Issues & Studies© 42, no. 2 (June 2006): 53-83.

Elite Mobility in Post-Reform Rural China

CHIH-JOU JAY CHEN

This study examines the mechanisms and factors that affect the stratification order in post-reform rural China. Using inter-village variations and measurements of social capital and kinship capital, it examines multilevel relationships between village context and individual determinants of career opportunities. It identifies two distinct paths into political and economic elite groups, one emphasizing party loyalty and the other meritocratic principles. At the same time, the political rewards of social capital and kinship networks further show how local social institutions drive stratification order. For cadre posts, the effects of political capital increase notably when it is accompanied by social capital and kinship capital, in addition to human capital. That is, those who are Party members, better educated, more socially connected, and originate from a strong sublineage are more likely to become village cadres. When it comes to entry into entrepreneurship, political, social, and kinship capital lose ground to human capital, which plays a determining role. Nevertheless, two village-level factors—the degree of industrialization and commercialization and the degree to which there is a developmental local state—are found to have significant effects on one's likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur. This study concludes that the distinct paths of status attainment for political and

---

CHIH-JOU JAY CHEN (陳志柔) received his Ph.D. from Duke University in 1997. He is Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Sociology of Academia Sinica, a jointly appointed Associate Professor at the Institute of Sociology, National Tsing Hua University, and Associate Director of the Center for Contemporary China, National Tsing Hua University. He is the author of *Transforming Rural China: How Local Institutions Shape Property Rights in China* (London and New York: Routledge/Curzon, 2004). Dr. Chen would like to acknowledge the research assistance of Te-lin Yu in statistical data analysis. Dr. Chen can be reached at <jaychen@sinica.edu.tw>.

economic elites are products of the workings of distinctive social and economic institutions in today's Chinese villages.

KEYWORDS: elite mobility; social capital; social stratification; kinship networks; rural China.

* * *

China has the world's fastest-growing economy but one of its most unequal societies. Economic reforms since the late 1970s have allowed China to grow at a staggering pace—close to 10 percent a year—but the new wealth has spread unevenly. In June 2005, China's government announced that the income gap had further widened in the first three months of the year, with the most affluent 10 percent of the population controlling 45 percent of the country's wealth while the poorest tenth of the population held little more than 1 percent of the wealth.[1] In particular, the urban-rural cleavage further exacerbates the income gap. In addition to the widening income gap, other measurements of inequality—like concentration of political power and social status—appear to have remained the same, or even increased. In the countryside, the Communist Party-centered power structure, characterized by the dominance of village cadres, has not changed much in the post-reform era. Meanwhile, private entrepreneurs have emerged to form a notable rural elite group representing a lucrative new occupation that enjoys very large income advantages. The Maoist era of egalitarian collectivism has decidedly come to an end. The trends which show growing disparities in income and power distribution in rural China highlight the significance of studying social change and social differentiation brought about by China's post-1978 economic reforms and consequent transformation.

There are several key questions to ask concerning socioeconomic disparities. The fundamental one is, what are the mechanisms of social mobility, the means by which some in society move ahead? Other questions are, who wields political power and who champions entrepreneurial

[1]"Income Gap in China Widens in First Quarter," Xinhua, June 20, 2005, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-06/20/content_3107515.htm.

spirit, and where did they come from? This study examines the mechanisms and factors that affect rural stratification in post-reform China. It investigates whether the status attainment processes in the Chinese rural reforms have varied over time due to the country's rapid economic development and substantial structural changes. It also explores whether elite mobility varies across regions due to their diverse socioeconomic conditions and institutional environment. Empirically, two questions are posed. First, to what extent do individual and village-level factors affect one's career opportunities (i.e., being a village cadre, private entrepreneur, or a farmer or peasant worker) and do clearly separated career advancement paths exist? Second, what is the relationship between individual characteristics and status attainment across villages? Thus the contextual sources of the variation are identified and the effects of institutional changes (i.e., privatization and democratization) and structural changes (i.e., industrialization and urbanization) on the mechanisms of status attainment in Chinese villages are examined.

Research on the Dynamics of China's Social Stratification

Over the past decade rigorous empirical research has been conducted on socioeconomic inequalities and social mobility in China. This research shows both continuity and change in what was once a politicized social mobility regime. However, we still lack convincing answers to long-standing questions and some preliminary answers to more recent ones.

First, despite the fact that the countryside has experienced greater and more profound transformations than urban areas, relatively little research has been conducted on rural China.[2] Of those studies that do deal with rural China, Nee's "market transition theory" has pioneered main-

[2]For a comprehensive review of the literature on Chinese social stratification and social mobility, see Yanjie Bian, "Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility," *Annual Review of Sociology* 28 (2002): 91-116; and Yanjie Bian, "Sociological Research on Reform-Era China," *Issues & Studies* 38, no. 4/39, no. 1 (December 2002/March 2003): 139-74.

stream sociological research on China's social stratification dynamics. It conceptualizes economic transformation as a shift of resource allocation from state redistribution to market institutions, leading to the decline of political power and the rise of human capital and entrepreneurial abilities.[3] Over the past two decades, the once homogeneous "peasant class" has become socially differentiated, and new rural classes have emerged.[4] Market expansion, the transformation of property rights, and the recently introduced grass-roots democracy have deeply transformed the social structure of rural China, and thus prompted a closer examination of the stratification of Chinese villages.

Second, much less attention has been paid to elite stratification than to income distribution in contemporary China studies. Income is only one of several scarce resources in a society and only one indirect indicator, rather than the proxy, of power and political position. Occupations in rural China today are more diversified and thus serve as better indicators for the Weberian concept of authority and neo-Marxist concept of control. In a recent survey Chinese researchers identified and defined eight emerging rural status groups, among which cadres, private entrepreneurs, managers, and petty bourgeois comprise the new elites.[5] In the transformation of post-communist countries, the liberalization of political markets is no less important than the liberalization of economic markets.[6] Indeed, there

---

[3]Victor Nee, "A Theory of Market Transition: From Redistribution to Markets in State Socialism," *American Sociological Review* 54, no. 5 (October 1989): 663-81; Victor Nee, "The Emergence of a Market Society: Changing Mechanisms of Stratification in China," *American Journal of Sociology* 101, no. 4 (January 1996): 908-49; and Yang Cao and Victor Nee, "Comment: Controversies and Evidence in the Market Transition Debate," ibid. 105, no. 4 (January 2000): 1175-89.

[4]For the once homogeneous "peasant class," see William L Parish, "Socialism and the Chinese Peasant Family," *Journal of Asian Studies* 34, no. 3 (May 1975): 613-30.

[5]The eight rural status groups are: (1) village administrators (i.e., village cadres; **農村管理者**), (2) private entrepreneurs (**私營企業主**), (3) managers of township and village enterprises (**鄉鎮企業管理者**), (4) self-employed laborers and individual merchants (**個體勞動者、個體工商戶**), (5) rural intellectuals and professionals (**農村知識份子**), (6) peasant workers (**農民工**), (7) wage laborers (**雇工**), and (8) farmers (**農業勞動者**). See Lu Xueyi, *Dangdai Zhongguo shehui jieceng yanjiu baogao* (A research report on social stratification of contemporary China) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2002), 178.

