

Taiwan and the 'China Impact'

Challenges and opportunities

Edited by Gunter Schubert

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Part II

The China impact on Taiwanese society

9 The social basis of Taiwan's cross-Strait policies, 2008–2014

Chih-Jou Jay Chen

This study explores the social basis of Taiwan's cross-Strait policies since 2008, observing the various groups who support and/or reject particular cross-Strait policies. More specifically, it examines how various factors, such as gender, ethnicity, social status, party identification and national identity, influence the possibility of supporting or opposing particular cross-Strait policies. These divisions in opinions reflect the social impact of the rapidly changing cross-Strait relationship in Taiwan.

Since the second change in ruling parties in 2008, Taiwan's relationship with China has significantly warmed. Between 2008 and 2014, the two have held ten talks and signed 21 trade and investment pacts, have initiated direct cross-Strait flights and have made Taipei the first market outside Hong Kong that is able to clear Renminbi transactions. Thus, cross-Strait relations have become the centre of politics and the principal site of public disputes in Taiwan. Some Taiwanese would tend towards the view that boosting cross-Strait trade and investment will contribute positively towards driving Taiwan's economic growth, while others are perturbed that it will only exacerbate the hollowing out of Taiwan's manufacturing industries. In June 2010, the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) opened up stronger cross-Strait ties in the fields of trade, finance and commerce. Cultural, educational and social exchanges have followed. In August 2010 Taiwan's legislature passed a bill recognizing 41 Chinese university degrees, and as of 2014 the number of recognized Chinese universities had increased to 129. Meanwhile, Taiwan has started to allow its universities and colleges to admit Chinese degree-seeking students. These events were a continuation of the June 2008 opening of Taiwan to Chinese tour groups, which has reached a daily quota of 5,000 Chinese citizens since April 2013. Earlier, the number of Chinese visitors to Taiwan increased from an average of 3,600 a day, after the daily quota was raised from 3,000 to 4,000 in early 2011, with the stipulation that Chinese visitors to Taiwan should travel as part of organized groups. Then, after June 2011, a maximum of 500 individual tourists per day from three Chinese cities (Beijing, Shanghai and Xiamen) were allowed to visit Taiwan. As of August 2014, 36 Chinese cities have been approved to grant individual tourist visits to Taiwan, reaching a daily quota of 4,000 tourists and further promoting tourism and social interaction between the two societies.

Taiwan's ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), claims that the above-mentioned trends have aided Taiwan's development over recent years, suggesting that they have helped the island achieve manufacturing goals and assisted in the realization of cross-Strait harmony. The opposition raised a hue and cry, arguing that this economic opening had substantially hollowed out Taiwan's manufacturing and high-tech industry and increased the disparity in wealth between rich and poor. Other critics were also wary of sacrificing Taiwan's political autonomy and cultural identity by helping Beijing realize its known intention of further binding Taiwan to the mainland. Given that Taiwan's media have indeed already taken up these talking-points on cross-Strait relations, the clamour in the legislature has belatedly mimicked the media. Although intensive debates and queries were conducted on the issue, the KMT still appeared to have control over the main direction of cross-Strait policies until the spring of 2014, when protesters linked with the Anti-Trade Pact Movement occupied the island's parliament to show their opposition to a trade pact with China.

In 2014, the Anti-Trade Pact Movement (also known as the Sunflower movement) protested against the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement proposed by the ruling party KMT in the legislature. The protesters felt that the trade pact with China would hurt Taiwan's economy and leave it vulnerable to political pressure from Beijing, while advocates of the treaty argued that increased economic relations would provide a necessary boost to Taiwan's economy. The movement has, to a great extent, weakened public support for accelerating the process of negotiating cross-Strait agreements. Meanwhile, the KMT failed to make headway on three related bills even after two extra legislative sessions in the summer of 2014.¹

Cross-Strait issues are often presented in the media and in the legislature as a two-sided debate, with each side rigidly staking out its own position without the ability to compromise or to provide room for any suggested alternatives. Indeed, in cross-Strait debates, parties rarely deviate from their positions, so that party positions ultimately end up deciding party preferences for cross-Strait policies. The media and politicians rarely examine other factors that may be influencing their citizens' positions and views on cross-Strait relations.

In the midst of these debates, people's attitudes have been constantly overlooked. It is true that the media often draws on public opinion, but there is still a lack of understanding as to the factors that affect public opinion in cross-Strait policies in Taiwan. Given the fact that supporters of the main political parties will follow their party's preferences and positions, what are the views of those 'independent' or 'undecided' voters who are fence-sitters supporting neither party? Furthermore, are there other factors that affect cross-Strait attitudes apart from political rhetoric, such as socio-economic status, gender or locality? In addition to the main issues (ECFA, Chinese tourists and other related issues), what are citizens' attitudes towards other social issues in cross-Strait affairs? A clear picture of the specific factors influencing Taiwanese cross-Strait relations and preferences cannot be adduced without a full understanding of the complex issues that govern Taiwanese responses.

Social differentiation and social cleavages have led to differences in positions and attitudes on cross-Strait issues in Taiwan. Different social groups of gender, class and party identification could certainly have different opinions on cross-Strait policies. These attitudinal differences and their consequences reflect not only Taiwan's social differentiation and social cleavages but also the social impact of China's rapid rise in the global economy and its powerful influence over cross-Strait relations. In particular, since these cross-Strait policies are at a pioneering stage in Taiwan, they will have lock-in effects on cross-Strait institutional development. These policies are related to each other; their legitimacy and implementation will have long-term effects on Taiwanese society and future cross-Strait relations.

