

The Social Bases of Cross-Strait Policies in Taiwan

兩岸政策的社會支持基礎：

性別、社會階層、政黨認同

Chih-Jou Jay Chen 陳志柔

Institute of Sociology

Academia Sinica

Taipei, Taiwan

[jaychen@sinica.edu.tw](mailto:jaychen@sinica.edu.tw)

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Abstract:

This paper examines the social bases of cross-strait policies in Taiwan. Drawing data from telephone surveys conducted in 2010, this project investigates Taiwanese people's attitudes toward different cross-strait policies, including (1) ECFA (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement), (2) allowing Chinese students to study in Taiwan, (3) recognizing Chinese diplomas and degrees, (4) allowing self-guided individual Chinese tourists, and (5) increasing the daily quota of Chinese tourists on group tours. This study finds that Taiwanese people's attitudes toward various cross-strait policies vary and are affected by their social and political background. In general, men, aged, pan-blue supporters, and high-status people are more likely to support the government's cross-strait policies. On the other hand, women, younger, non-pan-blue supporters, and lower-status people tend not to support these policies. These divisions of opinion reflect the social impacts of rapidly changing cross-strait relationship in Taiwan.

Key words: cross-strait relationship, cross-strait policies, Taiwan and China

## **Introduction**

This paper studies the social bases of Taiwan's cross-strait policies since 2010. It looks at the various groups who support or reject particular cross-strait policy. Specifically, it examines how gender, ethnicity, social status, party identification, and national identity of Taiwanese people influence the possibility of supporting or opposing particular cross-strait policies. These divisions of opinion reflect the social impacts of rapidly changing cross-strait relationship in Taiwan.

Since the second alteration of ruling political party in 2008, cross-strait relations have become the center of politics and the main site of public disputes in Taiwan. Some think that boosting cross-strait trade and investment will further drive Taiwan's economic growth, while others worry that it will only exacerbate the hollowing out of Taiwan's manufacturing. In June of 2010, the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) opened up deepening cross-strait ties in the fields of finance, commerce, and labor. At the same time, cultural, education, and social exchanges have followed. Two months later, the Taiwan legislature passed a bill that would recognize Chinese educational degrees, and to allow Chinese to come Taiwan to study in Taiwan's universities and colleges. These events were a continuation of the June 2008 opening of Taiwan to Chinese tour groups, which reached a daily quota of 3,100 people by the end of 2010. The number of Chinese visitors to Taiwan has increased to an average of 3,600 a day since the daily quota was raised from 3,000 to 4,000 in the early 2011, but they have been required to travel as part of organized groups. Then beginning in June 2011, a maximum of 500 individual tourists from three Chinese cities (Beijing, Shanghai, and Xiamen) were allowed to visit Taiwan daily, further promoting tourism and social interactions between Taiwan and China.

Taiwan's ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), has claimed the above mentioned trends have aided Taiwan's development over the past year, suggesting that it has

helped the island achieve manufacturing goals and to realize cross-strait harmony. The opposition cried that this economic opening has only hollowed out Taiwan's manufacturing and increased the disparity of wealth between rich and poor. The criticisms also worry that it will sacrifice Taiwan's political autonomy and cultural identity, helping Beijing realize its aim of further binding Taiwan. Given that Taiwan's media has taken up these talking points on cross-strait relations, and the clamor in the legislature has only mimicked them. At present it seems that the KMT has controlled the main direction of cross-strait policies.

Cross-strait topics are often presented in the media and the legislature as a two sided debate, which each side staking out its own position and never meeting in between or with any room for alternatives. Indeed, it is rare in discussions in Taiwan on cross-strait issues to deviate from either of the party positions, so that party position ends up deciding the preferences of cross-strait policy. The media or politicians rarely examine what other factors influence people's positions and views of cross-strait relations.

In the midst of these debates, people's attitudes have been constantly overlooked. It is true that the media often draw on public opinion, but we still lack an understanding of what factors affect public opinions in cross-strait policies. Given the fact that supporters of the main political parties will follow their party's preferences and positions, what are the views of those "independent" or "undecided" voters who are in the middle of support neither party? Furthermore, are there other factors that affect cross-strait attitudes apart from political rhetoric, such as socio-economic status, gender, or locality? In addition to the main issues (ECFA, Chinese tourists, etc.), what are people's attitudes toward other social issues in cross-strait affairs? Without a systematic investigation we are unable to have a clear view of the real factors influencing people's cross-strait positions and preferences.

Social differentiation and social cleavages have led to differences of positions and attitudes on cross-strait issues in Taiwan. That is to say, different social groups of gender, class, and party identification may have different opinions about cross-strait policies. These attitude differences and their consequences not only reflect Taiwan's social differentiation and social cleavages, but also the social impacts of China's rapid rise in global economy and its powerful influence over cross-strait relations. Especially, since these cross-strait policies are in a beginning stage, they will have lock-in effects on cross-strait institutional development. This is not just a single policy implementation without long term effects. On the contrary, these cross-strait policies and people's opinions toward them will have significant effects on long-term institutional changes in cross-strait relations and domestic politics in Taiwan.