[6]William L. Parish and Ethan Michelson, "Politics and Markets: Dual Transformations," *American Journal of Sociology* 101, no. 4 (January 1996): 1042-59.

are studies that examine the economic returns of political power.[7] Nevertheless, with the exception of recent works by Walder and his colleagues, little has been done to determine how such elite occupations as cadre posts and entrepreneurial positions are achieved in rural China.[8] Some scholars look forward to seeing market reforms change the political mechanisms of the Chinese Communist regime from a virtuocracy to a meritocracy.[9] Market competition changes the stratification order by rewarding skill and ability rather than rank and authority, and creates a new class of entrepreneurs whose incomes rise relative to administrators and former Party cadres.[10] Meanwhile, the literature also reveals that power and influence persist and generate disproportionate benefits in China's emerging market economy.[11] Walder's study of urban Chinese elites demonstrates that urban China has two distinct career paths that lead to a divided elite. The political path requires both educational and political credentials; the professional path requires educational but not political credentials.[12] As rural China moves away from a planned to a market economy, one question to be addressed is whether dual career paths have emerged, like those existing

---

[7]See, for example, Cao and Nee, "Comment," 1175-89; and Andrew G. Walder, "Income Determination and Market Opportunity in Rural China, 1978-1996," *Journal of Comparative Economics* 30, no. 2 (June 2002): 354-75.

[8]For studies of career mobility in urban China, see Andrew G. Walder, "Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order," *American Sociological Review* 60, no. 3 (June 1995): 309-28; and Andrew G. Walder, Bobai Li, and Donald J. Treiman, "Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime: Dual Career Paths into the Urban Chinese Elite, 1949 to 1996," ibid. 65, no. 2 (April 2000): 191-209. One of the few works on elite mobility in rural China is Andrew G. Walder, "Privatization and Elite Mobility: Rural China, 1979-1996" (Working Paper, Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, July 2002).

[9]Susan L. Shirk, "The Evolution of Chinese Education: Stratification and Meritocracy in the 1980s," in *China: The 80s Era*, ed. Norton Ginsburg and Bernard A. Lalor (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), 245-72; and Hong Yung Lee, *From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

[10]Nee, "A Theory of Market Transition," 663-81; and Nee, "The Emergence of a Market Society," 908-49.

[11]Yanjie Bian and John R. Logan, "Market Transition and the Persistence of Power: The Changing Stratification System in Urban China," *American Sociological Review* 61, no. 5 (October 1996): 739-58; and Xueguang Zhou, "Economic Transformation and Income Inequality in Urban China: Evidence from Panel Data," *American Journal of Sociology* 105, no. 4 (January 2000): 1135-74.

[12]Walder, "Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order," 309; and Walder, Li, and Treiman, "Politics and Life Chances," 191.

in urban China.

Third, the ways that contextual factors and regional variations in the extent of institutional change affect stratification mechanisms need to be scrupulously examined. Much existing research on income stratification in China focuses on the individual characteristics that have allowed people to reap more rewards during the reform era.[13] The effects of institutional arrangements on the relationship between individual factors and the stratification order need to be further addressed. Recent studies employ multilevel analysis to examine regional variations in income distribution resulting from economic growth and industrialization.[14] This paper will address these studies by examining elite stratification and emphasizing the contextual effects of key institutional arrangements in Chinese villages.

Institutional analysis is crucial for a better understanding of the dynamics and mechanisms of status attainment in Chinese villages. In addition to addressing how individuals are rewarded according to their individual characteristics, a study of institutional sources of inequality would further explain inequality structures. The same situation prevails if one considers regional heterogeneity in rural China and the new rural electoral institutions. Treating rural China as a homogeneous entity is both methodologically unsound and theoretically wasteful. It is unsound because regional variations in social stratification are obvious and substantial, and it is wasteful because we can take advantage of the regional variation in career determination to test theories that relate stratification order to the

[13]For example, see Nee, "A Theory of Market Transition," 663-81; Victor Nee, "Social Inequalities in Reforming State Socialism: Between Redistribution and Markets in China," *American Sociological Review* 56, no. 3 (June 1991): 267-82; Yusheng Peng, "Wage Determination in Rural and Urban China: A Comparison of Public and Private Industrial Sectors," ibid. 57, no. 2 (April 1992): 198-213; Bian and Logan, "Market Transition and the Persistence of Power," 739-58; and Nan Lin and Yanjie Bian, "Getting Ahead in Urban China," *American Journal of Sociology* 97, no. 3 (November 1991): 657-88.

[14]Yu Xie and Emily Hannum, "Regional Variation in Earnings Inequality in Reform-Era Urban China (in Symposium on Market Transition)," *American Journal of Sociology* 101, no. 4 (January 1996): 950-92; Nee, "The Emergence of a Market Society," 908-49; Walder, "Income Determination and Market Opportunity in Rural China," 354-75; and Yanjie Bian and Zhanxin Zhang, "Marketization and Income Distribution in Urban China, 1988 and 1995," in *The Future of Market Transition*, ed. Kevin T. Leicht (Stamford, Conn.: JAI Press, 2002), 377-415.

progress of institutional changes and industrialization. Regional heterogeneity in rural China is significant and considerable, not only because of the dissimilar pace and degree of economic growth in different parts of the Chinese countryside, but also, and more importantly, because there have been different models of rural reform, all of which lead to industrialization and development.[15] Privatization and local state-led growth characterize the most recent rural transformation in the post-reform era, and these have had significant effects on the stratification mechanism.[16] In addition to variations in economic institutions, regional disparities of grass-roots democratization in both degree and kind are partly due to economic development and to a deliberate trial scheme imposed at the outset by the central state.[17] Therefore, contextual variations in industrialization, property rights arrangements, and grass-roots political institutions may have clear impacts on stratification mechanisms.

Finally, the impacts of social networks on status attainment in rural China are noteworthy. They have not been tested with survey data, although useful conceptual frameworks and findings have been generated from sophisticated case studies. Based on the Blau-Duncan paradigm, which emphasizes the effects of achieved status (education and prior occupational status) on the ultimate attained status, studies of social stratification attribute individual opportunities for upward mobility to personal resources, namely personal qualifications and their positional power.[18] The

---

[15]William A. Byrd and Qingsong Lin, eds., *China's Rural Industry: Structure, Development, and Reform* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Chih-jou Jay Chen, *Transforming Rural China: How Local Institutions Shape Property Rights in China* (London and New York: Routledge/Curzon, 2004); Kellee S. Tsai, *Back-Alley Banking: Private Entrepreneurs in China* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002), 254-265; and Jean C. Oi and Andrew G. Walder, eds., *Property Rights and Economic Reform in China* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999).

[16]Jean C. Oi, "Two Decades of Rural Reform in China: An Overview and Assessment," Special Issue: The People's Republic of China after 50 Years, *The China Quarterly*, no. 159 (September 1999): 616-28.

