

RESEARCH ESSAY

A “generation in-itself”: authoritarian rule, exilic mentality, and the postwar generation of intellectuals in 1960s Taiwan

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This essay analyzes why and how, compared with the sweeping student and youth movements in the United States, Europe, Latin America, Japan, and other places in the world in the 1960s, the postwar generation in Taiwan remained politically and socially passive. Focusing on the relations between their exilic mentality, historical consciousness, and national identity, the essay is concerned with the political-cultural factors that shaped their inactivism. This generation grew up dominated by narrative constructed by the displaced state and the previous generation in exile. Their exilic mentality mingled with a strong sense of isolation and obligation to the Chinese nation, though the rigid political and social control filled them with gloom. The postwar generation of intellectuals in 1960s Taiwan, both local Taiwanese and mainlanders, was not an active “generation for-itself” but constituted a passive “generation in-itself.”

Keywords: Chinese exile; the postwar generation; intellectuals in Taiwan; 1960s Taiwan; generational consciousness; Chinese nationalism; historical narrative; Taiwanization

The 1960s was a period defined by its political, social, and cultural changes. Both durable and fleeting, these changes were driven largely by the baby boom generation. In many, if not most, parts of the world, the young were obsessed with being different and novel, giving the Sixties as a whole their indelible association with youth. To be young meant to be free, idealistic, enthusiastic, and full of optimism about a future profoundly different from one’s parents’ hidebound past. The spirit of liberation the young felt “went hand in hand with a critique of what existed: old forms were to be superseded and even destroyed in order to inaugurate the new.”

When we turn to Taiwanese youth in the 1960s, we find a very different profile – one characterized by inactivism, passivity, and a generalized demoralization. Thus far, few studies have examined the generational dimension of political and cultural life in postwar Taiwan. There have been even fewer studies on the stratum of young intellectuals that emerged in the 1960s, when they had not yet become a social force rising to challenge their country’s authoritarian rule. The purpose of this essay is to analyze why and how, in sharp contrast to their counterparts in North America, Europe, Latin America, Japan, and other parts of the world, the intellectuals of the postwar generation in Taiwan – even the reform-oriented ones – remained politically and socially passive in the 1960s. I am concerned with the political and cultural factors that shaped

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their inactivism, its social consequences, and important aspects of their generational consciousness.

Sociologist Fred Davis once examined a form of “lay habit of mind” or “folk sense...
initiated by Taiwan students in the United States, was the turning point. Young intellectuals of the postwar generation who had grown up and received their education under KMT rule began to openly challenge the political establishment and cultural traditions. The diplomatic setbacks were compounded by social problems caused by rapid economic growth, such as uncontrolled urbanization, the decline of rural areas, an unequal distribution of wealth, and labor disputes. Under such conditions, the young intellectuals emerged as a new social force that demanded democratically driven socio-political reforms based on a “return-to-reality” (huigui xianshi) ideology. Embracing a strong generational consciousness, they also played a leading role in a newly established “return-to-native-soil” (huigui xiangtu) cultural movement. Despite the intensity and passion of the reformist political demands that began in 1971, such as the full election of central government representatives, the KMT’s will to maintain the status quo did not waver. Because of the authoritarian state’s suppression, after two years of reformist discourse following the Diaoyutai incident, the young intellectuals lapsed into silence. However, many members of the young intellectuals who had awakened as a result of the Diaoyutai movement and Taiwan’s losing the UN seat had already started seeking ways to participate in social and political reform, such as joining the nascent opposition movement led by young local Taiwanese politicians Huang Xinjie and Kang Ningxiang. In general, the demands for socio-political reforms and cultural innovation in the 1970s heralded the “indigenization” (bentuhua) or “Taiwanization” (taiwanhua) of politics and culture that have characterized the ensuing decades. It was during the long transformation of politics and culture since the 1970s that the “exilic mentality” that informed politics and culture finally diminished.

In what follows, I will first make it clear what I mean by the terms “intellectuals” and “exilic mentality.” Next, I discuss the KMT’s political control and domination of education and culture, examining their effects on the postwar generation of intellectuals. I then move to an investigation of the generational consciousness of the young intellectuals, especially reformism-oriented ones. My focus will be on the relations between their exilic mentality, historical consciousness, and sense of national identity. In the 1960s, young, reform-oriented intellectuals generally felt cut off from history and separated from their true nation, in whose sad destiny they had no way of participating. They therefore had a sense of powerlessness. Ineffectual and melancholic, they often became conceited loners, possessed of an uneasy feeling of living in a “median,” temporary state. As a consequence, the postwar generation of intellectuals in 1960s Taiwan, both local Taiwanese and mainlanders, constituted a passive “generation in-itself,” instead of an active “generation for-itself” that could create a potent generational consciousness and bring about significant political and social changes (see analysis below). The very fact that Taiwanese youth were so unlike those elsewhere reinforces just how involuted, repressed, and demoralized the Taiwanese youth were. They were so put upon by the burdens of exile, propaganda, and unrealistic expectations that even in the Sixties, when the rest of the world was in rebellion, they sat on the sidelines.

“Intellectuals” and “exilic mentality”

As is widely acknowledged among scholars in the social sciences and humanities, “intellectuals” is a term with many shades of meaning. Its common definition in the sociology of intellectuals includes “persons with advanced educations, producers or
transmitters of culture or ideas, or members of either category who engage in public issues – sometimes gelled into a cohesive social group.” “Intellectuals” can also be a loaded concept, such that the “sociology of intellectuals is sometime written in a normative key.” Intellectuals, that is, are called on to fulfill their proper social role and judged against a normative and even idealized standard. My purpose in this essay is specific – to present part of the postwar Chinese exilic experience in Taiwan by examining the young intellectuals of the 1960s. So my use of “intellectuals” is more general, denoting persons with a higher education in various disciplines as well as idea-makers and cultural producers. Also in this essay the term “young intellectuals” connotes not only thinkers, writers, professors, and suchlike but also college students and graduates. In Taiwan, due to the influence of Chinese cultural tradition, especially Confucianism, concerned college students and graduates typically act and identify themselves as intellectuals.