### **Data and Measurement**

This paper draws on data from two rounds of telephone survey conducted in 2010 in Taiwan. They are part of a long term institutional research project run by the Institute of Sociology at Academia Sinica. The interviewees were Taiwanese citizens over eighteen years of age. The first round survey was conducted on June 1-22, and consisted of 1,242 respondents (with a 95% confidence interval and a sampling error of  $\pm 2.78\%$ ). The second round was conducted on December 16-26, and consisted of 1,238 respondents (with a 95% confidence interval and a sampling error of  $\pm 2.78\%$ ).<sup>1</sup> Among questions in the first round of survey were people's attitudes toward ECFA, recognizing Chinese degrees, and accepting Chinese students on a full-time basis. The second round of survey included questions of allowing independent Chinese individual tourists and increasing the daily quota of Chinese tourists.

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<sup>1</sup> For details regarding these two telephone surveys, see "Shehui yixiang diaocha zhixing baogao" (社會意向調查執行報告, 中央研究院社會學所), Inst. of Sociology, Academia Sinica.

Specifically, people's attitudes toward five cross-strait issues were studied, with three from the first round survey and two from the second round.<sup>2</sup> They are as follows.

- (1) Support or opposition for the signing of ECFA;
- (2) Support or opposition to the recognition of Chinese degrees;
- (3) Support or opposition for allowing Chinese college students to study in Taiwan;
- (4) Support or opposition for opening Taiwan to individual Chinese tourists; and
- (5) Support or opposition to increase the cap on the daily number of Chinese group tourists.

What are the kinds of cross-strait relationship the abovementioned issues refer to? For the ECFA question, it was the extent of mutual economic opening and trade ties with apparent economic implications. For Chinese tourists it is a question of social interaction and people-to-people exchange carrying more social implications. On recognizing Chinese degrees, it refers to "institutional acknowledgement," a matter of acknowledging and accepting a different institution and system with somewhat more political implications. Of course there might be mixed considerations of the individual respondents. For example, on relaxing restriction for Chinese tourism, in addition to considerations of social interaction and human contact, there might be economic considerations. However, at the fundamental level this would still fall under the original category of social interaction, for social interaction will bring forth economic effects. As far as people are concerned, attitudes with sentimental and instrumental motives are very reasonable and common.

The descriptive statistics of people's attitudes toward five cross-strait issues

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<sup>2</sup> The questions of the telephone surveys were as follows: 1) Do you support signing the ECFA? 2) Do you support the government's recognizing Chinese degrees? 3) Do you support the opening of Taiwan's universities to Chinese students? 4) Do you support opening to individual Chinese tourists? 5) The current daily limit of Chinese visitors to Taiwan is 3,000. Do you think this should increase, decrease, or keep the same? In compiling data we combined the extreme and the moderate answers on support or oppose.

display the trend of people's minds. In the categories of economic opening and cultural exchange, supporters outnumbered those who opposed. On the ECFA issue, 45 percent of respondents supported and 32 percent opposed (23 percent didn't know or refused to answer). On allowing Chinese students to study in Taiwan, 50 percent supported while 45 percent opposed (5 percent didn't know or refused to answer). Conversely, on the topics of institutional acknowledgement and social interaction, The opposers outnumbered the. On recognizing Chinese degrees, 44 percent supported and 50 percent opposed. On opening to individual Chinese tourists, 43 percent supported and 48 percent opposed. On increasing quotas for Chinese group tourists, 39 percent supported and 44 percent opposed. (Table 1)

[Table 1]

From the frequency distributions of the variables, it appears that Taiwanese people's opinions on cross-strait relations policy were fractured. The majority of the population supported economic opening and cultural exchange, but a majority also opposed institutional acknowledgement and social interaction. On the issue of the ECFA, support outweighed opposition by 13 percent, but a high percentage of people did not respond (23 percent). Apart from this issue, the difference of opinion on other policy issues was less than 5 percent, indicating that there is not a common ground on these issues in Taiwan. In comparison with other surveys conducted in 2010 by the media or other organizations, we also find a similar trend. On the ECFA and Chinese students attending Taiwanese universities, support outweighed opposition. However, on recognizing China's degrees and increasing the number of Chinese tourists, there was no clear trend of support or opposition.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> For example, a telephone poll conducted on April 22, 2010 by the China Times showed that 47 percent of Taiwanese supported Chinese students coming to Taiwan, but only 40 percent supported recognizing Chinese degrees. (China Times 2010/4/22). And on April 21-22, 2010, a TVBS telephone survey found that 51 percent of Taiwanese supported accepting Chinese students to Taiwan but only 35 percent supported recognizing Chinese degrees

In order to explain the differences of opinions on cross-strait policies, we considered the effects of the following variables: individual social positions, socioeconomic status, residential locality, party identification, national identify for independence or reunification, and other factors (outlined in Appendix one). These variables are explained below:

(1) Individual social positions include gender, age, marital status, and ethnicity. Age refers to the age of the respondent that year. Marital status is categorized as “not married” or married. Ethnicity was determined by the father’s native place of birth and could be Taiwanese Minnan, Taiwanese Hakka, or Mainlander (there were too few aborigine respondents and thus they did not present themselves as its own category).

(2) Socioeconomic status was indicated by education and income. Education was divided into three categories: junior high and under, high school, associate college and above. For income, this study was unable to set a common baseline because the first round survey asked for individual income and the second round asked for household income. There were fourteen income categories for both individual and household income, from no income to over NT\$200,000 per month.