[17]Kevin J. O'Brien, "Villagers, Elections, and Citizenship in Contemporary China," *Modern China* 27, no. 4 (October 2001): 407-35; and Tianjian Shi, "Economic Development and Election in Rural China," *Journal of Contemporary China* 8, no. 22 (1999): 425-42.

[18]Peter M. Blau and Otis D. Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure* (New York: Free Press, 1967).

research tradition of social networks, in contrast, emphasizes the effects of social capital on attained status. According to Nan Lin's theory, social capital exerts an important influence on attained status because it contains four elements of one's instrumental and expressive actions: information, influence, social credentials, and reinforcement.[19] Applying this proposition to Chinese societies directly relates to the Chinese culture of *guanxi* (關係), or interpersonal connections of sentiment and obligation that dictate social interaction, mutual anticipation, and behavioral patterns. While this application of social relations in instrumental actions is not unique to China, it appears that the pervasiveness of *guanxi* as a social fact gives credence to the claim that social relationship occupies a core position in the Chinese way of life far beyond its status elsewhere.[20] More important, the practice of *guanxi* involves not only symmetric economic exchange of transactional rationality but also asymmetric social exchange of relational rationality. *Guanxi* may serve as the instrumental means to obtain economic or social rewards, but on other occasions, *guanxi* itself becomes the end while instrumental action becomes the means.[21] In post-revolutionary China, the use of *guanxi* in the form of patron-client relations in the workplace has been the chief way in which workers secure resources and opportunities under Party clientelism.[22] *Guanxi* networks, predominantly strong-tie relations, were also found to promote occupational and career

[19]Nan Lin, *Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 20.

[20]Fei Xiaotong, "Guanyu xiangzhen fazhan de sikao" (Pondering the development of villages and townships), *Beijing daxue xuebao* (Beijing University Journal), 1992, no. 1:89-97; and Yanjie Bian, "*Guanxi* and the Allocation of Urban Jobs in China," *The China Quarterly*, no. 140 (December 1994): 971-99; and Thomas B. Gold, Doug Guthrie, and David Wank, "An Introduction to the Study of *Guanxi*," in *Social Connections in China: Institutions, Culture, and the Changing Nature of Guanxi*, ed. Thomas B. Gold, Doug Guthrie, and David Wank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3-20.

[21]Nan Lin, "*Guanxi*: A Conceptual Analysis," in *The Chinese Triangle of Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong: Comparative and Institutional Analysis*, ed. Alvin Y. So, Nan Lin, and Dudley Poston (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 2001), 153-66.

[22]Andrew G. Walder, *Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986); and David Wank, "Business-State Clientelism in China," in Gold, Guthrie, and Wank, *Social Connections in China*, 97-115.

opportunities in urban China.[23]

In rural China, kinship networks, one particular type of social network, have been a distinctive and prominent feature in economic institutions and grass-roots politics. Whyte argues that Chinese family patterns and lineage ties may have facilitated economic growth since the 1980s. Chinese familism provided resources under changed and uncertain conditions.[24] In Chinese villages, the bonds and obligations involved in lineage ties become a distinctive kind of social capital available for use by members of the lineage. Peng argues that kinship networks facilitate the founding and growth of private enterprises by conferring three types of social capital benefits on private entrepreneurs: the protection of private property rights, the reduction of uncertainty and transaction costs, and the building of better bridges to market information and entrepreneurial opportunities.[25] In grass-roots politics, the revived strength of lineage is clearly demonstrated in the village elections that have been institutionalized throughout rural China. A number of case studies reveal that village elections are dominated by sub-lineage alliances or by prominent lineage groups.[26]

The above overview indicates that scholars have still to address certain outstanding issues of rural status attainment (particularly elite status attainment, as far as social capital and kinship capital are concerned). The

---

[23]Yanjie Bian, "Bringing Strong Ties Back in: Indirect Ties, Network Bridges, and Job Searches in China," *American Sociological Review* 62, no. 3 (June 1997): 366-85.

[24]Martin King Whyte, "The Social Roots of China's Economic Development," Special Issue: China's Transitional Economy, *The China Quarterly*, no. 144 (December 1995): 999-1019.

[25]Yusheng Peng, "Kinship Networks and Entrepreneurs in China's Transitional Economy," *American Journal of Sociology* 109, no. 5 (March 2004): 1045-74. For an in-depth case study on kinship networks and private entrepreneurs in southern Fujian, see Chih-jou Jay Chen, "Local Institutions and the Transformation of Property Rights in Southern Fujian," in Oi and Walder, *Property Rights and Economic Reform in China*, 49-70.

[26]Xiao Tangbiao, *Cun zhi zhong de zongzu: dui jiuge cun de diaocha yu yanjiu* (Lineage in the village administration: a survey and research in nine villages) (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2001); Xiao Tangbiao, *Zongzu, xiangcun quanli yu xuanju: dui Jiangxisheng shierge cunweihui xuanju de guancha yanjiu* (Clans, village power, and elections: a study of twelve villager committee elections in Jiangxi Province) (Xi'an: Xibei daxue chubanshe, 2002); Gregory A. Ruf, *Cadres and Kin: Making a Socialist Village in West China, 1921-1991* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998); and Chen, *Transforming Rural China*, 173-77.

institutional arrangements that may affect stratification order in Chinese villages vary because of different degrees and kinds of marketization, property rights transformation, and local state behaviors. Also, Chinese villages are small communities in which local social networks, including kinship networks, have continued to play a key role in both political governance and business activities. As a result, elite stratification defining the occupation of cadre posts and positions as private entrepreneurs would be better explained by considering the effects of social networks in general and kinship networks in particular.

Data, Measurement, and Method

The present analysis employs data from a 2002 China Survey, conducted under the auspices of the Comparative Study of Democratization and Value Changes in East Asia (also known as the East Asia Barometer Survey). The project was launched in the summer of 2000 under the Program for Promoting Academic Excellence of the Universities in Taiwan,[27] under the co-directorship of Professors Fu Hu (**胡佛**) and Yun-han Chu (**朱雲漢**) at National Taiwan University.

The survey used a nationally representative multistage stratified random sample of 3,183 urban and rural individuals (drawing from sixty-seven cities or districts and sixty-two counties), representing China's adult population over eighteen years old residing in family households at the time of the survey. In addition, a village survey was conducted in conjunction with the larger country-wide survey, in which between five and eight villagers were selected and interviewed in each randomly selected village. The village administrations were also approached for assistance in filling out a village survey questionnaire. Among the 3,183 national cases, village-level data are available for 1,202 cases from 214 villages, account-

[27]This program was jointly sponsored by the ROC Ministry of Education and the National Science Council.

ing for 83 percent of the sampled villages across the country. This sub-sample is a fair representation of the rural population in China. The present analysis employs the individual-level data of this rural sub-sample and their village-level data.