Arguments among sociologists on the social character of intellectuals have been typically centered around intellectuals’ relationship to social class. Since the late 1920s, there have been in sociology three main ways of seeing intellectuals: as a class in themselves (intellectuals form a unique social group, developing common interests that set them apart from other groups in society), as class-bound (intellectuals do not form a particular social group because they are divided into subsets that emerge from and serve other social groups), or as class-less (intellectuals can be socially unattached or choose their affiliation, attaching themselves to classes to which they originally did not belong). I will not, however, describe Taiwanese intellectuals in strict class terms. For one thing, there is insufficient biographical data on the young intellectuals I address. Except for some prominent ones, it is difficult to pin down their class backgrounds. Moreover, as June Edmunds and Bryan S. Turner argue, “intellectuals are shaped not so much by class as by generational location.” In the particular context of postwar Taiwan, “provincial origin” (shengji), namely the distinction between the local Taiwanese and the mainlanders, is a crucial factor in shaping identity. Generation and provincial origin, in sum, played an especially strong role in forming the worldview of Taiwanese intellectuals, rendering class a secondary trait.

The concept of exile is no less cloudy than that of intellectuals. Attempts to define exile and other related terms usually feature extensive discussion of highly nuanced differences of circumstances and outlook. Some researchers have concluded that the great diversity of conditions that lead to or result from exile make impossible any perfect or comprehensive definition of what exile in fact is. For instance, Magda Stroinska argues:

There is no one simple and universal scenario for exile. It may be understood as any kind of displacement, voluntary departure or compulsory expulsion from one’s native land, expatriation, or simply finding oneself outside the borders of one’s native country, not because one had moved abroad but because the borders were moved. One may feel displaced, exiled and alienated by moving to a territory where the same language is spoken, but with a different accent. It may even be the case that the exiled person remains in the country but either chooses or is forced into inner exile because he or she does not speak “the same language” in a political sense. Sometimes, particularly for those who engage in the various forms of the artistic expression of ideas, inner exile means remaining silent or being silenced, but this enforced silence may speak volumes. The broadly understood notion of exile applies to millions of people world-wide, and yet no two experiences of exile are similar enough to warrant the creation of a prototype of exile or of an expatriated individual.
Compounding the nebulosity of “exile,” a host of other terms have been offered to designate the realities of displacement. Thus “exile now jostles against, and is often replaced by, such terms as diaspora, exodus, migrant, transmigrant, refugee, asylum seeker, and cosmopolitan.”

 Nonetheless, and in spite of the confusing proliferation of concepts and the difficulty in defining exile, “exile remains,” as Paul Allatson and Jo McCormack point out, “an important lived and critical issue in the 21st century” and many groups across the globe “still look to exile narratives for ways of understanding and managing their lives.” When “exile” is taken in terms more literal than figurative, Thomas Pavel argues:

It implies the idea of forced displacement (as opposed to voluntary expatriation) that occurs for political or religious reasons rather than economic ones (as opposed both to slave trading and to voluntary immigration). In recent centuries it most often takes the form of individual mobility (as opposed to collective migration and diaspora), although in a more primitive historical environment it can involve an entire nation, for example, the Jewish exile to Babylon or the exile of the Crimean Tartars under Stalin. In these later cases the element of forced displacement is present, as is another pervasive connotation of exile, the hope for return to the land of one’s ancestors. Immigrants begin a new life and find a new home; exiles never break the psychological link with their point of origin. Among the features of exile must thus be included the coercive nature of the displacement, its religious or political motivation, and the exile’s faith in the possibility of homecoming.

In the literal understanding that emphasizes actual exile, the distinction that the above citation from Pavel suggests between exiles, defined as a form of individual mobility, and refugees, defined as a form of collective migration, often becomes a matter of little significance in terms of the intense suffering caused by forced displacement.

In the last two decades or so, Edward Said’s analysis of the mental suffering that accompanies exile has been often cited as a paradigmatic explanation of exilic mentality. Writing in the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, Said points out that our age is “the age of the refugee, the displaced person, mass immigration” due to “its modern warfare, imperialism, and the quasi-theological ambitions of totalitarian rulers,” as well as famine and disease. For Said, exile is “one of the saddest fates,” “a condition of terminal loss,” and “a discontinuous state of being” because exiles are cut off from their roots, their land, and their past. However, like Pavel, who argues that “exiles never break the psychological link with their point of origin,” Said stresses that it is wrong to assume that being exiled is to be completely separated from one’s place of origin. He argues:

… for most exiles the difficulty consists not simply in being forced to live away from home, but rather, given today’s world, in living with the many reminders that you are in exile, that your home is not in fact so far away, and that the normal traffic of everyday contemporary life keeps you in constant but tantalizing and unfulfilled touch with the old place. The exile therefore exists in a median state, neither completely at one with the new setting nor fully disencumbered of the old, beset with half-involvements and half-detachments, nostalgic and sentimental on one level, an adept mimic or a secret outcast on another.

The mental suffering brought about by exile consists mainly in being caught between adjusting oneself to a new home and retaining one’s faith in the possibility of returning to one’s old home. In the Saidian understanding, living in this uneasy,
“median” state is the very essence of exilic existence. It is “the unhealable rift forced between a human being and a native place, between the self and its true home” that makes the sadness of exile insurmountable. In the same vein, feminist sociologist Hammed Shahidian, an Iranian exile in the United States, gives a touching description of this exilic mentality:

Exile means a mind torn asunder, pieces missing, pieces extra, memories convoluted. At times, a short stretch of a remote street living vividly in one’s memory represents the homeland; at others, no concrete artifact from home suffices. At times, the four walls of one’s hostland house become home; at others, not even one’s legal entitlement to citizenship suffices. At times, a short poem, a collected volume of essays, an old newspaper from home in the mother tongue become home; at others, not even the solid ground of the hostland under your feet suffices. Exile means the painful realization that where you live is and is not home, and that you do and do not live where home is.