Data and measurement

This study draws on data obtained from two rounds of telephone surveys conducted in 2010 in Taiwan. These surveys were part of a long-term institutional research project, the Taiwan Social Image Survey, conducted by the Institute of Sociology at Academia Sinica. The interviewees were Taiwanese citizens over the age of eighteen. The first survey was conducted between 1 and 22 June and consisted of 1,242 respondents. The second survey was conducted between 16 and 26 December and consisted of 1,238 respondents.²

The attitudes of those surveyed towards five cross-Strait issues were examined:

- 1 support for or opposition to the signing of ECFA;
- 2 support for or opposition to the recognition of Chinese university degrees;
- 3 support for or opposition to allowing Chinese degree-seeking college students to study in Taiwan;
- 4 support for or opposition to opening Taiwan to individual Chinese tourists;
- 5 support for or opposition to increasing the cap on the daily number of Chinese group tourists.

These policy issues referred to different dimensions of the cross-Strait relationship. With regard to the ECFA question, it was the extent of mutual economic opening and trade ties with apparent economic implications. On the topic of Chinese tourists, it was a question of social interaction and people-to-people exchanges, embodying substantive social implications. On the topic of recognizing Chinese university degrees, it was 'institutional acknowledgement', in the context of acknowledging and accepting a different institution and system in mainland China. Of course, there could certainly be mixed considerations on the part of individual respondents. For example, with regard to relaxing restrictions for Chinese tourism, in addition to considerations of social interaction and human contact, there could also be economic considerations. However, at the fundamental level, this would still fall into the original category of social interaction, since social interaction engenders economic effects. As far as the general population is concerned, attitudes deriving from sentimental and instrumental motives are reasonable and common.

The descriptive statistics of people's attitudes towards five cross-Strait issues revealed the trends in their minds (Table 9.1). In the categories of economic opening and cultural exchange, those in favour outnumbered those who opposed the issue. On the ECFA, 45 per cent of the respondents supported the issue and 32 per cent were against (23 per cent did not know or abstained from answering). On allowing Chinese students to study in Taiwan, 50 per cent supported the proposal while 45 per cent were opposed to it (5 per cent did not know or abstained from answering). Conversely, on the issues related to institutional acknowledgement and social interaction, the opponents outnumbered supporters. On the topic of recognizing Chinese university degrees, 44 per cent supported and 50 per cent opposed the proposal. On opening Taiwan to individual Chinese tourists, 43 per cent supported and 48 per cent opposed the proposal. On increasing quotas for Chinese group tourists, 39 per cent supported and 44 per cent opposed the proposal.

From the frequency distributions of the variables, it appears that deep divisions exist among the Taiwanese people on policy issues related to cross-Strait

Table 9.1 Attitudes towards cross-Strait policies in Taiwan

	N	%
<i>Economic opening</i>		
(1) Support signing the ECFA?		
Support	558	45
Don't support	395	32
Don't know (abstained from answering)	289	23
<i>Educational exchange</i>		
(2) Support allowing Chinese students to study in Taiwan?		
Support	618	50
Don't support	559	45
Don't know (abstained from answering)	65	5
<i>Institutional acknowledgement</i>		
(3) Support recognition of Chinese degrees?		
Support	541	44
Don't support	623	50
Don't know (abstained from answering)	78	6
<i>Social interaction</i>		
(4) Support allowing individual Chinese tourists into Taiwan?		
Support	535	43
Don't support	597	48
Missing values	106	9
(5) Relax restrictions on number of Chinese group tourists to Taiwan?		
Support	477	39
Don't support	540	44
Don't know (abstained from answering)	221	18

Sources: (1)–(3): first survey, conducted 2 June 2010; (4)–(5): second survey, conducted 16 December 2010.

relations. A large proportion of the respondents supported economic openings and cultural exchanges, but a large proportion also opposed institutional acknowledgement and social interaction. On the issue of the ECFA, support outweighed opposition by 13 per cent, but a high percentage of people abstained from answering the question (23 per cent). Apart from this issue, the differences in opinion on other policy issues was less than 5 per cent, indicating that there was no common meeting ground on these issues in Taiwan. A comparison with other surveys conducted in 2010 by the media or other organizations also revealed a similar trend. On the question of the ECFA and Chinese students attending Taiwanese universities, support outweighed opposition. However, on the question of recognition for China's university degrees, there was no clear trend towards support or opposition.³ On the topic of increasing the number of Chinese tourists, it seems most people supported a 'slow opening' to Chinese individual tourists.⁴

In order to explain the differences in the opinions on cross-Strait policies, we considered the effects of variables including the following: individual social positions, socio-economic status, residential locality, party identification, preference for independence or reunification, and other factors (outlined in Appendix I). These variables are explained below.

- 1 Individual social positions included gender, age, marital status and ethnicity. Age referred to the age of the respondent in the year of the survey. Marital status was categorized as 'not married' or married. Ethnicity was determined by the father's native place of birth and could be Taiwanese Minnan, Taiwanese Hakka or mainland (there were too few Aboriginal respondents and they did not, therefore, present themselves as a category).
- 2 Socio-economic status was indicated by education and income. Education was divided into three categories: junior high and below, high school, vocational college and above. For income, there were fourteen income categories for both individual and household income, from no income to over NT\$200,000 per month.
- 3 Residential locality was coded into two categories according to where respondents lived, namely, in southern Taiwan (Tainan, Kaohsiung and Pingdong) and elsewhere. This was for the purpose of obtaining a sense of the geographical differences between north and south Taiwan.
- 4 Party identification was measured from the questions the survey posed. The answers were divided into five categories: blue (KMT and PFP), green (DPP and TSU), those who chose candidates and not parties, those who supported both, and those who did not support any.
- 5 National identity for independence or reunification was measured from the questions the survey posed. The answers were grouped into four choices: reunification (including immediate reunification and maintaining status quo now but reunifying later), independence (including immediate independence and maintaining status quo now but independence later), maintaining status quo forever, and 'wait and see'.