(3) Residential locality was coded into two categories for where respondents lived, namely in southern Taiwan (Tainan, Kaohsiung, and Pingdong) and elsewhere. This was meant to get a sense of the geographical difference between north and south Taiwan.

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( [http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE\\_DB/DL\\_DB/yijung/201005/yijung-20100504120818.pdf](http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/yijung/201005/yijung-20100504120818.pdf)). A survey conducted by the Mainland Affairs Council on September 1-5, 2010 reported that 60 percent of the population supported a “slow opening” to Chinese individual tourists ( <http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/09211884354.pdf> ) ° This does show that without the “slow opening” phrase, there is a completely different result.

(4) Party identification was measured from the questions the survey posed. From the question of “what party do you support: DPP, KMT, PFP, or TSU?” answers were divided into five categories: blue (KMT and PFP), green (DPP and TSU), those who chose by candidate and not party, those who support both, and those who don’t support any. In analysis, we grouped together the answers “those who choose by candidate and those who support both or none” as a category of “middle voters” that fell between blue and green.

(5) National identify for independence or reunification was measured by the following questions. In the first round survey, the question asked, “do you support immediate reunification, immediate independence, or the status quo?” The answers were regrouped into four choices: reunification (including immediate reunification and maintaining status quo now but reunifying later), independence (including immediate independence and maintaining status quo now but independence later). In the second round survey, the question was slightly different: “given the state of cross-strait relations do you think it would be better for Taiwan in the future to be independent or to unify?” The answers were categorized as unify, independent and maintain status quo.

(6) Impact of ECFA on Taiwan’s wealth disparity: The original question was “do you think ECFA will increase, decrease, or have no impact upon Taiwan’s wealth disparity?” Answers were either increase, decrease, or have no impact.

(7) ECFA considerations: The original questions was: “In cross-straits economic relationship, some people think Taiwanese economic position is most important, while others think Taiwan’s sovereignty is most important. What do you think is most important? Answers were economy, sovereignty, or both.

(6) Impressions toward Chinese tourists. Three questions were asked to understand impressions of Chinese tourists: 1) “After opening Taiwan to Chinese tourists what is your overall impression of China’s society: do you feel closer to China, further from China, or no different?” Answers were chosen from “closer than before,” “further than before,” or “no difference.” 2) “Do you have some kinds of good impression on Chinese tourists in Taiwan?” Answers were recoded into two categories: “have a good impression (including behavior and attitude),” and “do not have a good impression or no opinion.” 3) “Do you have some kind of bad impression on Chinese tourists in Taiwan?” Answers were “have a bad impression (including behavior and attitude),” and “don not have a bad impression and no opinion.”

## **Results**

To examine the effects of various factors on different cross-strait policies, binary logistic regression models were used and presented as follows. Foremost, Table 2 shows the variables that may have influenced people’s support for ECFA, which will link to further economic opening and trade relations. In Model one through five, the effects of various independent variables were quite consistent. For personal characteristics, the higher age (although the influences were not that significant in model four, still it was near the significance level of 0.05), education, and individual income, the higher the support was for ECFA. Furthermore, mainlanders were more likely to support ECFA than Taiwanese Minnan people. Also, unmarried respondents had more support for ECFA than married ones. For party identification, those who supported the blues were more likely to support ECFA than those who supported the greens and those who were “middle voters.” On national identity, those who supported independence were less likely to support ECFA than those who supported

reunification and maintaining the status quo. Similarly, on the issue of ECFA creating greater wealth disparity, those who thought ECFA would make the disparity greater were less likely to support ECFA than those who thought it would have no impact. Finally, those who thought that in cross-strait trade Taiwan's economic advantage should be put first were more likely to support ECFA than those who thought sovereignty should be put first.

In conclusion, those who supported further opening cross-strait economy and trade relations by means of ECFA had these characteristics: older, higher socioeconomic status (education and income), supporting the blues and opposing Taiwan independence. Furthermore, other variables being equal, those who thought that ECFA would not influence wealth disparities and those who thought that in trade relations Taiwan's economic advantage should be given primacy were more likely to support ECFA.

[Table 2]

Second, for the issue of educational and cultural exchange, Table 3 presents binary logistic regression models to show the effects of various variables on the attitude toward permitting Chinese students to study in Taiwan. For personal characteristics, Model 1 shows that the higher the respondent's age, education, and individual income, the more likely they would support permitting Chinese students to study in Taiwan. Similarly, mainlanders were more likely to support such an opening than Taiwanese Minnan people. The second model shows that when combined with party identification, several factors such as education, individual income, and ethnicity (mainlanders versus Minnan) were still significant, but age began to become insignificant. At this stage, gender became a significant factor in which females tended to oppose permitting Chinese students more than males. The insignificant effect of age implied that it was party identification but age that had influence on

one's attitude for permitting Chinese students to study in Taiwan. Similarly, non-blue supporters (greens and "middle-voters" ) were more likely not to support permitting Chinese students than blues. In Model 3, the inclusion of variable of national identity (i.e., support for independence/unification) made the effect of ethnicity become insignificant. Relative to those advocating status quo, unification supporters were more likely to support permitting Chinese students, and independence supporters were more likely to oppose such a policy. Also, those unmarried were more likely to support permitting Chinese students than those married. In model 4, those who emphasized Taiwan's economic advantage over sovereignty were more likely to support permitting Chinese students.