Focusing on the temporal aspect of living in a median state as the kernel of exilic mentality, Magda Stroinska and Vittorina Cecchetto argue that “[e]xiles move in space, migrating from one place to another, but they also enter a very interesting and idiosyncratic relationship with time. They long for what they have lost (past) and fear what is yet to come (future), but they also cannot face the present,” like the Roman god Janus looking both ways.

Based on the Saidian approach to exile, by the “exilic mentality,” I mean a lasting mental tendency wherein one feels disturbed because of a sense of loss, uprootedness, and nostalgia, which is typical of the experience of people who are forced to leave their countries or homes for various reasons, especially for political reasons, and thus live in a median state. As shown in the analysis below, this was precisely the mentality that imbued the postwar Taiwanese society dominated by the displaced KMT state in general and characterized the postwar generation of intellectuals in the Sixties in particular.

Political control, education, and a silent generation

KMT rule in Taiwan was characterized by the “Sinicization” of the island. Politically, the authoritarian state claimed that it was the loyal envoy of Sun Yat-sen’s political vision of Chinese nation-building, laid out in Three Principles of the People (Sanmin zhuyi), and the legitimate guardian of the ROC founded by Sun in 1912. As a displaced regime, it strictly maintained the structure of the government organized around the constitution adopted on the mainland in 1936, asserting that the ROC was the sole legitimate government of all of China. The KMT state propagated its plan to “retake the mainland” (fangong dalu). Taiwan was ruled as a single-party authoritarian state under the guise of democracy. It served as a wartime base for countering the communists and a temporary refuge for rallying forces that would contribute to Chinese national revival. Culturally, the KMT state asserted that it was a resolute defender of “orthodox” Chinese cultural tradition, especially Confucianism. The “Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement” (Zhonghua wenhua fuxing yundong), initiated by Chiang Kai-shek in 1966, epitomized the authoritarian state policy. The movement was directed against the radical, iconoclastic “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” (Wuchan jieji wenhua da geming) in the PRC and held enormous sway over the cultural landscape on the island for the next two decades. Cultural values, symbols, art, music, theater, and craft, as well as Mandarin Chinese, were officially promoted at the expense of local counterparts.
The KMT’s political and cultural dominance in postwar Taiwan was ideologically justified by a specific interpretation of the island’s historical relationship with the Chinese mainland. From 1945 to the 1970s, a time of unequal political, social and cultural relations between local Taiwanese and mainlanders and of hegemonic anti-Communist discourse, a certain Chinese nationalist construction of the collective memory about the relationship between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland was legitimated in the public sphere. This construction highlighted: (1) the sanguine historical and cultural connections between Taiwanese people and mainlanders; (2) the contribution made to Taiwan’s development by the Chinese nation or people; (3) the nationalist sentiment and attachment to the ancestral land of Taiwanese compatriots; (4) the influence of the KMT-led nationalist revolution in the early twentieth century on Taiwanese anti-Japanese activities; (5) the contribution of the KMT’s eight-year war of resistance against Japan (1937–1945) to Taiwan’s escape from colonial rule; and (6) the importance of the Taiwanese people in the mission of reconquering the mainland. These points all emanated from Chinese nationalism. They were part of a comprehensive Chinese nationalist historical narrative whose elements are shown in Table 1.28 The schools, especially in their historical instruction, played a primary role in indoctrinating the population within this narrative. The KMT state promoted Chinese consciousness by encouraging public interest in “searching for roots” (xungen). The dominance of the China-centered narrative resulted in the dogma that Taiwan’s raison d’être was China’s future reunification. Historical memories and cultural traditions peculiar to the island were for the most part discredited.29

As many researchers have noted, the student rebellions that emerged throughout the globe in the 1960s were partly an effect of the growth in the young population and the expansion of higher education. When the baby boomers came of age, more of them than ever before went off to college. In the United States, the 1960s became “the most explosive decade in the entire history of educational expansion” and the “growth of higher education was the most remarked.”30 The dramatic expansion of higher education occurred as well in Western Europe, much of Latin America, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, China, and other parts of Asia. Informed with what Jeremi Suri calls an unprecedented international “language of dissent,” all of these regions, to varying degrees, had student and youth movements that challenged the status quo.31

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narrator/protagonist</th>
<th>Chinese people, the Chinese nation</th>
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<td><strong>Time frame</strong></td>
<td>The middle of the nineteenth century to the present</td>
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<td><strong>Central issues</strong></td>
<td>Chinese nationalism: the Chinese nation’s struggle for national sovereignty, independence and autonomy, involving resistance to political, economic and cultural invasion or aggression</td>
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<td><strong>Plot</strong></td>
<td>Beginning: inveterately weak traditional China humiliated and bullied by foreign powers from the middle of the nineteenth century</td>
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<td>Middle: the Republican revolution, the strivings and setbacks involved in nation-building, foreign intimidation and invasion</td>
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<td>End: (see conclusion/resolution below)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conclusion/resolution</strong></td>
<td>Resistance to foreign oppression, the pursuit of Chinese political, economic, and cultural independence and autonomy in order to make China rich and powerful</td>
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Taiwan was no exception in terms of the surge of the youthful population and the rapid growth of higher education. The increasing number of young people, both those still in school and those who had started their careers, began to draw considerable attention from the government and the public. Since the beginning of the 1960s, open discussions about a variety of social problems – such as the population explosion, the generation gap, juvenile delinquency, youth unemployment, and the brain drain caused by Taiwanese studying abroad – began to increase. Unlike in other countries, however, the Taiwanese students did not create any significant turmoil. Instead, a politically and socially passive generation was forming.