Villages are important social and economic units in the Chinese countryside. In 2003, there were 678,589 villages across rural China, each with an average of 365 households and an average population of 1,381.[28] Often a village comprises very few lineages and lineage branches, giving rise to extensive social networks and social cohesion. Almost all revenue for investment and welfare must come from the village itself—in the form of levies on villagers and production, rent from factory premises, and the profits of village collective enterprises or real estate. In rich coastal provinces from Jiangsu (**江蘇省**) to Guangdong (**廣東省**), many villages now draw their main income from selling or renting out village farmlands for industrial manufacturing. Villagers—in contrast to resident outsiders (such as managers and migrant peasant workers in village enterprises)—are effectively "shareholders" in the resources of the village, although village elites retain the lion's share of benefits. Over the past twenty-five years the rapid development of rural industry has enabled some villages to get richer than others, and has thus produced a new source of stratification among villages. There is significant variation even within the same township, with some villages engaging in non-agricultural activities or selling off village farmland, which is the result of their having enterprising cadres, a good location, infrastructure and transport facilities, or access to funds. Therefore, some villages have been launched into virtuous circles of development while others are trapped in vicious circles. As villagers' well-being and opportunities are strongly linked to the village they belong to, the effect of the village on one's socioeconomic status should be very significant and deserves closer examination.

This study implies multilevel relationships between village context and individual determinants of career opportunities, and the data includes

[28]Calculated from *Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2004* (China statistical yearbook 2004) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2004).

measures at both the individual and contextual level. That is, it implies a relationship not only between a respondent's individual characteristics and his/her career opportunities, but also between the village's sociopolitical characteristics and the impact of individual characteristics on one's career opportunities. The estimation methods must therefore take account of the multilevel hypotheses and data. Multilevel or hierarchical models, which nest one level of data (in this case, individuals) within another level (in this case, villages), are appropriate for testing such hypotheses. Dealing with multilevel data by simply assigning macro-level values to each individual in a village creates statistical problems: it ignores non-independent errors for individuals within the same village and heteroscedasticity across villages, and exaggerates the degrees of freedom for village-level variables.[29] These problems bias downward the estimates of standard errors. Multilevel or hierarchical models correct these problems by including a separate error term for the macro-level units, and allow for appropriate tests of significance for macro-level variables.[30]

Dependent Variables

Status attainment is the central theme of this study. *Village cadre* and *private entrepreneur*, the political and economic elites in rural China, are dummy variables for individuals who serve as some kind of village cadre (**村幹部**, *cunganbu*), or are involved in business, including being self-employed and owning private firms. Considering the fact that Chinese village cadres are not on state salaries but only on local subsidies, it is quite common for villagers to simultaneously hold more than one job. In this survey respondents were asked about their "primary occupation." The omitted reference category is farmer and wage employee, including farm-

[29]Guang Guo and Hongxin Zhao, "Multilevel Modeling for Binary Data," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 441-62.

[30]Ita Kreft and Jan de Leeuw, *Introducing Multilevel Modeling*, ed. Michèle Lamont and Marcel Fournier Lamont (London: Sage, 1998); and Stephen W. Raudenbush and Anthony S. Bryk, *Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data Analysis Methods* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2002).

ers working in local enterprises and outside the village. The survey sample reports that roughly 4 percent of the rural population were serving as village cadres at the time of the survey in 2002, 10 percent were involved in business (**做生意**, *zuo shengyi*) or had established a private business, and the other 86 percent were farmers or peasant workers.

In Chinese villages, village cadres play a key role in villagers' day-to-day life and the village's economic development and social solidarity. No matter whether they are appointed from above or elected from below, cadres continue to wield power in village affairs. The question is, to what extent are village cadres and private entrepreneurs an economic elite; that is, do they make significantly more money than the average farmer? The answer can be found in this study's national survey data: the income gaps between village cadres, private entrepreneurs, and farmers are significant. Specifically, the average household income for a private entrepreneur was 10,019 *yuan*, slightly higher than that of village cadres who earned an average household income of 6,967 *yuan*, with farmers lagging far behind with a household income of 6,381 *yuan*.

Individual-Level Measures

Human capital is the most important individual-level independent variable. In previous research, measures of human capital are intended to capture changes introduced by markets in China's transitional economy.[31] For this purpose the conventional measures of human capital used are education and experience. The literature highlights the particular importance of education for the development of rural industries in China.[32] In this study human capital is measured by the levels of formal schooling and experience. *Primary, junior*, and *advanced* are dummy variables for

[31]Nee, "A Theory of Market Transition," 663-81; Nee, "The Emergence of a Market Society," 908-49; and Xie and Hannum, "Regional Variation in Earnings Inequality," 950-92.

[32]See, for example, Samuel P.S. Ho, *Rural China in Transition: Non-Agricultural Development in Rural Jiangsu, 1978-1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 195, 206; and Jati K. Sengupta and Bo Q. Lin, "Recent Rural Growth in China: The Performance of the Rural Small-Scale Enterprises, 1980-86," *International Review of Applied Economics* 7, no. 2 (1993): 177-96.

individuals who graduated from primary schools; junior middle schools; and senior middle schools, technical schools, colleges, or universities. Because there were so few cases with education above the senior middle school level, those who had attended technical schools, colleges, or universities were polled together with those who had received senior middle school education. The omitted reference category is the individual who never attended school or failed to graduate from primary school. The *age* of the individual is employed to approximate work experience. *Gender* (**1** if male; **0** if female) serves as a control in the analysis. *Father's years of education* of the individual indicates the respondent's family background. *Party membership* is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual is a Party member (**1** if yes; **0** if no).

Social capital is conceptualized as "resources embedded in a social structure that are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions."[33] These resources are not possessed by individuals but tied to social relations. Social capital theory predicts that having greater access to social capital may enable one to realize status attainment.[34] More specifically, the quantity and quality of social capital are expected to contribute to its value as a means of social mobility. Lin pioneered the usage of the position generator approach to measure social capital.[35] The position generator approach samples a number of hierarchically ranked positions and asks respondents to indicate whether they have contacts in each of the positions. In this study the respondent is asked about eight occupations: primary school teacher, deputy of people's congress (**人大代表**), section chief or township mayor (**科長/鄉鎮長**), division chief or county magistrate (**處長/縣長**), bureau chief (**廳局長**), entrepreneur (**企業家**), lawyer, and bank official. The occupations in this survey questionnaire swing to more prestigious occupations in government and highlight the upper reachability in the position

[33]Lin, *Social Capital*, 29.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Nan Lin and Mary Dumin, "Access to Occupations through Social Ties," *Social Networks* 8 (1986): 365-85.

generator approach. Excluding the primary school teacher, which is more commonly reachable, only 18 percent of respondents had contacts with any of the abovementioned occupations. This study employs a dummy variable measured by whether an individual has contact with any of the abovementioned seven prestigious occupations (**1** if yes; **0** if no) as indicators of social capital. Since the analysis aims to test the influence of social capital on status attainment, it is important to rule out the possibility of reverse causal link in which social capital is gained by one's occupational position. To ensure that the respondents' access to social capital was available before they acquired any resources, only ties that had been established for more than *five* years were counted.