- 6 Impact of the ECFA on Taiwan's wealth disparities. The original question was: 'Do you think the ECFA will increase, decrease, or have no impact upon Taiwan's wealth disparities?' Answers were grouped by either 'increase', 'decrease' or 'no impact'.
- 7 ECFA considerations. The original questions were: 'In cross-Strait relations, some people think that Taiwan's economic position is most important, while others think that Taiwan's sovereignty is most important. What do you think is most important?' Respondents were given three answers to choose from 'economy', 'sovereignty' or 'both'.
- 8 Impressions of Chinese tourists. Three questions were asked in order to assess the respondents' impressions of Chinese tourists:
- 'After opening Taiwan to Chinese tourists what is your overall impression of China's society: Do you feel closer to China, further from China, or no different?'
 - 'Do you have a good impression of Chinese tourists in Taiwan?' Answers were coded into two categories:
 - 'have a good impression' (including behaviour and attitude);
 - 'do not have a good impression' or 'no opinion'.
 - 'Do you have a bad impression of Chinese tourists in Taiwan?' Respondents were again given three answers to choose from: 'have a bad impression (including behaviour and attitude)', 'do not have a bad impression' or 'no opinion'.

Results

To examine the effects of various factors on different cross-Strait policies, binary logistic regression models were used and presented as follows. First, Table 9.2 shows the variables that may have influenced people's support for the ECFA, which will lead to further economic opening and trade relations. In model (1) through model (5), the effects of various independent variables were quite consistent. With regard to personal characteristics, the greater the age (although the influences were not that significant in model (4), it was still near the significance level of 0.05) and the higher the education level and individual income, the stronger was the support for the ECFA. Furthermore, mainlanders were more likely to support the ECFA than Taiwanese Minnan people. Also, unmarried respondents showed more support for the ECFA than married respondents. With regard to party identification, those who supported the blues were more likely to support the ECFA than those who supported the greens and those who were 'middle voters'. On national identity, those who supported independence were less likely to support the ECFA than those who supported reunification and maintaining the status quo. Similarly, on the issue of the ECFA creating greater wealth disparities, those who thought the ECFA would make the disparities greater were less likely to support the ECFA than those who thought it would

Table 9.2 Factors influencing support for signing the ECFA

Model	1	2	3	4	5
	β	β	β	β	β
Age	0.03***	0.03**	0.02*	0.02	0.03*
<i>Education level (below lower secondary school)</i>					
High school	0.79**	0.81**	0.76*	0.88***	0.82*
Associate college and above	1.03***	1.08***	1.11***	1.14***	1.04**
Female (male)	0.21	0.10	0.11	0.05	-0.2
Unmarried (married)	0.35	0.56*	0.60*	0.54	0.56
Southern Taiwan (other areas)	-0.2	0.25	0.27	0.31	0.31
Average monthly income	0.11***	0.11**	0.11**	0.13**	0.16***
<i>Ethnicity (Minnan)</i>					
Hakka	0.26	-0.1	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1
Mainlander	1.74***	1.17***	1.02**	1.15**	1.20**
<i>Party affiliation (KMT)</i>					
DPP		-4.2***	-3.6***	-3.3***	-3.0***
Choose candidate/policy		-1.9***	-1.8***	-1.4***	-1.3***
Support all		-1.7***	-1.6***	-1.3***	-1.1*
Support none		-2.1***	-2.0***	-1.7***	-1.6***
<i>Tendency to support independence or reunification (maintain status quo)</i>					
Reunification			0.37	0.35	0.23
Independence			-1.3***	-1.2***	-0.1***
Wait and see			-0.3	-0.4	-0.3
<i>ECFA rich-poor influence (no influence)</i>					
Greater wealth disparities				-2.1***	-2.1***
Smaller wealth disparities				0.02	-0.1
<i>Emphasis on cross-Strait business negotiations (national sovereignty)</i>					
Economic advantage					1.33***
Both economic advantage and national sovereignty					0.46
Intercept	-2.7***	-0.8	-0.5	0.88	-0.4
Chi-square	111***	366***	397***	477***	510***
Df	9	13	16	18	20
N	827	827	827	827	827

Notes

* $p < 0.05$.

** $p < 0.01$.

*** $p < 0.001$.

Dependent variable: 1: 'Support ECFA'; 0: 'Don't support ECFA'.

A variable in brackets refers to the reference group.

have no impact at all. Finally, those who thought that, in cross-Strait trade, Taiwan's economic advantage should be put first were more likely to support the ECFA than those who thought sovereignty should be put first.

In conclusion, those who supported further opening up the cross-Strait economy and trade relations by means of the ECFA were older citizens with

higher socio-economic status (education and income) who supported the blues and opposed Taiwan's independence. Furthermore, other variables being equal, those who thought that the ECFA would not influence wealth disparities and those who thought that, in trade relations, Taiwan's economic advantage should be given primacy were more likely to support the ECFA.

Second, on the issue of educational and cultural exchanges, Table 9.3 presents binary logistic regression models to show the effects of various variables on the