The KMT’s tight political control of Taiwanese society was surely a central factor in the passivity of Taiwanese youth. Having grown up in the same postwar Taiwanese social environment significantly decreased the differences among members of the postwar generation created by their particular provincial backgrounds. Since the emergence of modern Chinese nationalism at the turn of the twentieth century, the postwar generation that came to maturity in the 1960s was the first generation that the KMT state had successfully indoctrinated with its particular version of Chinese nationalism under peacetime conditions. Their original Chinese sentiments formed primarily under the influence of KMT-dominated school education and political propaganda.

The KMT doctrine, rooted in a particular version of Chinese nationalism, dominated the young generation’s education and achieved a marked assimilating effect with regard to their political attitudes. This assimilating effect, brought about by a shared social environment in general and state indoctrination in particular, made the young intellectuals, both local Taiwanese and mainlanders, distinct from their parents, who had been educated on the mainland or in Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule before 1945. In addition, state education, along with one’s family socialization, reinforced the exilic mentality among the postwar generation. For them, this mentality was something taught and not a function of their direct, personal experience. In sum, the KMT’s severe political control, domination of education and culture, and ceaseless insistence on the goal of retaking the mainland were the major factors in maintaining the exilic mentality even among young intellectuals, who had not experienced firsthand the pain of displacement.

Nonetheless, there existed a particular type of political activism among Taiwanese students and youth under the authoritarian KMT state. The Chinese Youth Corps of Anti-Communism and Saving the Nation (Zhongguo qingnian fangong jiuguotuan, hereafter CYC), was a state-sponsored organization that played a key role in creating this kind of political activism. The CYC, originating from the Anti-Communist and Anti-Russia League of the Chinese Youth (Zhongguo qingnian fanggong kange lianhehui), was established in 1952. Chiang Ching-kuo, the eldest son of Chiang Kai-shek, was its first leader (1952–1973). The main task of the CYC was to mobilize youth, especially students, under party leadership. With the help of the KMT, they were inculcated with ideas of patriotism and leader worship. Supported by the KMT state, the CYC developed into a large organization that penetrated into every school, college, and university, where it carried out mobilization work. From the early 1950s to the late 1960s, it initiated patriotic and anti-Communist movements, such as the Building Battle-ship to Revenge Movement (Jianjian fuchou yundong, 1954–1955), the Support Wuhan Student Anti-Communism Movement (Zhiyuan wuhan qingnian xuesheng fangong kangbao yundong, 1956), the Chinese Youth Self-Fortification Movement (Zhongguo qingnian ziqiang yundong, 1961), and the Forget-Not to Recover the Chinese Mainland Movement (Wuwang zaiju yundong, 1965). At heart,
these movements reflected intense propaganda and political indoctrination efforts, and were not autonomous student and youth movements. They were, indeed, explicit attempts to preempt any youth activities that might challenge the KMT.39

The patriotic and anti-Communist fervor championed by the movements soon died down. For the KMT state, the 1960s was a decade of consolidation and the successful repression of the opposition, after which it kept reiterating its determination to fight against Communism. The kind of political activism among the youth and the students shaped by the CYC can be regarded as a dimension of political repression under authoritarian rule. In addition, the patriotic and anti-Communist movements functioned as a reminder that the exile had not ended and thus contributed to the maintenance of the exilic mentality. The movements, originally intended to mobilize students and youth, ironically created a demobilizing effect by promoting the feeling of existing in a median, depressive state. In this sense, the unintended consequences that accompanied these movements were similar to those resulting from the school pedagogy that centered around the Chinese nationalist historical narrative, propaganda about Taiwan as a temporary anti-Communist base, and the retaking of the mainland.

During the Sixties, young intellectuals in Taiwan hardly expressed themselves regarding political reality in written discourse, except for the above-mentioned political activism initiated by the state authorities. The KMT believed that one of the major reasons they lost the civil war and were forced into exile was that the student movements sweeping China in the late 1940s supported the Chinese Communists. Thus, after the KMT state relocated in Taiwan, one of its top priorities was to prevent any possibly damaging student activism.40 The purpose of the CYC established in the early 1950s was partly to achieve this. As mentioned earlier, the thrust behind the various activities the CYC organized was a clear effort to pre-empt any anti-KMT attempt by directing youth activities and channeling their energies. There was a political taboo against dealing with engaging overseas student movements. Although the second half of the 1960s saw an increasing number of reports and comments in newspapers and magazines on student movements abroad, only few of them gave an analytic view of these events.41 Most if not all the coverage was negative, emphasizing the destructive, left-leaning qualities of these movements and their capacity to corrupt young minds.42 It was not until the early 1970s, as the young intellectuals rose to challenge the political establishment and cultural traditions, that they began to openly draw on the student protests abroad to justify their demands for a democratic society. Even then, reference to their remote counterparts was limited.43

Members of the postwar generation did occasionally engage in socio-political criticisms in the 1960s. Such criticisms, variously indignant and sarcastic, were made mostly by young intellectuals from a mainlander background and were typically informed by a distinct generational consciousness. These mainlander intellectuals were haunted by memories of their parents’ bitter experiences of exile, and thus tended to have a deeply sorrowful outlook generated by national crisis and family calamity.44 Generally speaking, the local Taiwanese young intellectuals were less capable of speaking and writing Mandarin Chinese than their mainlander counterparts. In fact, mainlanders dominated the mass media and public opinion. Public discussions in which young intellectuals addressed themselves to the distinctive problems their generation faced were rare, but not non-existent. In the spring of 1961, Wang Hongjun, at the time the Chair of the Department of Journalism, National Chengchi University, published an essay entitled, “How to Get Young People to Take the Baton?” (Ruhe shi qingnian jieshang zheyibang) in Free Youth (Ziyou qingnian), a
Wang did not, however, attribute the problem to young people alone. He argued that the government should have made necessary arrangements for solving the problem and that the older generation should help young people. He thus concluded that, “If a runner in the relay race is not willing to hand off the baton when he or she does not want to run fast and a large number of players he or she trained can just fall behind far away, how can they win the gold medal?”