Kinship capital is a dummy variable measured by whether an individual belongs to the largest lineage branch (**房**) in the whole village (**1** if yes; **0** if no). Empirical studies in rural China document that it is primarily the lineage branch in a village, not the surname group or grand lineage, which serves to provide its members with common vested interests, networks, capital, and assistance. Members of the same lineage branch often establish loyalty networks and, through branch rites and activities, consolidate their identity and have assistance networks.[36]

Village-Level Measures of Institutional Environment

In addition to the above set of individual-level variables, there are contextual variables indicating economic development and the institutional environment. The core question that motivates the analysis is whether the relative net returns from education, Party membership, social capital, and kinship capital vary by level of economic development or in qualitatively different types of local institutional arrangements.

The following village-level measures are drawn from the village survey to indicate the extent of a village's economic development and in-

[36]Anita Chan, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger, *Chen Village under Mao and Deng*, expanded and updated edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Chen, "Local Institutions and the Transformation of Property Rights in Southern Fujian," 61-67; and Chen, *Transforming Rural China*, 172-77.

dustrialization. *Industrialization and commercialization* is a dummy variable, gauging the structural change that defines economic development in a village by reference to the most important sector (agriculture, industry, and tertiary industry) in the village economy (**1** if industry or tertiary industry; **0** if agriculture). The survey shows that 14 percent of villages report that their most important sector is industry or tertiary industry. *Requisitioning of farmland* is also a dummy variable that specifies whether the village's farmland was ever requisitioned by the state over the past ten years. This is an index to show the intervening role of the local state in the structural change of local development. The village survey shows that farmland had been requisitioned in 30 percent of villages.

To assess the property rights arrangements in a village, *private enterprise output* gauges the relative importance of the private sector in the village. It is defined as the proportion of output contributed by individual and private enterprises. The lowest value is **0**; the highest is **1**. The average village derives 29 percent of its village output from individual or private production.

In addition to measures of village economic context, this study also examines the contextual effects brought about by political and social institutions. *Democratization* measures the institutionalization of grass-roots democracy. It is a count variable (ranging from **0** to **7**) defined as how many times the village committee members, including the village chief, have been directly elected by villagers. A village's experience in handling its village committee election is presumed to serve as a good indicator of village-level political reform. The average number of elections per village in this study is just under four.

Urban proximity is the variable that purports to measure the extent of the market in the area. It is defined as the distance from the village to the neighboring county town. The average distance between a village and its nearest county town is forty-three kilometers.

Farmland per capita indicates the amount of arable land usable by peasants. This may affect one's choice of staying in agriculture or seeking outside employment.

Statistical Models and Results

After excluding observations whose information is missing on any of the variables used in the analysis, the working sample consists of 870 individuals in 196 villages. The deleted cases are mostly missing data on the respondent's individual occupation, or his/her village-level variables. A further analysis with missing data was employed: from EM (expectation-maximization) estimated statistics, the null hypothesis of MCAR (missing completely at random) cannot be rejected, indicating that the data were missing completely at random.

Statistical Models

Hierarchical multinomial regression analyses are employed to test hypotheses, drawing from hierarchical generalized linear models (HGLMs).[37] The models use "farmers" (including farmers and peasant workers) as the reference category for the dependent variable in the multinomial logistic regressions, thus contrasting those who are village cadres with those who are farmers, and those who are private entrepreneurs with those who are farmers. This study hypothesizes that individual- and village-level variables that predict being a village cadre are somewhat different from those that predict entering private entrepreneurship.

HGLMs use the logit link function when the level-1 sampling model is multinomial. Define η_{mij} as the log-odds of falling into category m relative to that of falling into category M. Specifically,

$$\eta_{mij} = \log [\psi_{mij}/\psi_{Mij}]$$

$$\phi_{Mij} = 1 - \sum_{m=1}^{M-1} \phi_{mij}$$

Where

[37]Raudenbush and Bryk, *Hierarchical Linear Models*, 291.

In words, η_{mij} is the log-odds of being in m-th category to M-th category, which is known as the "reference category." In the present study, η_{1ij} is the log-odds of being in the "village cadres" category relative to the third category, "farmers or peasant workers." Similarly, η_{2ij} is the log-odds of the "private entrepreneurs" category relative to the third category, "farmers or peasant workers."

At the individual level, father's years of education, male, age, primary school, junior middle school, advanced schooling, Party membership, social capital, and kinship capital are used as predictors, so that η_{mij} can be written as

$$\begin{aligned}\eta_{mij} = {} & \beta_{0j(m)} + \beta_{1j(m)*}\,(\text{Father's years of education})_{ij} + \beta_{2j(m)*}\,(\text{Male})_{ij} \\ & + \beta_{3j(m)*}\,(\text{Age})_{ij} + \beta_{4j(m)*}\,(\text{Primary school})_{ij} \\ & + \beta_{5j(m)*}\,(\text{Junior middle school})_{ij} + \beta_{6j(m)*}\,(\text{Advanced schooling})_{ij} \\ & + \beta_{7j(m)*}\,(\text{Party membership})_{ij} + \beta_{8j(m)*}\,(\text{Social capital})_{ij} \\ & + \beta_{9j(m)*}\,(\text{Kinship capital})_{ij}\end{aligned}$$

for m = 1,2. For this example, with M = 3, there would be two level-1 equations, for η_{1ij} and η_{2ij}.

At the village level, industrialization and commercialization, democratization, private output, farmland per capita, urban proximity, and requisitioning of farmland are used as predictors. The level-2 model has a parallel form like the individual-level models.

Furthermore, this study allows these intercepts to vary randomly, even after controlling for other variables. It constrains all other level-1 coefficients to be fixed for the sake of parsimony and computational stability. These level-1 predictors such as "father's education" and "age" have been centered on their group means. The level-2 predictors such as "democratization," "private output," "farmland per capita," and "urban proximity" have been centered on their grand means.

Results

Table 1 shows the individual- and village-level characteristics of the general sample. Table 2 further shows the characteristics of three

Table 1
Mean and Standard Deviation of Sample Villagers and Villages, 2002

	Mean	S.D.
Individual-level variables (N = 870)		
Father's years of education	2.35	3.21
Male	0.51	0.50
Age	43.72	12.52
Education		
Under primary school	0.43	0.49
Primary school	0.27	0.45
Junior middle school	0.24	0.43
Advanced schooling	0.06	0.24
Party membership	0.11	0.31
Occupation		
Village cadre	0.04	0.19
Private entrepreneur	0.10	0.29
Farmer/peasant worker	0.86	0.34
Social capital	0.18	0.39
Kinship capital	0.21	0.41
Village-level variables (N = 196)		
Industrialization & commercialization	0.14	0.35
Democratization	3.85	1.92
Private enterprise output	0.29	0.42
Farmland per capita	1.28	1.09
Urban proximity	42.9	32.24
Requisitioning of farmland	0.30	0.46

occupation groups: village cadre, private entrepreneur, and farmer or peasant worker. ANOVA tests, Kruskal-Wallis tests, or Chi-square tests are employed for different variables to see if there is any significant difference in the characteristics among the three status groups. For individual-level characteristics, there is no statistically significant difference in family background (indicated by father's education) and kinship capital among three occupation groups. Statistically significant relations appear in such characteristics as gender, education, Party membership, and social capital. Compared with ordinary peasants (i.e., farmers and peasant workers), more village cadres are male (73 versus 48 percent), better educated (57 percent