Table 9.3 Factors influencing support for allowing Chinese students into Taiwan

Model	1	2	3	4
	β	β	β	β
Age	0.01*	0.01	0.01	0.01
<i>Education level (below junior high school)</i>				
High school	0.49*	0.45*	0.41	0.37
Associate college and above	0.84***	0.80***	0.81***	0.79***
Female (male)	-0.22	-0.32*	-0.33*	-0.42**
Unmarried (married)	0.33	0.40	0.44*	0.41
Southern Taiwan (other areas)	-0.11	0.10	0.13	0.12
Average monthly income	0.09***	0.08**	0.08**	0.08*
<i>Ethnicity (Minnan)</i>				
Hakka	0.15	-0.07	-0.10	-0.10
Mainlander	1.05***	0.58*	0.45	0.42
<i>Party affiliation (KMT)</i>				
DPP		-2.44***	-2.09***	-1.94***
Choose candidate/policy		-0.90***	-0.74***	-0.66**
Support all		-0.50	-0.42	-0.30
Support none		-1.05***	-0.96***	-0.91***
<i>Tendency to support independence or reunification (maintain status quo)</i>				
Reunification			0.74*	0.68*
Independence			-0.74***	-0.63**
Wait and see			0.17	0.17
<i>Emphasis on cross-Strait business negotiations (national sovereignty)</i>				
Economic advantage				0.58***
Both economic advantage and national sovereignty				0.41
Intercept	-1.63***	-0.41	-0.43	-0.86
Chi-square	94.9***	225.3***	254.7***	266.3***
Df	9	13	16	18
N	1,029	1,029	1,029	1,029

Notes

* $p < 0.05$.

** $p < 0.01$.

*** $p < 0.001$.

Dependent variable: 1: 'Support the government opening Taiwan to Chinese students to come to study'; 0: 'Don't support the government opening Taiwan to Chinese students to come to study'. A variable in brackets refers to the reference group.

attitude towards permitting Chinese degree-seeking students to study in Taiwan. For personal characteristics, model (1) shows that the greater the respondent's age and the higher the education level and individual income, the more likely it is that they would support allowing Chinese students to study in Taiwan. Similarly, mainlanders were more likely to support such an opening than Taiwanese Minnan people. Model (2) shows that, when combined with party identification, several factors such as education, individual income and ethnicity (mainlanders versus Minnan) were still significant, but age became insignificant. At this stage, gender became a significant factor in that more females than males tended to oppose allowing Chinese students to study in Taiwan. The insignificant effect of age implied that it was party identification rather than age that had an influence on the respondents' attitudes towards allowing Chinese students to study in Taiwan. Similarly, non-blue voters (greens and 'middle-voters') were more likely not to support allowing Chinese students than blues. In model (3), the inclusion of national identity variables (i.e. support for independence/unification) rendered the effect of ethnicity insignificant. Relative to those advocating the status quo, unification supporters were more likely to support allowing Chinese students to study in Taiwan, and independence supporters were more likely to oppose such a policy. Also, those who were unmarried were more likely to support allowing Chinese students than those who were married. In model (4), those who emphasized Taiwan's economic advantage over sovereignty were more likely to support allowing Chinese students to study in Taiwan.

In conclusion, supporters of educational and cultural exchanges in the form of allowing Chinese degree-seeking students to study in Taiwan exhibited these characteristics: male, higher socio-economic status (education and income), blue-camp supporters, and pro-unification and anti-independence. Furthermore, they were more likely to give primacy to Taiwan's economic position over the country's political sovereignty. Conversely, females, people with lower socio-economic status, green-camp supporters and middle voters, pro-independence supporters, and those who emphasized sovereignty over economic advantage tended not to support allowing Chinese degree-seeking students into Taiwan.

Third, on policies related to institutional acknowledgement, Table 9.4 provides models that show support for recognizing Chinese university degrees. From models (1) to (4), the effects of variables are highly consistent. Overall, model (4) reveals that older, more highly-educated male mainlanders who are blue-camp supporters, pro-unification and have higher incomes tended to support the recognition of Chinese university degrees. Also, those who gave primacy to economic advantage over national sovereignty were more likely to support the recognition of Chinese university degrees.

In summary, the characteristics of those who supported the recognition of Chinese university degrees were the following: older, high socio-economic status, male, mainlanders, blue-camp supporters and pro-unification supporters. Furthermore, they were more likely to give primacy to the economy over sovereignty. Conversely, those who were younger, female, with lower socio-economic status, non-blue supporters, pro-independence supporters, and with a preference

Table 9.4 Factors influencing support for recognition of Chinese degrees

Model	1	2	3	4
	β	β	β	β
Age	0.02**	0.02*	0.02*	0.02**
<i>Education level (below lower secondary school)</i>				
High school	0.81***	0.76***	0.74**	0.71**
Associate college and above	1.11***	1.06***	1.10***	1.07***
Female (male)	-0.25	-0.35*	-0.33*	-0.47**
Unmarried (married)	0.27	0.33	0.35	0.32
Southern Taiwan (other areas)	-0.28	-0.10	-0.11	-0.11
Average monthly income	0.09***	0.09**	0.08**	0.08*
<i>Ethnicity (Minnan)</i>				
Hakka	0.18	0.01	-0.01	0.00
Mainlander	1.33***	0.94***	0.81***	0.80***
<i>Party affiliation (KMT)</i>				
DPP		-2.36***	-2.01***	-1.79***
Choose candidate/policy		-0.93***	-0.74***	-0.63**
Support all		-0.46	-0.37	-0.19
Support none		-0.87***	-0.74***	-0.67***
<i>Tendency to support independence or reunification (maintain status quo)</i>				
Reunification			1.16***	1.09***
Independence			-0.73***	-0.55*
Wait and see			0.06	0.06
<i>Emphasis on cross-Strait business negotiations (national sovereignty)</i>				
Economic advantage				0.87***
Smaller wealth disparities				0.48
Intercept	-2.40***	-1.34**	-1.40**	-2.11***
Chi-square	132.5***	247.3***	283.5***	308.3***
Df	9	13	16	18
N	1,027	1,027	1,027	1,027

Notes

* $p < 0.05$.** $p < 0.01$.*** $p < 0.001$.

Dependent variable: 1: 'Support government recognition of Chinese degrees'; 0: 'Oppose government recognition of Chinese degrees'. A variable in brackets refers to the reference group.

for sovereignty over economic opportunity were more likely to oppose the recognition of Chinese university degrees.