In conclusion, supporters of educational and cultural exchange in the form of permitting Chinese students exhibited these characteristics: male, higher socioeconomic status (education and income), blue-camp supporters, and pro-unification and anti-independence. Furthermore, they were more likely to give primacy to Taiwan's economic advantage over political sovereignty. Conversely, females, people with lower socioeconomic status, green-camp supporters and middle voters, pro-independence supporters, and those who emphasize sovereignty over economic advantage, tended not to support allowing Chinese students into Taiwan.

[Table 3]

Third, on policies relating to institutional acknowledgement, Table 4 lays out the models for support for recognizing Chinese university degrees. From Model 1 to 4, the effects of variables are very consistent. Overall, from model 4, those who were male, mainlander, older, more educated, blue-camp supporter, pro-unification, and with a higher income tended to support recognizing Chinese degrees. Also, those who gave primacy to economic advantage over national sovereignty were more likely to support recognition of Chinese degrees.

In summary, the characteristics of those who support recognition of Chinese degrees are the following: older, high socioeconomic status, male, mainlander, blue-camp supporters, and pro-unification supporters. Furthermore, he/she was more likely to give primacy to economy over sovereignty. Conversely, younger, female, of lower socioeconomic status, non-blue supporters, pro-independence supporters, and with a primacy to sovereignty over economy was more likely to oppose recognition of Chinese university degrees.

[Table 4]

Fourth, on the issues of cross-society interaction, Table 5 presents models for opening Taiwan to individual Chinese travelers. It shows that ethnicity (mainlander versus Taiwanese Minnan) as a factor did not impact support for opening to individual Chinese travelers, and that difference is caused by party identification. Non-blue voters were more likely to oppose opening than blue voters. Higher educated people were more likely to support opening than lower educated people, as were those who are unmarried. However, women were more likely to oppose than males. People's feeling of relatedness to Chinese travelers, as well as their impression of good or bad influenced their responses to opening more. Those that felt closer were more likely to support, as were those who had a good impression.

[Table 5]

Lastly, on social interaction, Table 6 presents models for increasing Chinese tourist quota to Taiwan. Females were less likely to support such a policy, as were native Taiwanese Minnan people. Ethnicity was not a factor in support or not, rather the case rested upon party identification. Non-blue voters were more likely than blue voters to oppose increasing visitors. Those who support independence were more likely to oppose than those who support status quo. The feeling of closeness to Chinese visitors and good and bad impressions also had an influence on support or not

for increasing the number of visitor quota. Those that had a good impression and felt closer were more likely to support increases; whereas those who had a bad impression were less likely.

[Table 6]

### **Remarks**

From the above analysis, it is clear that there are differences among Taiwanese attitudes towards the government's China policies. Furthermore, there are different social bases for each topic, sometimes converging, and sometimes diverging. Most obviously, social differentiation and social cleavages have led to differences of positions and attitudes on cross-strait issues in Taiwan. Furthermore, these differences reflect how cross-strait policies and the rise of China have affected different social groups in Taiwan. In personal background, the older the individual, as well as the higher his/her socioeconomic status, the more likely he/she was to support policies on China (economic, cultural, social, institutional). This is also to say, the younger the individual and the lower his/her socioeconomic status, the more likely he/she was to oppose further interaction with China. This is all to say that class differences do have a profound influence on support or opposition to cross-strait policies.

Table 7 is a breakdown of percentages of group support for the various cross-strait policies. These topics of analysis are: 1) ECFA; 2) permitting Chinese students; 3) recognizing Chinese degrees; 4) opening to individual Chinese tourists; 5) increasing the daily quota for Chinese group tourists. Percentage of support among older respondents (over 42 years old) on these issues is: 1) 48%; 2) 51%; 3) 45%; 4) 45%; and 5) 40%. The percentage support among younger respondents (under 42 years old) is: 1) 42%; 2) 50%; 3) 43%; 4) 44%; and 5) 40%. From these figures we see that overall older respondents had higher levels of support for these policies than younger ones. At the same time, those with higher education were more likely to

support these policies. The percentages are 58%, 61%, 55%, 54%, and 46% for those with more than a high school education, and 35%, 42%, 35%, 37%, and 35% for those with less a high school education.

[Table 7]

The factor of southern Taiwan does not, in fact, have any significant effect on the people's position on cross-strait policies. The category of mainlander is a significant variable when controlling other variables in light of people's attitude towards economic opening with ECFA and institutional acknowledgment with recognizing Chinese degrees. For issues of permitting Chinese students and increasing the group tourist quota, when controlling for party identification or national identity, the mainlander effect disappeared.

On the surface, the influence of party identification on positions on cross-strait policies looks to be as expected. Green supporters have a strong tendency to oppose policies towards China. But it is worth pointing out that green and blue support is not the entire spectrum of Taiwan political affiliation. Together, greens and blues only make up about 50 percent of the population (Blue 34 percent, Green 17 percent). What is the position towards cross-strait policies of the other half who do not have a strong party identification? Generally speaking, people of this other half are located directly in the middles of blues and greens. When the factors of personal background were equal (age, gender, socioeconomic status, and ethnicity), the middle voters who were neither blue nor green tended to show less support to China policies.