Wang’s article provoked much public discussion on the “take-the-baton” problem (“jiebang” wenti), including Li Ao’s essay, “The Old Man and the Baton” (Laonian-ren han banzi) published in an intellectual journal, Apollo (Wenxing, 1957–1965), at the end of 1961. Li Ao, a young mainlander who was a National Taiwan University graduate in history, had just been discharged from his military reserve service. Later, he became the most popular anti-traditionalist among the young intellectuals because he aroused the “Debate on Chinese and Western Culture” (Zhongxi wenhua lunzhan) by publishing a series of articles in Apollo in 1962 that harshly attacked the older generation of intellectuals of mainlander background, including such important scholars and thinkers as Qian Mu (1895–1990), Liang Shuming (1893–1988), Xu Fuguan (1903–1982), and Hu Qiuyuan (1910–2004). In his first contribution to Apollo, “The Old Man and the Baton,” Li quoted from Chinese classics to condemn the traditionalist attitude of the older generation whose members he believed were only concerned with consolidating their own social positions and interests. This attitude, he felt, prevented youth from pursuing their dreams. He defiantly claimed: “We are not interested at all in a baton which is covered outwardly by new paint but has rotted away completely within – we have held out our hands in the close air for a long time, eagerly looking forward to your passing us a really brand-new baton!” Both Wang’s and Li’s articles elicited much discussion in newspapers and magazines, but it then diminished over the next several months.

Heated public discussions among young intellectuals returned less than two years later. In May 1963, a young American who came to Taiwan to study and a scholar from Taiwan who had studied in Germany sent their contributions to the KMT’s official newspaper, Central Daily News (Zhongyang ribao). In their articles, they criticized people in “Chinese” society, that is, Taiwan, for lacking public morality, leading a life of vanity, and indulging in luxurious and expensive habits. They also criticized people in Taiwan for admiring everything of foreign (mainly Western) origin, evident in the desire of young people to go to America. These criticisms prompted students at
the National Taiwan University, the most prestigious in the island country, to initiate a “self-consciousness movement” (Zijue yundong). It called on young people to refrain from self-seeking and instead to heighten their commitment to public morality.\(^5^0\) The Self-Consciousness Movement won support from college and high-school students in northern Taiwan and generated considerable discussion in newspapers and magazines. Even the KMT endorsed the Movement by publishing a supportive editorial in *Central Daily News*. However, the Movement lost its momentum within one month.\(^5^1\)

Both the open discussion on the take-the-baton problem provoked by Wang Hongjun’s essay and the Self-Consciousness Movement revealed the young intellectuals’ distinct generational consciousness. This was clearly indicated by the Movement’s slogans, such as “Don’t Let History Judge Us to Be a Decadent and Selfish Generation!”, “We Are not a Resentful Generation! We Are not a Lost Generation! We Are not a Decadent Generation!”, “We Are an Honest and Dedicated Generation!” and “We Are an Awakening Generation!”\(^5^2\)

Moreover, this generational consciousness was intertwined with a form of national identity informed by the KMT’s historical narrative. Dealing with how youth could take over the baton, Wang Hongjun related this problem to the mission of fighting against the communists and reinstating the country.\(^5^3\) As for Li Ao, his biting essay, “The Old Man and the Baton,” appeared to address this issue in a way that had little to do with national identity. Nevertheless, in an article published one year later, in which he reviewed the debate that “The Old Man and the Baton” and his later essays in *Apollo* had brought about, Li asserted that “the lost generation will eventually turn out an indignant generation.” He believed that “the day they change is precisely the turning point whence China has a bright future” and that “to save and build up our country is a project of vital and lasting importance, so their field of vision is not limited to this tiny island, but is extended to the days when the lost mainland is recovered.”\(^5^4\)

With regard to the Self-Consciousness Movement, students posted open letters on the National Taiwan University campus, making declarations in an agitated tone, such as, “Do we really want to see our generation become decadent? … Who would not have hoped that we had a flawless society? Who would not have hoped that we could confidently say that ‘I am a Chinese!’ Fellow students, we must awake!” The students maintained, “If we still cannot awaken to the need for self-renewing, then the Chinese nation that has existed nearly for five thousand years will indeed have no future.”\(^5^5\) The Movement’s later development further displayed that generational consciousness and national identity based on historical narration were intimately connected. The Movement’s name changed to “The Self-Consciousness Movement of the Chinese Youth” (Zhongguo qingnian zijue yundong) and thus was viewed as “a moral improvement movement with a nationalist color.”\(^5^6\)

In spite of the discussion on the take-the-baton problem provoked by Wang Hongjun’s essay and the Self-Consciousness Movement, in general in the 1960s the young intellectuals’ public discussions, whether about the vexing problems peculiar to their generation or about general social issues, were rare. The discussions did not prompt the young intellectuals to engage in any collective action that challenged the establishment. Even the Self-Consciousness Movement, which drew support from college students, focused on self-improvement and individual practice.\(^5^7\) In September 1960, less than half a year before Wang Hongjun published his article on the take-the-baton problem, Lei Zhen, once a follower of Chiang Kai-shek, was arrested on sedition charges. The magazine *Free China* (Ziyou zhongguo, 1949–1960), established by
Lei and other liberal mainlander intellectuals of the older generation, had been shut down. Lei’s attempts, in cooperation with local Taiwanese politicians, to found a new party came to an end. The pro-democracy newspaper Public Comment (Gonglunbao), run by one of Lei’s collaborators, local Taiwanese provincial assemblyman Li Wanju, was forcibly reorganized and sold. As for Li Ao, on the day when his “The Old Man and the Baton” was published in Apollo, he was allegedly given the following warning by an ex-convict released from the political prison on Green Island: “I really don’t want you to keep writing this way. If you do keep writing this way, sooner or later you’ll be headed there [Green Island] too!” Founded in 1957, Apollo was shut down in 1965. In 1964, Peng Mingmin, a political science professor of local Taiwanese background at the National Taiwan University, and his two students secretly prepared a manifesto calling for a new democratic constitution and Taiwan’s independence (Taiwan duli). They declared that “retaking the mainland” is impossible and that the people of Taiwan must overthrow Chiang Kai-shek’s regime and build a new government and a new country. Before this manifesto was issued, the three were caught and put in prison. In 1966, Lu Guomin, Xu Caode, Yan Yimo, and Huang Hua, all young local Taiwanese intellectuals, secretly organized the Association for Promoting National-wide Youth Solidarity (Quanguo qingnian tuanjie cujinhui) in order to form a party, re-establish multi-party democracy, and pursue Taiwan’s independence. Shortly after the Association formed it was broken up by the national intelligence bureau, and its founders arrested. As a result of the authoritarian state’s close surveillance and harsh suppression, political dissents and activists were incapable of generating an effective and widespread reaction among the members of the postwar generation, let alone the public as a whole.