Fourth, on the issues of cross-society interaction, Table 9.5 presents models for opening Taiwan to individual Chinese travellers. It shows that ethnicity (mainlander versus Taiwanese Minnan) as a factor did not negatively impact on support for opening Taiwan to individual Chinese travellers, and that differences were associated with party identification. Non-blue voters were more likely to oppose opening up Taiwan than blue voters. Highly educated, unmarried people were more likely to support increasing cross-Strait economic interaction than

Table 9.5 Factors supporting opening up Taiwan to Chinese individual tourists

Model	1	2	3	4	5	6
	β	β	B	β	β	β
Age	0.0***	0.0**	0.0**	0.0**	0.0**	0.0*
<i>Education (below lower secondary school)</i>						
High school	0.5*	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5
Associate college and above	0.9***	0.8**	0.8**	0.8**	0.9***	1.0***
Female (male)	-0.3	-0.4*	-0.3*	-0.4*	-0.4*	-0.3
Unmarried (married)	0.4	0.5*	0.5*	0.6*	0.5*	0.5*
Southern Taiwan (other areas)	-0.2	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.0
Household income	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<i>Ethnicity (Minnan)</i>						
Hakka	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2
Mainlander	0.8***	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2
<i>Party affiliation (blue)</i>						
Green		-1.3***	-1.0***	-0.8**	-0.6*	-0.6*
Choose candidate/policy		-0.9***	-0.8**	-0.7**	-0.6*	-0.5
None		-0.6**	-0.5*	-0.3	-0.2	-0.2
<i>Unification or independence (status quo)</i>						
Unification			0.7	0.6	0.6	0.7
Independence			-0.8***	-0.6**	-0.6*	-0.4
<i>Impressions of Chinese tourists</i>						
Feel closer to China ^a (no)				0.9***	0.8***	0.8***
Good impressions ^b (no)					0.8***	0.8***
Bad impressions ^c (no)						-0.7***
Intercept	-2.3***	-1.5*	-1.5**	-1.9***	-2.1***	-1.9**
Chi-square	56	89	105	131	146	160
Df	9	12	14	15	16	17
N	671	671	671	671	671	671

Notes

* $p < 0.05$.** $p < 0.01$.*** $p < 0.001$.

Dependent variable: 1: 'Support opening Taiwan to individual Chinese travellers'; 0: 'Oppose opening Taiwan to individual Chinese travellers'. A variable in brackets refers to the reference group.

a Since the opening of Taiwan to Chinese tourists, do you feel closer to China?

b Do you have a good impression of Chinese tourists in Taiwan?

c Do you have a bad impression of Chinese tourists in Taiwan?

people with a lower level of education. However, women were more likely to oppose these issues than males. People's feeling of relatedness to Chinese travellers and their impressions of Chinese tourists as good or bad significantly influenced their responses to opening up Taiwan. Those who felt closer and those who had a good impression of Chinese tourists were also more likely to support economic liberalization across the Taiwan Strait in the long term.

Lastly, on social interaction, Table 9.6 presents models for increasing the Chinese tourist quota to Taiwan. Females were less likely to support such a policy, as were native Taiwanese Minnan people. Ethnicity was not a factor in this context; rather the case rested upon party identification. Non-blue voters were more likely than blue voters to oppose increasing the number of Chinese visitors; those who supported independence were more likely to oppose increases

Table 9.6 Factors influencing increasing the number of Chinese group tourist quotas

Model	1	2	3	4	5	6
	β	β	β	β	β	β
Age	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<i>Education (below lower secondary school)</i>						
High school	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2	-0.3	-0.2	-0.2
Associate college and above	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2
Female (male)	-0.5**	-0.6***	-0.6***	-0.7***	-0.7***	-0.7***
Unmarried (married)	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
Southern Taiwan (other areas)	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Household income	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<i>Ethnicity (Minnan)</i>						
Hakka	-0.1	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.4
Mainlander	0.6*	0.2	0.1	0.1	-0.1	-0.1
<i>Party affiliation (blue)</i>						
Green		-1.6***	-1.2***	-1.0***	-0.9***	-0.9***
Choose candidate/policy		-0.5*	-0.5	-0.3	-0.3	-0.2
None		-0.8***	-0.7***	-0.5*	-0.5*	-0.5*
<i>Unification or independence (status quo)</i>						
Unification			0.5	0.3	0.4	0.4
Independence			-0.9***	-0.8**	-0.7*	-0.6*
<i>Impressions of Chinese tourists</i>						
Feel closer to China ^a (no)				1.0***	0.9***	0.9***
Good impressions ^b (no)					0.7***	0.8***
Bad impressions ^c (no)						-0.4*
Intercept	-0.6	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.4
Chi-square	29	72	88	118	130	135
Df	9	12	14	15	16	17
N	621	621	621	621	621	621

Notes

* $p < 0.05$.

** $p < 0.01$.

*** $p < 0.001$.

Dependent variable: 1: 'support increasing quotas'; 0: 'quotas can decrease or remain the same'.

A variable in brackets refers to the reference group.

a Since the opening of Taiwan to Chinese tourists, do you feel closer to China?

b Do you have a good impression of Chinese tourists in Taiwan?

c Do you have a bad impression of Chinese tourists in Taiwan?

than those who supported the status quo. The feeling of closeness and the good or bad impressions of Chinese visitors also had an influence on respondents' support or non-support for increasing the quota of visitors. Those who had good impressions or felt closer to Chinese tourists were more likely to support an increase in the quota of visitors, whereas those who had a bad impression were less likely to opt for a quota increase.