Lastly, most ignored but what should give us the most cause for pause is the impact of gender on support for cross-strait policies. From Table 7 we see that male support on cross-strait policies is consistently higher than female. The issues and figures are: 1) ECFA (48% vs. 44%); 2) permitting Chinese students (55% vs. 46%); 3) recognizing Chinese degrees (49% vs. 40%); 4) open to individual tourists (50%

vs. 39%); 5) increasing group tourist quota (47% vs. 33%). When placing economic opening alongside other factors, gender is not imbalanced. However, for other issues, such as educational exchange, institutional acknowledgement, or social interaction, and after controlling for personal background (education, marriage, income, and ethnicity), females tended to oppose policies more than males.

From Tables 8 to Table 11 we have analyzed the relationship between gender, party identification, and each of the policies under consideration. Table 8 shows that for the issue of ECFA gender is not a factor in support of the policy among blue and green voters. The ratio difference between male and female blue support voters is small (51% ; 49%). Table 9 shows that for educational exchange issues the gender difference among non-blue voters is not significant. However, among blue voters females clearly oppose the policy of opening to Chinese relatively more than males do. Among the non-blue voters, opposition to the policy was about split with 49 percent of males opposing and 51 percent of females. Conversely, among blue voters 36 percent of males opposed, while 64 percent of females did. The same gender discrepancy among blue voters exists on the issue of institutional acknowledgement and social interaction. In Table 10, gender difference was not obvious among non blue voters over the issue of recognizing Chinese degrees. However, among blue voters 38 percent of males opposed, while 62 percent of females did. As for opening to individual Chinese travelers, non blue gender difference was negligible, but for blue voters 35 percent of males opposed, while 65 percent of females did (Table 11). Similarly, 36 percent of male blue voters opposed increasing group tourist quotas, while 64 percent of female blue voters did (table 12).

[Table 8-12]

From this analysis it is evident that Taiwan females have a different position on cross-strait policies than their male counterparts. On economic opening and trade,

women were not that different from men. However, on non-economic policies, women were more likely to take an opposing position than men, for example, policies on institutional acknowledgement and social interaction. Why is this the case? We don't have a certain explanation yet, but can propose a few hypotheses. First, it is about personal need for stability. The issues of permitting Chinese students, recognizing Chinese degrees, and increasing group tourist quotas will have an immediate impact on the society. For housewives or single women, such policies have the potential to upturn the predictability and stability of everyday life. Thus, these groups would be more likely to have a conservative position on such cross-strait interactions so as to keep it within the realm of predictability. Furthermore, the impression of Chinese chauvinism leads many Taiwanese women to mistrust further cross-strait social interactions. Second, it may reflect the need for a stable home and a committed relationship. Many women do not see that they will benefit from any further cross-strait social exchange. In fact, they stand the possibility of losing. These past twenty years have seen Taiwanese businessmen go off to China and send money back home to their wives, who feel alienated as they tend to value marriage stability and a secure home. Although this kind of cross-strait split home is the minority of Taiwanese families today, the impression it has left on society is disproportionate and draws a wide influence. Third, for Taiwanese women there exists a potential threat from a Chinese mistress. Even if Taiwan's economy benefits from ECFA, those who are making money and enjoying life are mostly men, but the brunt of the social interactions with China falls on women. For example, the media has recently made a roar of the "Chinese mistress" effects, which has created a further distrust among women on policies of cross-strait interactions, and led them to feel to be the victims in cross-strait social interactions. Finally, it may be related to concerns on the impact on the marriage market. The increasing social interactions with China will stimulate the

marriage market leaving unmarried Taiwanese women feeling that they are now in competition with Chinese women, placing the fear in the minds of the Taiwanese housewife that their young daughters may find a match with Chinese men on college campus. Perhaps as a result of these factors, given the effects of party identification, socioeconomic status, and age, gender on cross-strait social policies remains an independent and significant factor in today's Taiwanese society.

Table 1 : Attitudes on cross strait policies in Taiwan

	N	%
<b>Economic opening</b>		
(1) Support signing ECFA ?		
Support	558	45
Not support	395	32
Don't know (didn't answer)	289	23
<b>Educational exchange</b>		
(2) Support allowing Chinese students to study in Taiwan?		
Support	618	50
Not support	559	45
Don't know ( didn't answer )	65	5
<b>Institutional acknowledgement</b>		
(3) Support recognizing Chinese degrees?		
Support	541	44
Not support	623	50
Don't know ( didn't answer )	78	6
<b>Social interaction</b>		
(4) Support allowing individual Chinese tourists into Taiwan?		
Support	535	43
Don't support	597	48
Missing values	106	9
(5) Relax restrictions on number of Chinese group tourists to Taiwan?		
Support	477	39
Don't support	540	44
Don't know ( didn't answer )	221	18

Sources:

(1) - (3) : The first round survey conducted in June 1-22, 2010.

(4) - (5) : The second round conducted in December 16-26, 2010.

