 (.26)	.56 (.25) <sup>*</sup>
Global knowledge				-.09 (.03) <sup>**</sup>	-.05 (.04)	.03 (.04)
<i>Cultural Ideology</i>						
Xenophobia				.08 (.05)	.04 (.05)	.19 (.06) <sup>**</sup>
In-group orientation				.08 (.04) <sup>*</sup>	.005 (.04)	-.08 (.05)
Intercept	-2.34 (.50) <sup>***</sup>	-1.86 (.54) <sup>***</sup>	-1.61 (.64) <sup>**</sup>	-2.80 (.56) <sup>***</sup>	-1.90 (.60) <sup>***</sup>	-1.96 (.72) <sup>**</sup>

Notes: The reference category for the equations is "willing to accept migrants in all situations."

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$

Table 5. Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Taiwanese Acceptance of Migrants from **China**

Independent variable	Model A			Model B		
	Rejection All b (s.e.)	No Co-worker b (s.e.)	Co-worker b (s.e.)	Rejection All b (s.e.)	No Co-worker b (s.e.)	Co-worker b (s.e.)
<i>Socio-demographic</i>						
Age	.002 (.01)	.004 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.001 (.01)	.0002 (.01)	-.01 (.01)
Male	-.06 (.12)	-.28 (.14)*	-.33 (.16)*	-.04 (.12)	-.29 (.14)*	-.30 (.16)*
Ethnic background						
Fujian	.90 (.22)** *	.61 (.24)**	.05 (.24)	.83 (.23)** *	.65 (.25)**	.001 (.24)
Hakka	.98 (.27)** *	.58 (.30)*	.20 (.30)	.89 (.28)** *	.61 (.30)*	.15 (.31)
Mainlander (r.)						
Single	-.18 (.17)	.08 (.19)	.07 (.21)	-.18 (.17)	.10 (.20)	.14 (.21)
Rural residence	-.18 (.12)	.05 (.14)	.32 (.16)*	-.24 (.13)	-.04 (.15)	.29 (.16)
Year of education	.01 (.02)	.04 (.02)*	.03 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.05 (.02)*	.03 (.03)
Social status	-.12 (.04)** *	-.10 (.04)*	-.06 (.05)	-.11 (.04)**	-.10 (.04)*	-.06 (.05)
<i>Cultural Contact</i>						
Travel				.13 (.14)	.32 (.16)	.24 (.18)
Acquaintance				-.13 (.15)	.03 (.16)	-.09 (.18)
Global knowledge				-.06 (.03)	-.04 (.04)	.06 (.04)
<i>Cultural Ideology</i>						
Xenophobia				.17 (.05)** *	.10 (.06)	.22 (.06)** *
In-group orientation				.02 (.04)	.02 (.04)	.02 (.05)
Intercept	-1.12 (.50)*	-1.90 (.58)**	-1.18 (.64)	-1.70 (.56)**	-2.21 (.65)**	-2.17 (.73)**

Notes: The reference category for the equations is “willing to accept migrants in all situations.”

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$

Table 6. Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Taiwanese Acceptance of Migrants from **South East Asia**

Independent variable	Model A						Model B					
	Rejection All		No Co-worker		Co-worker		Rejection All		No Co-worker		Co-worker	
	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)
<i>Socio-demographic</i>												
Age	.01	(.01)*	.005	(.01)	.01	(.01)	.01	(.01)	.01	(.01)	.005	(.01)
Male	.12	(.13)	-.10	(.15)	-.16	(.14)	.13	(.13)	-.11	(.15)	-.13	(.14)
Ethnic background												
Fujian	.16	(.20)	.37	(.25)	-.02	(.21)	.04	(.21)	.36	(.25)	-.06	(.21)
Hakka	.43	(.25)	.33	(.32)	.28	(.26)	.30	(.26)	.30	(.32)	.25	(.26)
Mainlander (r.)												
Single	-.35	(.18)*	-.18	(.21)	-.02	(.18)	-.41	(.19)*	-.24	(.21)	.02	(.19)
Rural residence	-.05	(.13)	-.09	(.15)	.10	(.14)	-.12	(.13)	-.13	(.16)	.07	(.14)
Year of education	-.02	(.02)	.03	(.02)	.07	(.02)**	.003	(.02)	.05	(.02)*	.06	(.02)**
Social status	-.03	(.04)	-.05	(.04)	.01	(.04)	-.02	(.04)	-.04	(.05)	.01	(.04)
<i>Cultural Contact</i>												
Travel							-.02	(.14)	-.15	(.16)	.01	(.15)
Acquaintance							-.96	(.20)**	-.23	(.20)	.12	(.16)
Global knowledge							-.02	(.04)	-.09	(.04)*	.06	(.04)
<i>Cultural Ideology</i>												
Xenophobia							.11	(.05)*	.02	(.06)	.14	(.05)**
In-group orientation							.12	(.04)**	-.02	(.05)	.01	(.04)
Intercept	-1.16	(.51)*	-2.19	(.61)**	-2.25	(.55)**	-1.79	(.58)**	-2.03	(.68)**	-2.98	(.62)**

Notes: The reference category for the equations is “willing to accept migrants in all situations.”