Marxist class analysis makes a distinction between class membership (a “class in-itself”) and class consciousness (a “class for-itself”); that is, between the objective situation of a social class and subjective awareness, among members of this class, of their common interests based on this situation. For Marxists, only when an objectively existing class becomes conscious of itself, can it successfully act and transform from a “class in-itself” to a “class for-itself.” The postwar generation of intellectuals in 1960s Taiwan, both local Taiwanese and mainlanders, constituted – to borrow a Marxist term in class analysis – a passive “generation in-itself.” The postwar generation of intellectuals in 1960s Taiwan, both local Taiwanese and mainlanders, constituted – to borrow a Marxist term in class analysis – a passive “generation in-itself.” However, like June Edmunds and Bryan S. Turner, I invoke the Marxist vocabulary, but not in its “original” specification. The notion of “generation in-itself” is used to capture a sense of generational shared passivity and demoralization as a result of their objective situation of living under an exilic and authoritarian regime. Only few of them, as shown in the cases of the discussion on the take-the-baton problem and the Self-Consciousness Movement, developed a generational consciousness, public commitment, and social activism. As a whole, the postwar generation of college students and young intellectuals in 1960s Taiwan was far from an active “generation for-itself,” a “historical generation,” or a “strategic generation,” which could create a potent generational consciousness and bring about significant social change. The collective consciousness of a generation for-itself is not one rooted in social class – instead, it is rooted in a conception of generational identity. As I pointed out above, it was not until the early 1970s, when the major diplomatic setbacks caused the young intellectuals to mobilize around demand for political reform and cultural innovation, that the generation in-itself began to transform into a generation for-itself. This shift involved a break with the exilic mentality and the embrace of a return-to-reality and return-to-native-soil outlook.
Authoritarian social surveillance shaped the postwar generation’s developmental experience, because it was instituted in schools through the rigid tutelage and ideological education supervised mainly by the Office of Student Affairs (xundaochu). When they were still in high schools, many young intellectuals had experienced the “white terror” of the authoritarian state, which in the name of anti-Communism suppressed any cause or activity deemed politically threatening, such as the push for Taiwan’s independence. As a magazine writer recalled at the beginning of the 1970s:

In high school, I once wrote an essay criticizing the police in my neighbourhood for taking vegetables without paying and generally throwing their weight around. I felt it was a kind of official corruption. As a result, my National Language [Guowen, Mandarin Chinese] teacher turned the essay over to the school Office of Student Affairs. I was called down to the office, where I was met by the director, the military officers, the tutor of my class, and the National Language teacher. They asked me what my father did, whether we had a subscription to the Public Comment, whether we often read Free China … and they wanted me to write a confession and a letter of contrition and declared in class that I had an “ideological problem.” They even had a classmate report on the sly on what I said and did. Subsequently … I was so scared that I filled out the form to join the KMT.

… Eight years ago, when the Self-Consciousness Movement was launched … there were immediately people who said that as individuals they were unwilling to make any public criticism of social evils. Their reason was fear of getting on the blacklist, which would leave them unable to leave the country and would affect their futures.

In 1968, Taiwan extended compulsory schooling from six to nine years. The dull schooling and the enormous work required to prepare for a series of entrance examinations added to the demoralization of the postwar generation.

Loss, the exilic mentality, and the nationalist historical narrative

In addition to authoritarian social surveillance, another vital factor in the young intellectuals’ demoralization was Taiwan’s uncertain political future as “Free China” in the wake of the KMT-CCP confrontation. For the young, the island’s prospects were gloomy. Freedom of thought and speech were strongly curtailed. Intellectuals concerned about the country’s future typically did not know which way to go or whom to follow. Wang Xiaobo (1943–), a leading student in the Defending Diaoyutai Movement, summarized the popular feelings of his generation in the 1960s in two brief sentences: “Objectively speaking, we could not find our way out. Subjectively speaking, our minds were full of dismal thoughts” (keguanshang meiyou chulu, zhuguanshang xishuang kumen). And despite Taiwan’s rapid industrialization in the 1960s, young intellectuals’ job opportunities were still limited. Under these political, psychological, and material conditions, studying abroad and beginning careers in foreign countries, especially the United States, became a popular alternative for young intellectuals. For them, as Wang Xiaobo pointed out, the mere thought of emigrating brought some relief to one’s depression.