Table 2 : Factors influencing support for signing ECFA

Model	1		2		3		4		5	
	$\beta$		$\beta$		$\beta$		$\beta$		$\beta$	
Age	0.03	***	0.03	**	0.02	*	0.02		0.03	*
Education level (below junior high school)										
High school	0.79	**	0.81	**	0.76	*	0.88	**	0.82	*
Associate college and above	1.03	***	1.08	***	1.11	***	1.14	***	1.04	**
Female ( Male)	0.21		0.10		0.11		0.05		-0.2	
Unmarried ( married)	0.35		0.56	*	0.60	*	0.54		0.56	
Southern Taiwan (other areas)	-0.2		0.25		0.27		0.31		0.31	
Average monthly income	0.11	***	0.11	**	0.11	**	0.13	**	0.16	***
Ethnicity ( Fujian)										
Hakka	0.26		-0.1		-0.2		-0.1		-0.1	
Mainlander	1.74	***	1.17	***	1.02	**	1.15	**	1.20	**
Party affiliation ( KMT)										
DPP			-4.2	***	-3.6	***	-3.3	***	-3.0	***
Choose candidate/policy			-1.9	***	-1.8	***	-1.4	***	-1.3	***
Support all			-1.7	***	-1.6	***	-1.3	**	-1.1	*
Support none			-2.1	***	-2.0	***	-1.7	***	-1.6	***
Tendency to support independence or reunification (maintain status quo)										
Reunification					0.37		0.35		0.23	
Independence					-1.3	***	-1.2	***	-0.1	***
Wait and see					-0.3		-0.4		-0.3	
ECFA rich-poor influence ( No influence)										
Greater wealth disparity							-2.1	***	-2.1	***
Smaller wealth disparity							0.02		-0.1	
Emphasis on cross strait business negotiations ( National sovereignty)										
Economic advantage									1.33	***
Economic sovereignty									0.46	
Intercept	-2.7	***	-0.8		-0.5		0.88		-0.4	
Chi-square	111	***	366	***	397	***	477	***	510	***
df	9		13		16		18		20	
N	827		827		827		827		827	

\* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001

Note : Dependent variable: 1: "Support ECFA"; 0:"Don't support ECFA"

A variable in brackets is the reference group.

Table 3 : Factors influencing support for permitting Chinese students

Model	1	2	3	4
	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$
Age	0.01 *	0.01	0.01	0.01
Education level (below junior high school)				
High school	0.49 *	0.45 *	0.41	0.37
Associate college and above	0.84 ***	0.80 ***	0.81 ***	0.79 ***
Female (Male)	-0.22	-0.32 *	-0.33 *	-0.42 **
Unmarried (married)	0.33	0.40	0.44 *	0.41
Southern Taiwan (other areas)	-0.11	0.10	0.13	0.12
Average monthly income	0.09 ***	0.08 **	0.08 **	0.08 *
Ethnicity (Fujian)				
Hakka	0.15	-0.07	-0.10	-0.10
Mainlander	1.05 ***	0.58 *	0.45	0.42
Party affiliation (KMT)				
DPP		-2.44 ***	-2.09 ***	-1.94 ***
Choose candidate/policy		-0.90 ***	-0.74 ***	-0.66 **
Support all		-0.50	-0.42	-0.30
Support none		-1.05 ***	-0.96 ***	-0.91 ***
Tendency to support independence or reunification (maintain status quo)				
Reunification			0.74 *	0.68 *
Independence			-0.74 ***	-0.63 **
Wait and see			0.17	0.17
ECFA rich-poor influence (No influence)				
Greater wealth disparity				0.58 ***
Smaller wealth disparity				0.41
Intercept	-1.63 ***	-0.41	-0.43	-0.86
Chi-square	94.9 ***	225.3 ***	254.7 ***	266.3 ***
df	9	13	16	18
N	1029	1029	1029	1029

\* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001

Note : Dependent variable: 1: "Support the government opening Taiwan to Chinese students to come to study"; 0: "Do not support the government opening Taiwan to Chinese students to come to study". A variable in brackets is the reference group.

Table 4 : Factors influencing support for recognizing Chinese degrees

Model	1		2		3		4	
	$\beta$		$\beta$		$\beta$		$\beta$	
Age	0.02	**	0.02	*	0.02	*	0.02	**
Education level (below junior high school)								
High school	0.81	***	0.76	***	0.74	**	0.71	**
Associate college and above	1.11	***	1.06	***	1.10	***	1.07	***
Female (Male)	-0.25		-0.35	*	-0.33	*	-0.47	**
Unmarried (married)	0.27		0.33		0.35		0.32	
Southern Taiwan (other areas)	-0.28		-0.10		-0.11		-0.11	
Average monthly income	0.09	***	0.09	**	0.08	**	0.08	*
Ethnicity (Fujian)								
Hakka	0.18		0.01		-0.01		0.00	
Mainlander	1.33	***	0.94	***	0.81	***	0.80	***
Party affiliation (KMT)								
DPP			-2.36	***	-2.01	***	-1.79	***
Choose candidate/policy			-0.93	***	-0.74	***	-0.63	**
Support all			-0.46		-0.37		-0.19	
Support none			-0.87	***	-0.74	***	-0.67	***
Tendency to support independence or reunification (maintain status quo)								
Reunification					1.16	***	1.09	***
Independence					-0.73	***	-0.55	*
Wait and see					0.06		0.06	
ECFA rich-poor influence (No influence)								
Greater wealth disparity							0.87	***
Smaller wealth disparity							0.48	
Intercept	-2.40	***	-1.34	**	-1.40	**	-2.11	***
Chi-square	132.5	***	247.3	***	283.5	***	308.3	***
df	9		13		16		18	
N	1027		1027		1027		1027	

\* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001

Note : dependent variable: 1: "Support the government recognizing Chinese degrees"; 0:"Oppose the government recognizing Chinese degrees". A variable in brackets is the reference group.