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Chinese Rural Elites, 2002

(Percentage/Mean)

	Village cadre (n = 33)	Private entrepreneur (n = 83)	Farmers/Peasant workers (n = 754)	Total (n = 870)	Test
Individual-level variables					
Father's education	2.73	2.36	2.33	2.35	ANOVA = 0.241
Male	73	70	48	51	Chi-square = 21.5***
Age	45	39	44	44	K-W test = 15.5***
Education					Chi-square = 52.2***
Under primary school	30	27	45	43	
Primary school	12	18	29	27	
Junior middle school	36	47	21	24	
Advanced schooling	21	8	5	6	
Party membership	49	12	9	11	Chi-square = 50.4***
Social capital	42	28	16	18	Chi-square = 19.7***
Kinship capital	33	17	22	22	Chi-square = 3.8
Village-level variables					
Industrialization & commercialization	9	34	10	12	Chi-square = 39.1***
Democratization	4.94	3.31	3.89	3.88	ANOVA = 8.56***
Private output	.20	.46	.26	.28	K-W test = 19.2***
Farmland per capita	1.29	1.01	1.33	1.30	ANOVA = 3.4*
Distance to nearest county town	37	32	46	44	ANOVA = 6.7***
Requisitioning of farmland	27	64	25	29	Chi-square = 53.9***

attending junior middle school or higher versus 26 percent attending junior middle school or higher), Party members (49 versus 9 percent), and possess more social capital (42 percent having contacts with prestigious occupations versus 16 percent for peasants). Similarly, differences in the above-mentioned characteristics between private entrepreneurs and ordinary peasants (i.e., farmers and peasant workers) also exist. For village-level characteristics, in comparison with ordinary peasants, private entrepreneurs come from villages which are more industry- and commerce-based (34 versus 10 percent), democratized (3.31 versus 3.89 times), private-sector dominated (46 versus 26 percent), closer to a county town (32 versus 46 kilometers), and which have had farmland requisitioned (64 versus 25 percent).

In table 3, the intercept of the village cadre is the expected log-odds of a villager being a village cadre relative to being a "farmer or peasant worker," holding all other variables constant and a random effect of zero. It is adjusted for the between-village heterogeneity in the likelihood of being a village cadre relative to being a "farmer or peasant worker." The estimated conditional expected log-odds is –4.86.

The predicted probability that the same villager responds as being a village cadre is $\exp\{-5.27\}/(1 + \exp\{-5.27\} + \exp\{-4.15\}) = 0.005$. The predicted probability that the same villager gives a private entrepreneur response is $\exp\{-4.15\}/(1 + \exp\{-5.27\} + \exp\{-4.15\}) = 0.015$. Thus, the predicted probability of a farmer or peasant worker response for the same villager is $1 - 0.005 - 0.015 = 0.98$.

The individual-level effects associated with heightened odds of becoming a village cadre (relative to a farmer or peasant worker) include being male, having advanced schooling (relative to under primary school), being a Party member, possessing social capital, and holding kinship capital (all $p < 0.05$).

To be specific, the odds of a male becoming a village cadre rather than a farmer or peasant worker are $\{0.96\} = 2.61$ times greater (increase about 161 percent) than for a female, controlling for other variables. The odds of a villager who attended senior high school or above becoming a village cadre rather than a farmer or peasant worker are $\exp\{1.43\} = 4.18$ times

Table 3
Multinomial Multilevel Model

	Village cadres		Private entrepreneurs	
	Coefficient	P-value	Coefficient	P-value
Village-level variables				
Industrialization & commercialization	–0.46	0.56	1.11**	0.01
Democratization	0.33**	0.01	–0.05	.052
Private enterprise output	–0.48	0.42	0.51	0.16
Farmland per capita	–0.11	0.64	0.12	0.48
Urban proximity	–0.01	0.33	–0.01	0.11
Requisitioning of farmland	–0.12	0.81	1.35***	0.00
Individual-level variables				
Father's education	–0.08	0.32	–0.07	0.17
Male	0.96*	0.03	0.91**	0.01
Age	0.01	0.69	–0.04**	0.01
Education (under primary school as reference group)				
Primary school	–0.55	0.40	–0.11	0.79
Junior middle school	0.85	0.12	1.01**	0.01
Advanced schooling	1.43*	0.03	0.57	0.30
Party membership	1.81***	0.00	–0.11	0.81
Social capital	1.01*	0.02	0.35	0.30
Kinship capital	0.98*	0.04	–0.19	0.60
Intercept	–5.27***	0.00	–4.15***	0.00

Note: The outcome variable is: (1) village cadres; (2) private entrepreneurs; and (3) farmers or peasant workers (the reference group).

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

greater (increase about 318 percent) than those of one who did not finish primary school, controlling for other variables. The odds of a Party member becoming a village cadre rather than a farmer or peasant worker are exp{1.81} = 6.11 times greater (increase about 511 percent) than those of a non-Party member, controlling for other variables. The odds of a villager with social capital becoming a village cadre rather than a farmer or peasant worker are exp{1.01} = 2.75 times greater (increase about 175 percent) than those of one who lacks social capital, controlling for other variables. The odds of a villager with kinship capital becoming a village

cadre rather than a farmer or peasant worker are exp{0.98} = 2.66 times greater (increase about 166 percent) than the odds of one who lacks kinship capital, controlling for other variables.

In predicting the odds of becoming a private entrepreneur (relative to a farmer or peasant worker), each of the corresponding coefficients is smaller and only gender, age, and junior middle schooling have coefficients that are significantly different from zero. The individual-level effects are found to be associated with negative heightened odds in age ($p < 0.01$). Those who are male or attended junior middle school (relative to having no primary schooling) may have heightened odds of becoming a private entrepreneur (both $p < 0.01$) rather than a farmer or peasant worker.

The odds of a male becoming a private entrepreneur rather than a farmer or peasant worker are exp{0.91} = 2.48 times greater (increase about 148 percent) than those of a female, controlling for other variables. The odds of a villager who attended junior middle school becoming a private entrepreneur rather than a farmer or peasant worker are exp{1.01} = 2.75 times greater (increase about 175 percent) than one who did not finish primary school, controlling for other variables. The odds of becoming a private entrepreneur rather than a farmer or peasant worker are multiplied by exp{–0.04} = 0.96 (decrease about 4 percent) with each one-year increase in age, controlling for other variables.

Switching to village level, controlling for individual-level variables, despite a slight and small effect of urban proximity, the only village characteristic associated with being a village cadre (versus being a farmer or peasant worker) is the village's level of democratization. An average villager who lives in a village with more institutionalized village committee elections is more likely to become a village cadre than a counterpart who lives in a village with less experience of village committee elections. In these latter villages, becoming a village cadre is only associated with particular individual characteristics such as Party membership, social capital, and kinship capital.