At the beginning of the 1960s, the London-based publication The China Quarterly published a special issue on Taiwan. An author of a feature article in the issue keenly described older mainlander intellectuals in the following terms:

With the collapse of the Nationalists [KMT] most of the intellectuals who fled the mainland had lost confidence in themselves and could find no meaning in the life for
which they were trained. They can do little more than cherish the myth of the return to the mainland. When the intellectuals arrived on Formosa [Taiwan] they were not prepared for permanent exile. Many cherished the Chinese tradition of returning to die in one’s hometown. “Even if a tree is as tall as 1,000 feet, its leaves fall back to the very spot where it is rooted.” Quite a few see many more opportunities on the “conquered” mainland than on Formosa. Some rationalize the present unsatisfactory conditions on the island. Once back on the mainland, democracy will be realized, taxes reduced, and all will be well with the world. The Nationalists have fostered this myth, which in so many ways is its raison d’être. To Chiang Kai-shek it must seem that to rethink the ideology of his régime could only lead into dangerous ways. Dogma is the order of the day.70

The older mainlander intellectuals, as this passage attests, existed in an uneasy, “median” exilic state, plagued by the tension between involvement and detachment. Put otherwise, they were torn between adjusting to their new home in Taiwan and retaining their faith in the possibility of returning to the Chinese mainland. Although the “Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China,” signed in December 1954, prevented Taiwan from going communist, it had also restricted any unilateral action by KMT forces to retake the mainland. Mainlanders felt detained on the island, growing more melancholy with every passing year. In November 1957, several years before his “baton” article, Wang Hongjun published a short piece in the founding issue of Apollo. In it, he confessed to being fed up with the “low spiritual pressure zone” in Taiwan. The causes of the spiritual squalor, in his estimation, were “the despondency, numbness, and escapism in people’s hearts and minds.”71 In another article, Wang, himself a mainlander, vividly described the mentality of exiled mainlanders:

People from the mainland have already spent ten years on Taiwan. A couple of months ago, a magazine asked a few prominent figures to express their feelings in writing on this topic … The general sense was that after ten years the youth of yesterday is middle-aged today, and the middle-aged man is already graying. In only a few words, there was the irresistible chill of the autumn wind covering the earth with frost in no time.

These feelings were all authentic. They all had a deep sense of humanity. No one could deny them or reproach them. In fact that’s the way it felt. Ten years of constricted existence is enough to erode anyone’s will. The international situation seemed dark and uncertain. Although the fires of revolt are always lit on the mainland, for the great act of reconquering the mainland we need to wait for the right opportunity. Many people have gradually gone from expectation to anxiety, from anxiety to disappointment, and from disappointment to passivity … What’s their time frame? Today. How far out are they looking? Taiwan. If you ask them where they came from, why they came, where they’re going, they have nothing to say.72

Given this exilic mentality, to study abroad and then emigrate (especially to the United States) became the dream in which the parents of the mainlander postwar generation invested their hopes. As displayed in the self-criticism voiced by those who initiated the Self-consciousness Movement, descriptions of the postwar generation as “depressed,” “passive,” “selfish,” “silent,” “apathetic,” “realistic and having no dream,” “self-seeking and indifferent to any public issue” were common in the 1960s. To many Taiwanese, including young mainlanders, the desire to study abroad was the epitome of these unhealthy tendencies.73 However, many also believed that the blame should be placed upon the older generation. Dealing with his personal experience in the 1960s, a youth inspired by the Defending Diaoyutai Movement explained:
The parents who came from the mainland to Taiwan had experienced fighting the CCP, but these were experiences of pain and failure. Although they’ve been singing the tune of the great task of restoring China, they’re the ones who most lack the confidence to do so. They basically are unwilling for their sons and daughters to get caught up in the maelstrom of political struggle. They even hope that their children may escape this contentious island of Taiwan. They started the overseas study current, which has been flowing for twenty years. They’re defeatists, and they have passed on their defeatism to the next generation.

Even a number of older mainlanders of the refugee generation made similar criticisms. Xu Fuguan, a prominent New Confucian in his sixties who taught at the Christian Tunghai University, blasted the mainlanders for their exilic mentality, manifest in the vogue of overseas study. Most parents, he alleged, were in fact proud of having children who had emigrated from Taiwan.

The opposition between the Nationalist island and the Communist mainland gave young intellectuals a sense of being trapped on Taiwan and shut out of history. Feeling that they could do nothing to change the political situation, they were overwhelmed by a sense of powerlessness. A basic reason for this feeling was the KMT state’s rigid control over historical education and publishing, leaving them relatively unfamiliar with their own history, whether Chinese or Taiwanese. The aspiration of the postwar generation towards Western learning and the powerful influence of Western – especially American – culture upon them also produced in its members a feeling of separation from their own national history and fate. In particular, the younger generation tended to know little about Taiwan’s history. A telling example is Ye Rongzhong’s (1900–1978) daughter, Ye Yunyun (1945–). Ye Rongzhong was secretary to one of the most important leaders in the Taiwanese anti-colonial movement under the Japanese, Lin Xiantang (1877–1956). As one of the older, local Taiwanese intellectuals who withdrew from politics because of disappointment with the KMT rule, Ye Rongzhong devoted himself to writing a series of important historical works in the 1960s, such as A History of the Taiwanese Political and Social Movements in the Period of Japanese Occupation (Rijuxia taiwan zhengzhi shehui yundongshi), A Chronicle of Remarkable Happenings in Taiwan in the Period of Japanese Occupation (Rijuxia taiwan dashi nianbiao), and A Profile of Taiwanese Distinguished Figures (Taiwan renwu qunxiang). Looking back to when her father was working on these publications, Ye Yunyun confessed:

During the 1960s, I usually helped my father copy his manuscripts and thus became the first reader of his works. However, I was not different from a great many young people of my generation. In those days, I was oriented to the West and felt little interest in the history of which I myself was part. Upon reflection, it was not until I left my island homeland that I began to take learning about Taiwanese history seriously.