Discussion

The results of the above analysis show that there are significant differences in the various factors that affect people's attitudes towards the government's cross-Straits policies, in which social differentiation and social cleavages have played a key role. Furthermore, these differences reflect the ways in which cross-Straits policies and the rise of China have affected different social groups in Taiwan. These policies relate to different aspects of cross-Straits interactions, including economic cooperation (the ECFA), educational exchange (allowing Chinese degree-seeking students), institutional acknowledgement (recognizing Chinese university degrees) and social interactions (allowing more group and individual Chinese tourists into Taiwan). With regard to personal background, the older the individual and the higher his/her socio-economic status, the more likely he/she was to support policies related to increasing exchanges with China. This is also to say, the younger the individual and the lower his/her socio-economic status, the more likely he/she was to oppose further interactions with China. In short, age and socio-economic status played a vital role in whether the respondents supported or opposed cross-Straits policies.

Table 9.7 provides a breakdown of the percentages of group support for the various cross-Straits policies. The issues of analysis are: (1) the ECFA; (2) allowing Chinese degree-seeking students to study in Taiwan; (3) recognizing Chinese university degrees; (4) opening to individual Chinese tourists; and (5) increasing the daily quota for Chinese group tourists. The percentage of older respondents (over 42 years of age) who supported these issues were: (1) 48 per cent; (2) 51 per cent; (3) 45 per cent; (4) 45 per cent; and (5) 40 per cent. In comparison, the percentages of support among younger respondents (under 42 years of age) were: (1) 42 per cent; (2) 50 per cent; (3) 43 per cent; (4) 44 per cent; and (5) 40 per cent. These figures show that, overall, older respondents showed higher levels of support for these policies than younger respondents. At the same time, those with higher levels of education were more likely to support these policies. The percentages in this category were: 58 per cent, 61 per cent, 55 per cent, 54 per cent, and 46 per cent for those who were educated above high school level, with 35 per cent, 42 per cent, 35 per cent, 37 per cent, and 35 per cent for those educated to below high school level.

Why do the younger groups with relatively low socio-economic status tend to oppose the strengthening of economic and social interaction with China? One explanation could be found in their perceived economic interests and collective identities. With regard to economic interests, the younger groups with low

Table 9.7 Cross tables of personal characteristics and cross-Strait policies (percentages of respondent sample)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	<i>ECFA</i> (N = 1,185)	<i>Allow Chinese students</i> (N = 1,185)	<i>Recognize Chinese degrees</i> (N = 1,185)	<i>Open to individual travellers</i> (N = 1,143)	<i>Increase group tourist quotas</i> (N = 1,143)
<i>Age</i>					
Young	42	50	43	44	40
Old	48	51	45	45	40
<i>Education</i>					
Below high school	35	42	35	37	35
Associate college and above	58	61	55	54	46
<i>Gender</i>					
Male	48	55	49	50	47
Female	44	46	40	39	33
<i>Party affiliation</i>					
Blue	77	72	65	59	58
Middle	37	47	40	41	33
Green	8	19	15	26	22

Notes

- 1 The figures show the percentages for 'support'; other items include 'oppose' and 'don't know' (abstained from answering).
- 2 'Young' refers to those born in 1968 and after. 'Old' refers to those born in 1967 and before.
- 3 Blues include KMT and PFP. Greens include DPP and TSU.
- 4 Middle voters include those who voted for the candidate or policy and not the party, who support all parties, or who support no party.

socio-economic status have a more vulnerable position on the labour market. They are subjected to media influence on the disadvantages for their interests in cross-Strait relations, such as stories about tougher job market competition and rising prices for housing and commodities. For these reasons, they tend to oppose the further liberalization of cross-Strait economic relations. Young people describe themselves as a 'crash generation', with stagnating wages and limited upward mobility. For this reason, they may have doubts about further opening interactions with China. The Sunflower movement in March 2014 was mainly composed of young people who were opposed to the KMT government's proposed Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement. This student movement was a clear expression of the anxiety of young people in Taiwan with regard to further cross-Strait economic exchanges. In addition to competitive economic interests, those who have grown up since the 1990s have been less subject to the social and educational influences of the KMT, which leans towards Chinese identity and pro-reunification platform. Young people identify more strongly with Taiwan and they also have fewer connections with China

than the older generations. In fact, on the contrary, the increasing threats and impacts of China in recent years have touched a nerve in many people, which has led to their having reservations with regard to strengthening cross-Strait relations.

The reserved attitude towards cross-Strait policies seems to have developed in recent years in conjunction with growing Taiwanese identity and anti-China sentiment. For example, in a 2014 island-wide survey, the percentage of those respondents who lean towards Taiwanese independence or are hoping that independence will be achieved quickly reached 24 per cent, a record high since 1994. It is clear that this anti-China trend was strengthened by the student protests in March. The same survey showed that 60 per cent of the respondents identified themselves as Taiwanese, the highest level since such surveys began in 1992, while 33 per cent identified as Taiwanese and Chinese and only 4 per cent as Chinese, both these figures being the lowest since the surveys began (BBC Chinese 2014).

The so-called 'southern Taiwan factor' does not, in fact, have any significant effect on people's position on cross-Strait policies. The category of 'mainlander' is a significant variable when controlling other variables in light of people's attitudes towards economic opening up by the ECFA and towards institutional acknowledgement by the recognition of Chinese degrees. With regard to permitting Chinese students to study in Taiwan and increasing the quotas of group tourists, the mainlander effect disappeared when party identification and national identity were taken into consideration.

On the surface, the influence of identification with the party on the positions of respondents with regard to cross-Strait policies appears to correspond with our expectations. Green supporters showed a strong tendency towards opposing policies for greater interaction with China. But it is worth pointing out that green and blue support does not make up the entire spectrum of Taiwan political affiliation. Together, the greens and the blues only make up about 50 per cent of the population (blue 34 per cent, green 17 per cent). What is the position on cross-Strait policies of the other 50 per cent which does not have a strong party identification? Generally speaking, these citizens were located precisely between the blues and the greens. Given the similarity of their personal backgrounds with regard to age, gender, socio-economic status and ethnicity, middle voters who were neither blue nor green tended to show less support for cross-Strait policies than blue supporters.