As for predicting the odds of becoming a private entrepreneur (relative to a farmer or peasant worker), village-level effects associated with heightened odds include "industrialization and commercialization" and

"requisitioning of farmland" (both $p < 0.01$). The odds of someone living in an industry-based or commerce-based village becoming a private entrepreneur rather than a farmer or peasant worker are $\exp\{1.11\} = 3.03$ times greater (increase about 203 percent) than those of someone living in an agriculture-based village, controlling for other variables. The odds of someone living in a village that has had its farmland requisitioned by the government becoming a private entrepreneur rather than a farmer or peasant worker are $\exp\{1.35\} = 3.86$ times greater (increase about 286 percent) than those of one who lives in a village whose farmland has never been requisitioned, controlling for other variables.

Discussions and Conclusions

This study provides new and convincing evidence on the status attainment of political and economic elites in post-reform rural China. Using inter-village variations in economic structure and institutional arrangements and measurements of social capital and kinship capital, it has achieved significant findings that have important theoretical implications. This study shows that dual career paths exist for rural elite positions, and that political and educational credentials are screened differently for entry into cadre posts and into entrepreneurial positions. Party membership, which is a prerequisite for holding administrative posts in the urban state apparatus, also remains a fundamental determinant for cadre posts in villages. Political screening is still the key filter in recruiting village leaders. Educational credentials are paramount for achieving both cadre posts and entrepreneurial positions. In this respect, the results correlate with Walder's research in urban China which finds two paths to urban elite status: one emphasizing educational credentials leading to high prestige professional positions, and the other emphasizing a combination of Party and educational credentials leading to administrative posts within the government.[38] In a later study, Walder and his colleagues add that a college

[38]Walder, "Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order," 309.

education did not become a criterion for administrative positions until the post-Mao period.[39] The present analysis of rural China also finds that there are two distinct paths into political and economic elite groups: Party loyalty and meritocratic principles.

In addition, this study examines the effects of social networks and kinship support, linking these factors to the fundamental institutions governing status attainment in Chinese society. The enduring essential impact of political credentials on administrative career may reflect the fact that state socialist practices are still alive, and have not been eroded by the expanding market economy as some theorists have predicted. At the same time, the political payoff of social capital and kinship networks further shows the forces of local institutions in driving stratification in rural China. For a Chinese villager pursuing a cadre post today, the effects of political capital increase notably when it is combined with social capital and kinship capital, in addition to human capital. Being equipped with contacts in politics and business outside the village and having been born into a dominant lineage branch inside the village both boost one's chance of achieving a cadre post. This study demonstrates that the attainment of rural cadre positions is closely related to five aspects: gender, human capital, political capital, kinship capital, and social capital.

The significant effects of social capital and kinship networks on achieving cadre posts may be an unintended consequence of the introduction of village elections in the 1990s. In contrast to the previous practice of village cadres being appointed from above within the Party, village cadres, including the Party branch secretary, are now selected through popular elections. As a result, the ability to mobilize majority support among ordinary villagers is more crucial now in order to become a village cadre. This explains why social capital and kinship networks play a major role in today's village politics. This trend actually reflects a return to generic familism and clanism practices in rural China that were rejected during the Mao years.

---

[39]Walder, Li, and Treiman, "Politics and Life Chances," 191.

In contrast to the path to a village cadre post, the path to private entrepreneurship is quite different. Political, social, and kinship capital lose ground to human capital which plays a determining role when it comes to entry into entrepreneurship. Formal schooling facilitates the development of management skills and widens the horizons of entrepreneurs. The present study finds that the typical private entrepreneur tends to be male, younger, and with a better than average education.

The insignificant effect of social capital and kinship capital on a villager's likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur deserves further discussion and exploration in later research. Anecdotal evidence indicates the importance of *guanxi* in doing business in China. The findings here do not necessarily contradict the thesis that business performance is closely related to the entrepreneur's social capital. The message here is that a villager's initial action of becoming a private entrepreneur (rather than his/her subsequent performance) may not be affected by his/her deposit of social capital at the time of entering the business. What matters for becoming a private entrepreneur is one's human capital, sex, age, and, more important, the macro-market environment in which he/she is situated.

Two village-level factors—the degree of industrialization and commercialization and the existence of a developmental local state—are found to have significant effects on one's likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur. Other things being equal, the more industrialized or commercialized a village is, the more likely its villagers are to become private entrepreneurs. Again, a history of the village's farmlands being requisitioned by the local state significantly increases the likelihood of its villagers becoming private entrepreneurs. This finding is in line with Nee's market transition theory which argues that the shift from plan to market changes the stratification order of society.[40]

From a nationwide survey in rural China in 1989-90, Nee finds that only in the inland provinces does political capital (measured by holding

[40]Nee, "A Theory of Market Transition," 663; and Nee, "The Emergence of a Market Society," 908.

former cadre positions) increase the odds of entering into entrepreneurship; political capital has no significant effect in the coastal provinces which are presumed to be more industrialized and commercialized. Rather than relying on indirect and proxy indicators of market institutions, the present study employs a much more direct measurement to tackle the "market transition" issue. It measures the village's degree of industrialization and commercialization to gauge the extent to which individuals are influenced by the market mechanism. It finds that the main factors contributing to an individual becoming an entrepreneur are that individual's human capital and the market institutions of his/her village. Political capital, social capital, and kinship capital are hard to convert into significant and helpful forces in the entrepreneurial career path, in contrast to their significant advantages in advancing one's career in village administration.

In conclusion, in terms of stratification order, post-reform rural China cannot be simply characterized as moving along a one-dimensional road from a redistributive institution to a market or capitalist institution. The distinct paths of status attainment for political and economic elites in Chinese villages are products of the workings of distinctive political, social, and economic institutions. This highlights the fact that post-reform rural China has qualitatively unique features that merit study more from the point of view of institutional specificity. In addition to market institutions, some particular institutional arrangements—such as property rights, urbanization, grass-roots democratization, social networks, and clanism—have played a role in the dynamic stratification mechanism in rural China. It remains to be seen whether these institutional arrangements will decline, persist, or transform and significantly impact on Chinese society.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bian, Yanjie (邊燕杰). 1994. "*Guanxi* and the Allocation of Urban Jobs in China." *The China Quarterly*, no. 140 (December): 971-99.

_____. 1997. "Bringing Strong Ties Back in: Indirect Ties, Network Bridges, and Job Searches in China." *American Sociological Review* 62, no. 3 (June): 366-85.

_____. 2002. "Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility." *Annual Review of Sociology* 28:91-116.

_____. 2002/03. "Sociological Research on Reform-Era China." *Issues & Studies* 38, no. 4/39, no. 1 (December/March): 139-74.

_____, and John R. Logan. 1996. "Market Transition and the Persistence of Power: The Changing Stratification System in Urban China." *American Sociological Review* 61, no. 5 (October): 739-58.

_____, and Zhanxin Zhang (**張展新**). 2002. "Marketization and Income Distribution in Urban China, 1988 and 1995." In *The Future of Market Transition*, ed. Kevin T. Leicht, 377-415. Stamford, Conn.: JAI Press.