Table 5 : Factors for support for opening to Chinese individual tourists

Model	1		2		3		4		5		6	
	$\beta$		$\beta$		$\beta$		$\beta$		$\beta$		$\beta$	
Age	0.0	***	0.0	**	0.0	**	0.0	**	0.0	**	0.0	*
Education (below junior high school)												
High school	0.5	*	0.4		0.4		0.4		0.5		0.5	
Associate college and above	0.9	***	0.8	**	0.8	**	0.8	**	0.9	***	1.0	***
Female ( Male)	-0.3		-0.4	*	-0.3	*	-0.4	*	-0.4	*	-0.3	
Unmarried ( married)	0.4		0.5	*	0.5	*	0.6	*	0.5	*	0.5	*
Southern Taiwan (other areas)	-0.2		-0.1		0.0		-0.1		0.0		0.0	
Household income	0.1		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Ethnicity ( Fujianese)												
Hakka	0.3		0.3		0.2		0.3		0.2		0.2	
Mainlander	0.8	***	0.4		0.4		0.3		0.2		0.2	
Party affiliation ( Blue)												
Green			-1.3	***	-1.0	***	-0.8	**	-0.6	*	-0.6	*
Choose candidate/policy			-0.9	***	-0.8	**	-0.7	**	-0.6	*	-0.5	
None			-0.6	**	-0.5	*	-0.3		-0.2		-0.2	
Unification or independence (status quo)												
Unification					0.7		0.6		0.6		0.7	
Independence					-0.8	***	-0.6	**	-0.6	*	-0.4	
Impressions to Chinese tourists												
Feel closer to China <sup>a</sup> (no)							0.9	***	0.8	***	0.8	***
Good impressions <sup>b</sup> (no)									0.8	***	0.8	***
Bad impressions <sup>c</sup> (no)											-0.7	***
Intercept	-2.3	***	-1.5	*	-1.5	**	-1.9	**	-2.1	***	-1.9	**
Chi-square	56		89		105		131		146		160	
df	9		12		14		15		16		17	
N	671		671		671		671		671		671	

\* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001

Note: dependent variable: 1:”Support opening Taiwan to individual Chinese travelers” ; 0:”Oppose opening Taiwan to individual Chinese travelers”. A variable in brackets is the reference group.

a: After the opening of Taiwan to Chinese tourists, do you feel closer to China ?

b: Do you have a good impression of Chinese tourists in Taiwan?

c: Do you have a bad impression of Chinese tourists in Taiwan ?

Table 6 : Factors influencing increasing Chinese group tourist quotas

Model	1	2	3	4	5	6
	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$
Age	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Education (below junior high school)						
High school	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2	-0.3	-0.2	-0.2
Associate college and above	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2
Female ( Male)	-0.5 **	-0.6 ***	-0.6 ***	-0.7 ***	-0.7 ***	-0.7 ***
Unmarried ( married)	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
Southern Taiwan (other areas)	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Household income	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ethnicity ( Fujianese)						
Hakka	-0.1	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.4
Mainlander	0.6 *	0.2	0.1	0.1	-0.1	-0.1
Party affiliation ( Blue)						
Green		-1.6 ***	-1.2 ***	-1.0 ***	-0.9 ***	-0.9 ***
Choose candidate/policy		-0.5 *	-0.5	-0.3	-0.3	-0.2
None		-0.8 ***	-0.7 ***	-0.5 *	-0.5 *	-0.5 *
Unification or independence (status quo)						
Unification			0.5	0.3	0.4	0.4
Independence			-0.9 ***	-0.8 **	-0.7 *	-0.6 *
Impressions to Chinese tourists						
Feel closer to China <sup>a</sup> (no)				1.0 ***	0.9 ***	0.9 ***
Good impressions <sup>b</sup> (no)					0.7 ***	0.8 ***
Bad impressions <sup>c</sup> (no)						-0.4 *
Intercept	-0.6	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.4
Chi-square	29	72	88	118	130	135
df	9	12	14	15	16	17
N	621	621	621	621	621	621

\* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001

Note:

dependent variable: 1:”support to increase quotas”; 0:”quotas can decrease or remain the same.”

A variable in brackets is the reference group.

a: After the opening of Taiwan to Chinese tourists, do you feel closer to China ?

b: Do you have a good impression of Chinese tourists in Taiwan?

c: Do you have a bad impression of Chinese tourists in Taiwan ?

Table 7 : The cross tables of personal characteristics and cross-strait policies  
(percentages of the group number of respondents)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	ECFA (N=1185)	Allow Chinese students (N=1185)	Recognize Chinese degrees (N=1185)	Open to individual travelers (N=1143)	Increase group tourist quotas (N=1143)
<b>Generation</b>					
Young	42%	50%	43%	44%	40%
Old	48%	51%	45%	45%	40%
<b>Education</b>					
Below high school	35%	42%	35%	37%	35%
Associate college and above	58%	61%	55%	54%	46%
<b>Gender</b>					
Male	48%	55%	49%	50%	47%
Female	44%	46%	40%	39%	33%
<b>Party affiliation</b>					
Blue	77%	72%	65%	59%	58%
Middle	37%	47%	40%	41%	33%
Green	8%	19%	15%	26%	22%

Note:

- 1: The percentages show the support ones, and other items include “oppose,” and “don’t know” (refused to answer).
- 2: Young generation refers to those born in 1968 and after. Old generation refers to those born in 1967 and before.
3. Blues include KMT and PFP. Greens include DPP and TSU.
4. Middle voters include those who voted for the candidate or policy and not the party, support all parties, or support no party.