Lastly, the surprising impact of gender on support for cross-Strait policies is noteworthy and demands an explanation. This study found that a higher percentage of Taiwanese women than men opposed the increases in social exchanges with China. There were few differences between women and men with regard to their positions on economic issues, such as the ECFA. However, when background factors such as marriage status and income were taken into account, men and women were found to be deeply divided in their opinions on social issues. These issues included cultural and educational exchanges, recognition of Chinese diplomas and social interaction.

Table 9.7 shows quite clearly that male support for cross-Strait policies is consistently higher than female support for the same policies. The issues and corresponding figures for male and female are:

- 1 ECFA (48 per cent vs 44 per cent);
- 2 allowing Chinese degree-seeking students to study in Taiwan (55 per cent vs 46 per cent);
- 3 recognizing Chinese university degrees (49 per cent vs 40 per cent);
- 4 open to individual tourists (50 per cent vs 39 per cent);
- 5 increasing group tourist quota (47 per cent vs 33 per cent).

When economic openings were placed alongside other factors, the differences in the percentages between the genders were not imbalanced. However, with regard to other issues such as educational exchanges, institutional acknowledgement and social interaction, taking into account personal background (education, marriage, income and ethnicity), females showed a stronger tendency towards opposing policies than males.

Tables 9.8 to 9.11 analyse the relationship between gender, party identification and each of the policies under consideration. Table 9.8 shows that, on the topic of the ECFA, gender was not a factor with regard to support for the policy

Table 9.8 Cross tables of gender, party and the ECFA (%)

Party affiliation		ECFA		
		Support (N = 280)	Oppose (N = 32)	Total (N = 312)
Blue	Male	51	56	52
	Female	49	44	48
		Support (N = 198)	Oppose (N = 317)	Total (N = 515)
Non-blue	Male	56	55	56
	Female	44	45	45

Table 9.9 Cross tables of gender, party and allowing Chinese students into Taiwan (%)

Party affiliation		Allowing Chinese students		
		Support (N = 277)	Oppose (N = 92)	Total (N = 369)
Blue	Male	55	36	50
	Female	45	64	50
		Support (N = 274)	Oppose (N = 386)	Total (N = 660)
Non-blue	Male	54	49	51
	Female	46	51	49

Table 9.10 Cross tables of gender, party and recognition of Chinese degrees (%)

Party affiliation		Recognition of Chinese degrees		
		Support (N = 250)	Oppose (N = 113)	Total (N = 363)
Blue	Male	55	38	50
	Female	45	62	50
		Support (N = 233)	Oppose (N = 431)	Total (N = 664)
Non-blue	Male	56	49	52
	Female	44	51	49

Table 9.11 Cross tables of gender, party and opening to individual tourists (%)

Party affiliation		Opening to individual travellers		
		Support (N = 160)	Oppose (N = 88)	Total (N = 248)
Blue	Male	58	35	50
	Female	43	65	50
		Support (N = 162)	Oppose (N = 261)	Total (N = 423)
Non-blue	Male	53	49	50
	Female	48	51	50

among blue and green voters. The difference between male and female blue voters expressed as a ratio was small (51 per cent; 49 per cent).

Table 9.9 shows that for educational exchanges, the gender difference among the non-blue voters was not significant. However, among the blue voters, females were relatively more strongly opposed to the policy of opening to Chinese students than males. Among the non-blue voters, opposition to the same policy was split between 49 per cent of the males and 51 per cent of the females. Conversely, among the blue voters, 36 per cent of the males and 64 per cent of the females were opposed to the educational exchange issue. The same gender discrepancy exists among the blue voters with regard to the issues of recognizing Chinese university degrees and increasing the quota of Chinese tourists. In Table 9.10, a gender difference was not obvious among the non-blue voters on the issue of recognizing Chinese degrees. However, among the blue voters, 38 per cent of the male respondents were opposed to recognizing Chinese degrees, against 62 per cent of the female respondents. As for opening Taiwan to individual Chinese travellers, the non-blue gender difference was negligible, but for the blue voters, 35 per cent of the male respondents and 65 per cent of the female respondents were opposed to this issue (Table 9.11). Similarly, 36 per cent of the male blue voters were opposed to increasing group tourist quotas, against 64 per cent of the female blue voters (Table 9.12).

Table 9.12 Cross tables of gender, party and increasing Chinese group tourist quotas (%)

Party affiliation		Increasing Chinese group tourist quotas		
		Support (N = 148)	Oppose (N = 89)	Total (N = 237)
Blue	Male	59	36	50
	Female	41	64	50
		Support (N = 141)	Oppose (N = 243)	Total (N = 384)
Non-blue	Male	56	45	49
	Female	44	55	51

This analysis shows that, in Taiwan, the female respondents adopted a position on cross-Strait policies that differed from that of their male counterparts. On economic opening and trade, the differences in the responses of the women and the men were not so marked. However, on non-economic policies, women were more likely to adopt an opposing position than men, for example on policies pertaining to institutional acknowledgement and social interaction. Why is this the case? A final explanation has not yet been found, but a few working hypotheses present themselves. First, the differences may derive from a personal need for stability, in particular for stable homes and committed relationships. The issues of permitting Chinese students to study in Taiwan, recognizing Chinese degrees and increasing group tourist quotas would have an immediate impact on people's living environment and social networks. For housewives and single women, such policies would have the potential to overturn or disrupt the predictability and stability of everyday life. The last 20 years have witnessed Taiwanese businessmen going away to China and sending money back home to their wives, who have tended to feel that this development threatens the stability of their marriages and the security of their valued home environment. Although only a few women live in separated families because their husbands work in China, the impact of the feelings of insecurity that this has engendered has been widely acknowledged within Taiwanese society. In fact, women would be more likely to take a conservative position on increasing cross-Strait interaction in order to ensure that it remains in the realm of predictability and stability.