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$

Table 7. Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Taiwanese Acceptance of Migrants from **Europe**

Independent variable	Model A			Model B		
	Rejection All	No Co-worker	Co-worker	Rejection All	No Co-worker	Co-worker
	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)
<i>Socio-demographic</i>						
Age	.02 (.01)**	.01 (.01)*	.02 (.01)*	.02 (.01)**	.01 (.01)*	.01 (.01)*
Male	.40 (.15)**	.25 (.16)	.27 (.16)	.44 (.15)**	.24 (.16)	.30 (.16)*
Ethnic background						
Fujian	.36 (.25)	.15 (.25)	.13 (.24)	.24 (.26)	.14 (.25)	.10 (.24)
Hakka	.62 (.31)	.26 (.31)	.45 (.31)	.45 (.32)	.19 (.32)	-.04 (.32)
Mainlander (r.)						
Single	-.62 (.24)**	-.29 (.22)	.18 (.21)	-.68 (.24)**	-.33 (.22)	.19 (.21)
Rural residence	.32 (.15)*	-.06 (.16)	.16 (.16)	.22 (.15)	-.10 (.16)	.13 (.16)
Year of education	-.11 (.02)**	-.06 (.02)**	.03 (.02)	-.06 (.02)**	-.03 (.02)	.04 (.03)
Social status	-.12 (.04)**	-.07 (.04)	.004 (.05)	-.09 (.04)	-.05 (.04)	.01 (.05)
<i>Cultural Contact</i>						
Travel				.18 (.25)	-.44 (.29)	.08 (.24)
Acquaintance				-.81 (.49)	-.38 (.40)	.23 (.28)
Global knowledge				-.16 (.04)**	-.06 (.04)	-.03 (.04)
<i>Cultural Ideology</i>						
Xenophobia				.15 (.05)**	.03 (.06)	.16 (.06)**
In-group orientation				.12 (.04)**	.01 (.04)	.03 (.05)
Intercept	-1.33 (.60)*	-1.43 (.62)*	-3.21 (.63)***	-1.91 (.66)**	-1.69 (.70)*	-3.79 (.72)***

Notes: The reference category for the equations is “willing to accept migrants in all situations.”

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$

Table 8. Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Taiwanese Acceptance of Migrants from **North America**

Independent variable	Model A			Model B				
	Rejection	All	No Co-worker	Co-worker	Rejection	All	No Co-worker	Co-worker
	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)
<i>Socio-demographic</i>								
Age	.01	(.01)*	.01	(.01)	.01	(.01)	.01	(.01)
Male	.39	(.15)**	.25	(.16)	.41	(.16)**	.40	(.15)**
Ethnic background								
Fujian	.15	(.25)	.19	(.27)	.23	(.25)	.01	(.26)
Hakka	.46	(.30)	.20	(.34)	-.06	(.33)	.25	(.31)
Mainlander (r.)								
Single	-.52	(.23)*	.02	(.23)	.02	(.21)	-.57	(.24)*
Rural residence	.47	(.15)**	-.11	(.16)	.26	(.16)	.34	(.15)
Year of education	-.13	(.02)**	-.08	(.02)**	.02	(.02)	-.06	(.02)*
Social status	-.13	(.04)**	-.09	(.05)*	.05	(.05)	-.10	(.04)*
<i>Cultural Contact</i>								
Travel					-.38	(.28)	.18	(.25)
Acquaintance					-.68	(.37)*	-.67	(.32)*
Global knowledge					-.20	(.04)**	-.06	(.04)
<i>Cultural Ideology</i>								
Xenophobia					.19	(.05)**	.11	(.06)*
In-group orientation					.09	(.04)*	.04	(.05)
Intercept	-.64	(.61)	-1.24	(.67)	-3.38	(.63)***	-1.54	(.68)*

Notes: The reference category for the equations is “willing to accept migrants in all situations.”

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$

Table 9. Summary of Predicted Effects of Independent Variables on Attitude toward Acceptance of Migrants from Six Countries or Regions

	Japan	S. Korea	China	S.E. Asia	Europe	N. America
<i>Socio-demographic Attributes</i>						
Older age		-			-	
Male		-	+		-	-
Mainlander	-		+			
Single	+			+	+	+
Rural residence	-					
Year of education		-		-	+	+
Social status			+			+
<i>Cultural Contact</i>						
Casual contact: travel						
Real contact: acquaintance	+	+		+		+
Global knowledge	+	+		+	+	+
<i>Cultural Ideology</i>						
Xenophobia	-	-	-	-	-	-
In-group orientation	+	-		-	-	
Intercept	+	+	+	+	+	+

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