Table 8 : The cross table of gender, party, and ECFA

		ECFA		
Party affiliation		support ( N=280 )	oppose ( N=32 )	total ( N=312 )
Blue	Male	51%	56%	52%
	Female	49%	44%	48%
		Support ( N=198 )	oppose ( N=317 )	total ( N=515 )
Non-blue	Male	56%	55%	56%
	Female	44%	45%	45%

Table 9 : The cross table of gender, party, and permitting Chinese students

		Permitting Chinese students		
Party affiliation		support ( N=277 )	oppose ( N=92 )	total ( N=369 )
Blue	Male	55%	36%	50%
	Female	45%	64%	50%
		support ( N=274 )	oppose ( N=386 )	total ( N=660 )
Non-blue	Male	54%	49%	51%
	Female	46%	51%	49%

Table 10 : The cross table of gender, party, and recognition of Chinese degrees

		Recognition of Chinese degrees		
Party affiliation		support ( N=250 )	oppose ( N=113 )	total ( N=363 )
Blue	Male	55%	38%	50%
	Female	45%	62%	50%
		support ( N=233 )	oppose ( N=431 )	total ( N=664 )
Non-blue	Male	56%	49%	52%
	Female	44%	51%	49%

Table 11 : The cross table of gender, party, and opening to individual travelers

		Opening to individual travelers		
Party affiliation		support ( N=160 )	oppose ( N=88 )	total ( N=248 )
Blue	Male	58%	35%	50%
	Female	43%	65%	50%
		support ( N=162 )	oppose ( N=261 )	total ( N=423 )
Non-blue	Male	53%	49%	50%
	Female	48%	51%	50%

Table 12 : The cross table of gender, party, and increasing Chinese group tourist quotas

		Increasing Chinese group tourist quotas		
Party affiliation		support ( N=148 )	oppose ( N=89 )	total ( N=237 )
Blue	Male	59%	36%	50%
	Female	41%	64%	50%
		support ( N=141 )	oppose ( N=243 )	total ( N=384 )
Non-blue	Male	56%	45%	49%
	Female	44%	55%	51%

Appendix 1 : Descriptive statistics

Variable name	First round 2010/06				Second round 2010/12			
	( N=1242 )				( N=1238 )			
	N	%	Mean	S.D.	N	%	Mean	S.D.
Age	1219	98	47	15	1188	96	48	15
Education								
Below junior high school	299	24			344	28		
High school	364	29			359	29		
Higher degree	575	46			530	43		
Gender								
Male	604	49			601	49		
Female	638	51			637	52		
Marriage status								
Married	964	78			994	80		
Unmarried	276	22			236	19		
Area								
Southern Taiwan	321	26			302	24		
Other areas	915	74			936	76		
Ethnicity								
Hakka	152	12			145	12		
Fujianese	894	72			891	72		
Mainlander	170	14			170	14		
Missing values	26	2			32	3		
Individual/household monthly income	1200	97	5.0	2.8	973	79	7.5	3.5
			(3~4,000 NT dollars )				(5~6,000 NT dollars)	
Missing values	42	3			265	21		
Party affiliation								
Blue	416	34			416	34		
Green	207	17			206	17		
Choose candidate (or policy)	202	16			204	17		
Support all	49	4						
Support none	333	27			365	30		
Missing values	35	3			47	4		

Appendix 1 : Descriptive statistics (continue)

Variable	First round 2010/06		Second round 2010/12	
	(N=1242)		(N=1238)	
	N	%	N	%
Unification or independence sentiment <sup>4</sup>				
Unification	111	9	206	17
Independence	253	20	77	6
Depends on situation	463	37		
Maintain status quo	348	28	858	69
Missing values	67	5	97	8
Do you think the signing of the ECFA will increase wealth disparity in Taiwan, decrease it, or not have any impact?				
Increase	632	51		
Decrease	78	6		
No influence	246	20		
Missing values	193	16		
In cross strait economic interaction what do you think it most important, Taiwan's economic advantage, Taiwan's sovereignty, or both are equally important?				
Economic advantage	665	54		
National sovereignty	391	32		
Both are important	137	11		
Missing values	49	4		
After the opening of Taiwan to Chinese tourists, how do you feel about Chinese society: closer, more distant, or no different?				
Yes			457	37
No			667	54
Missing values			114	9

<sup>4</sup> There was a discrepancy in the questions of the two different rounds of interviews. See text for discussion.

Appendix 1 : Descriptive statistics (continue)

Variable	First round 2010/06		Second round 2010/12	
	(N=1242)		(N=1238)	
	N	%	N	%
Do you have a good impression of Chinese tourists?				
Yes			301	24
No			721	58
Missing values			216	17
Do you have a bad impression of Chinese tourists?				
Yes			482	39
No			614	50
Missing values			142	12

Note: "Missing values" include those who didn't know how to respond, refused to answer, evaded the question, had no opinion, or gave some other answer that could not be categorized.