Second, these differences may reflect the gender differences in moral values that affect political attitudes. For example, recent scholarship suggests that, in the US, men and women responded differently when asked about cultural issues such as anti-war matters, civil rights, abortion rights, women's rights and homosexual rights (Kaufmann 2002, 2006); women tend to be more concerned about social welfare issues, while men tend to be more concerned about economic issues (Thorson and Stambough 1994). In Taiwan, women are more concerned about social issues than men, and this may produce a gender difference in party support and electoral behaviour (Yang 2006, Yang and Liu 2009). This can lead to their having different attitudes towards cross-Strait social policies.

Third, Taiwanese women may feel that they face a potential threat from Chinese mistresses. Even if Taiwan's economy benefits from the ECFA, those who are making money and enjoying life are mainly men, while women have to bear the brunt of the social consequences resulting from the increasing cross-Strait interaction. For example, the Taiwanese media has recently reported many stories about the 'Chinese mistress' which has engendered further distrust among women on policies of cross-Strait interactions and led them to feel victimized in cross-Strait social interactions (Shen 2005, 2008). Many women do not see benefits accruing from further cross-Strait social exchanges. In fact, they feel disadvantaged by these social exchanges and feel that they do not stand to benefit from them (Shen 2014). Finally, the differences may be related to concerns about the impact on the marriage market. Increasing social interaction with China would have the effect of stimulating the marriage market, leaving unmarried Taiwanese women with the feeling that they are now in competition with Chinese women. This could place the fear in the minds of Taiwanese housewives that their young children may find potential marriage partners among the Chinese men and women on the college campus. It could be argued that, as a result of these factors, the effects of party identification, socio-economic status, age and gender on social policies remain independent and significant variables in today's Taiwanese society.

Conclusion

In Taiwan, for some social groups – females, the younger generation, and people with lower socio-economic status – the reservations expressed with regard to cross-Strait policies specifically reflect the collective concerns and anxieties caused by the surging China impact, particularly after the acceleration in cross-Strait exchanges after 2008, which eventually led to the Anti-Trade Pact Movement in 2014. These social groups are economically vulnerable and relatively disadvantaged in Taiwanese society. They seem uncomfortable and insecure in the face of increasing social interactions with Chinese people coming to Taiwan. This kind of collective anxiety did not exist in previous years, i.e. before 2008. For example, studies on Taiwanese attitudes towards immigration policies for bride immigrants from China and Southeast Asia have shown that, in the early 2000s, gender, age and socio-economic status had little effect on people's attitudes regarding immigration policies. During that period, when cross-Strait contacts were not so intensive and interactions not so frequent, people's attitudes regarding cross-Strait policies were shaped mainly by partisan competition and political rhetoric, instead of socio-economic status and self-interest (Chen and Yu 2005; Tsai 2011). However, when cross-Strait exchanges intensified and everyday life was affected, people's attitudes altered, reflecting their emotional feelings and interpretations of China's rising impact on civil society in Taiwan.

This chapter shows that the reservations with regard to cross-Strait policies in Taiwan that have accumulated since 2008 are not only drawn along partisan lines, and that they have long transcended the pattern of Taiwanese party

Table A9.1 Continued

Variable	First round 2010/06 (N = 1,242)		Second round 2010/12 (N = 1,238)	
	N	%	Mean	S.D.
<i>Do you think the signing of the ECFA will increase wealth disparities in Taiwan, decrease them, or not have any impact?</i>				
Increase	632	51		
Decrease	78	6		
No influence	246	20		
Missing values	193	16		
<i>In cross-Strait economic interaction what do you think is most important: Taiwan's economic advantage, Taiwan's sovereignty, or are both equally important?</i>				
Economic advantage	665	54		
National sovereignty	391	32		
Both are important	137	11		
Missing values	49	4		
<i>After the opening of Taiwan to Chinese tourists, do you feel closer to China?</i>				
Yes (closer)			457	37
No (more distant or no different)			667	54
Missing values			114	9
<i>Do you have a good impression of Chinese tourists?</i>				
Yes			301	24
No			721	58
Missing values			216	17
<i>Do you have a bad impression of Chinese tourists?</i>				
Yes			482	39
No			614	50
Missing values			142	12

Notes

'Missing values' include those who did not know how to respond, abstained from answering, evaded the question, had no opinion, or gave some other answer that could not be categorized.

1 There was a discrepancy in the questions in the two different rounds of interviews. See text for discussion.

Notes

- 1 The three bills delayed in the legislature until the summer of 2014 include the setting up of free economic pilot zones, a monitoring mechanism for cross-Strait pacts, and the endorsement of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement with China signed the previous year. These three issues were listed as the KMT's top priorities in the upcoming session of the legislature slated for September 2014.
- 2 For details of these two telephone surveys, see Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica (2013).
- 3 For example, a telephone poll conducted on 22 April 2010 by the *China Times* showed that 47 per cent of the Taiwanese supported Chinese students coming to Taiwan, but only 40 per cent supported the recognition of Chinese degrees. And on 21–22 April 2010, a TVBS telephone survey found that 51 per cent of the Taiwanese supported

accepting Chinese degree-seeking students in Taiwan, but only 35 per cent supported the recognition of Chinese degrees. See www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/yijung/201005/yijung-20100504120818.pdf (accessed 15 October 2012).

- 4 A survey conducted by the Mainland Affairs Council from 1 to 5 September 2010 reported that 60 per cent of the population supported a 'slow opening' to Chinese individual tourists. See www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/09211884354.pdf (accessed 15 October 2012).

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