Blau, Peter M., and Otis D. Duncan. 1967. *The American Occupational Structure*. New York: Free Press.

Byrd, William A., and Qingsong Lin, eds. 1990. *China's Rural Industry: Structure, Development, and Reform*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cao, Yang, and Victor Nee. 2000. "Comment: Controversies and Evidence in the Market Transition Debate." *American Journal of Sociology* 105, no. 4 (January): 1175-89.

Chan, Anita, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger. 1992. *Chen Village under Mao and Deng*, expanded and updated edition. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Chen, Chih-jou Jay (**陳志柔**). 2004. *Transforming Rural China: How Local Institutions Shape Property Rights in China*. London and New York: Routledge/Curzon.

_____. 1999. "Local Institutions and the Transformation of Property Rights in Southern Fujian." In *Property Rights and Economic Reform in China*, ed. Jean C. Oi and Andrew G. Walder, 49-70. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Fei, Xiaotong (**費孝通**). 1992. "Guanyu xiangzhen fazhan de sikao" (**關於鄉鎮發展的思考**, Pondering the development of villages and townships). *Beijing daxue xuebao* (**北京大學學報**, Beijing University Journal), no. 1:89-97.

Gold, Thomas B., Doug Guthrie, and David Wank, eds. 2002. S*ocial Connections in China: Institutions, Culture, and the Changing Nature of Guanxi*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Guo, Guang, and Hongxin Zhao. 2000. "Multilevel Modeling for Binary Data." *Annual Review of Sociology* 26:441-62.

Ho, Samuel P.S. 1994. *Rural China in Transition: Non-Agricultural Development in Rural Jiangsu, 1978-1990*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kreft, Ita, and Jan de Leeuw. 1998. *Introducing Multilevel Modeling*, ed. Michèle Lamont and Marcel Fournier Lamont. London: Sage.

Lee, Hong Yung. 1991. *From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lin, Nan (**林南**). 2001. *Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

_____. 2001. "*Guanxi*: A Conceptual Analysis." In *The Chinese Triangle of Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong: Comparative and Institutional Analysis*, ed. Alvin Y. So, Nan Lin, and Dudley Poston, 153-66. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood.

_____, and Mary Dumin. 1986. "Access to Occupations through Social Ties." *Social Networks* 8:365-85.

_____, and Yanjie Bian. 1991. "Getting Ahead in Urban China." *American Journal of Sociology* 97, no. 3 (November): 657-88.

Lu, Xueyi (**陸學藝**). 2002. *Dangdai Zhongguo shehui jieceng yanjiu baogao* (**當代中國社會階層研究報告**, A research report on social stratification of contemporary China). Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe.

Nee, Victor. 1989. "A Theory of Market Transition: From Redistribution to Markets in State Socialism." *American Sociological Review* 54, no. 5 (October): 663-81.

_____. 1991. "Social Inequalities in Reforming State Socialism: Between Redistribution and Markets in China." *American Sociological Review* 56, no. 3 (June): 267-82.

_____. 1996. "The Emergence of a Market Society: Changing Mechanisms of Stratification in China." *American Journal of Sociology* 101, no. 4 (January): 908-49.

O'Brien, Kevin J. 2001. "Villagers, Elections, and Citizenship in Contemporary China." *Modern China* 27, no. 4 (October): 407-35.

Oi, Jean C. 1999. "Two Decades of Rural Reform in China: An Overview and Assessment." Special Issue: The People's Republic of China after 50 Years. *The China Quarterly*, no. 159 (September): 616-28.

_____, and Andrew G. Walder, eds. 1999. *Property Rights and Economic Reform in China*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Parish, William L. 1975. "Socialism and the Chinese Peasant Family." *Journal of Asian Studies* 34, no. 3 (May): 613-30.

_____, and Ethan Michelson. 1996. "Politics and Markets: Dual Transformations." *American Journal of Sociology* 101, no. 4 (January): 1042-59.

Peng, Yusheng. 1992. "Wage Determination in Rural and Urban China: A Comparison of Public and Private Industrial Sectors." *American Sociological Review* 57, no. 2 (April): 198-213.

_____. 2004. "Kinship Networks and Entrepreneurs in China's Transitional Economy." *American Journal of Sociology* 109, no. 5 (March): 1045-74.

Raudenbush, Stephen W., and Anthony S. Bryk. 2002. *Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data Analysis Methods*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.

Ruf, Gregory A. 1998. *Cadres and Kin: Making a Socialist Village in West China, 1921-1991*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Sengupta, Jati K., and Bo Q. Lin. 1993. "Recent Rural Growth in China: The Performance of the Rural Small-Scale Enterprises, 1980-86." *International Review of Applied Economics* 7, no. 2:177-96.

Shi, Tianjian (史天健). 1999. "Economic Development and Election in Rural China." *Journal of Contemporary China* 8, no. 22:425-42.

Shirk, Susan L. 1984. "The Evolution of Chinese Education: Stratification and Meritocracy in the 1980s." In *China: The 80s Era*, ed. Norton Ginsburg and Bernard A. Lalor, 245-72. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.

Tsai, Kellee S. 2002. *Back-Alley Banking: Private Entrepreneurs in China*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Walder, Andrew G. 1986. *Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

_____. 1995. "Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order." *American Sociological Review* 60, no. 3 (June): 309-28.

_____. 2002. "Income Determination and Market Opportunity in Rural China, 1978-1996." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 30, no. 2 (June): 354-75.

_____. 2002. "Privatization and Elite Mobility: Rural China, 1979-1996." Working Paper, Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University.

_____, Bobai Li, and Donald J. Treiman. 2000. "Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime: Dual Career Paths into the Urban Chinese Elite, 1949

to 1996." *American Sociological Review* 65, no. 2 (April): 191-209.

Whyte, Martin King. 1995. "The Social Roots of China's Economic Development." Special Issue: China's Transitional Economy. *The China Quarterly*, no. 144 (December): 999-1019.

Xiao, Tangbiao (**蕭唐鏢**). 2001. *Cun zhi zhong de zongzu: dui jiuge cun de diaocha yu yanjiu* (**村治中的宗族**: **對九個村的調查與研究**, Lineage in the village administration: a survey and research in nine villages). Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe.

_____. 2002. *Zongzu, xiangcun quanli yu xuanju: dui Jiangxisheng shierge cunweihui xuanju de guancha yanjiu* (**宗族、鄉村權力與選舉**: **對江西省十二個村委會選舉的觀察研究**, Clans, village power, and elections: a study of twelve villager committee elections in Jiangxi Province). Xi'an: Xibei daxue chubanshe.

Xie, Yu, and Emily Hannum. 1996. "Regional Variation in Earnings Inequality in Reform-Era Urban China (in Symposium on Market Transition)." *American Journal of Sociology* 101, no. 4 (January): 950-92.

Xinhua (**新華社**). 2005. "Income Gap in China Widens in First Quarter." June 20. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-06/20/content_3107515.htm

Zhou, Xueguang. 2000. "Economic Transformation and Income Inequality in Urban China: Evidence from Panel Data." *American Journal of Sociology* 105, no. 4 (January): 1135-74.