If this was the experience of a child whose parent was a member of the Taiwanese anti-colonial elite, it is not surprising that ordinary young intellectuals of local Taiwanese origin – let alone those of mainland origin – knew little about the island’s past. A well-known mainlander fiction writer of the postwar generation, Zhang Xiguo (1944–), commented:

Concerning the education we received on Taiwan … what’s especially important is that it has left modern “intellectuals” with an extraordinary lack of knowledge about China. The cohort or group who grew up on Taiwan is almost completely spiritually Americanized. Before leaving the country, they never had any chance to understand China, much
less Taiwan. They have no relations, except family relations, chaining them to Taiwan. They have no feeling for or insight into Taiwan. They don’t feel Taiwan is their home. Spiritually speaking, they’re disjointed from either Taiwan or China.78

As mentioned above, the postwar generation was typically criticized for being silent, pessimistic, and self-seeking. In addition, the young intellectuals typically regarded themselves as members of an “uprooted” or “lost” generation.79 Although this mood prevailed among both the mainlanders and the local Taiwanese, it derived mainly from the experience of exile from the mainland, from the dream of “retaking the mainland,” and from the KMT’s claim that Taiwan was but a temporary base. In this regard, Zhang Xiguo once pointed out: “There is no need to hide the fact. Those who migrated to Taiwan after 1945, especially the intellectuals, could not build up a deep feeling of love for Taiwan in the beginning in a way that they loved their homeland. This is undoubtedly a source of the sense of uprootedness and loss.”80

But this sense of isolation from Chinese and Taiwanese history does not mean that young intellectuals had no sense of history. In fact, their feelings of estrangement and powerlessness coexisted with a particular sense of history shaped by the KMT-sanctioned nationalist historical narrative. Many young mainland intellectuals arrived in Taiwan together with their parents when they were still babies, and they only vaguely remembered fleeing the mainland. Others were born in Taiwan and had no personal experience of seeking refuge at all. These young intellectuals of mainland origin held what I call a “quasi-exilic mentality,” in the sense that their feelings were not based on their personal experiences. Reflecting upon how her parents’ nostalgia had had a great influence on her, a college student admitted in an essay published in a school bulletin in the 1970s that although the mainlanders of her generation had never been to the mainland, they usually felt homesick for their parents’ hometowns. She wrote:

[T]here were times when I wasn’t really sure where I was from. It stood to reason that since I was born in Taiwan I was Taiwanese, but when people asked me where I was from, I would without thinking reply: “Hunan.” My elders would often go on to reply: “Hunan’s a nice place!” I couldn’t help feel a little proud of myself. As a child, whatever I read about Hunan in geography class I would swallow whole, hungry for knowledge. Since it was my homeland I should understand it and love it, right? But I’d never seen this homeland. It was distant and vague … . [W]eren’t we waiting for the bugle to start playing, for the time we’d leave this temporary resting place and reconquer the mainland?

I don’t know how many in our generation “sighed with homesickness looking at the province of origin on their ID cards.” At least that’s how I grew up, and that’s what my elders taught me … 81

Similarly, Wang Fusu (1952–), a medical student at the National Taiwan University who organized campus activities to promote socio-political reforms issuing from the Defending Diaoyutai Movement, displayed the quasi-exilic mentality in an article published in a school magazine. “Those who have never touched the land, gazed at the blue sky, or eaten the rice of home can only be homesick for a place they’ve seen on a map or in a photograph. Ah! The times we live in are so terribly tragic!”82

Examining the collective memory of the Holocaust, Marianne Hirsch describes how generational factors condition how Jewish survivors and their children related to the trauma. For Hirsch, these children are “exiled from a world that has ceased to exist, that has been violently erased” and “live at a further temporal and spatial remove
from that decimated world” than their parents. She argues that the distance separating children of Holocaust survivors from the locus of origin is a break impossible to bridge. For those born or growing up after the Holocaust, their memory of it is different from their parents’ in temporal and qualitative terms. Hirsch calls this secondary, or second-generation, memory “postmemory.”

Postmemory is a powerful form of memory precisely because its connection to its object or source is mediated not through recollection but through an imaginative investment and creation. That is not to say that memory itself is unmediated, but that it is more directly connected to the past. Postmemory characterizes the experience of those who grew up dominated by narrative that preceded their birth, whose own belated stories are displaced by the stories of the previous generation, shaped by traumatic events that can be neither fully understand nor re-created.

As Hirsch herself argues, although her notion of postmemory is developed in relation to children of Holocaust survivors, it can usefully describe the second-generation memory of other cultural or collective traumatic events and experiences. Young mainlander intellectuals’ “quasi-exilic mentality,” born of events unquestionably less extreme, nonetheless shares striking similarities with the postmemory of children of Holocaust survivors. When they sighed with homesickness looking at the province of origin on their ID cards, finding the names of their parents’ hometowns on a map, or stroking the photograph of their remote home, young mainlander intellectuals’ connection to the past is mediated through an imaginative investment and creation influenced mainly by the KMT state’s and/or their parents’ narrative.

Although the young intellectuals of local Taiwanese origin had no experience of family suffering like their mainlander counterparts, they shared a similar exilic state of mind because through their school education, they had internalized the KMT state’s nationalist historical narrative and the myth of returning to the mainland. Their particular state of mind was a “semi-quasi-exilic mentality,” as it were. In light of Hirsch’s concept, it may also be called a form of “semi-postmemory.” Zhang Junhong (1938–), who was of local Taiwanese background and later became a leading Taiwanese oppositionist in the late 1970s, once reflected on the school education his generation had received. He pondered how the students had been instilled with the idea that they were the inheritors of a historical legacy that had lasted 5000 years and the owners of the extensive land of a great country. The teaching of modern Chinese history at school, Zhang recollected, made them believe that China must be reinstated as a power to avenge herself, and they all hoped that this could be achieved. Zhu Yunhan (1956–), a mainlander in his twenties and a graduate of political science in the 1970s, was regarded as a KMT moderate reformist at that time. He stated that under the pressure of the different entrance examinations to high schools, colleges, and universities, students were forced to stuff themselves with historical knowledge from textbooks. Thus school textbooks shaped their historical knowledge of China, including that of China’s successive dynasties, the foreign aggression and civil strife in the recent century, and the KMT-CCP civil war and ensuing cross-strait confrontation. In his reflections, Zhu pointed out that the teaching of history at school had a very strong influence on his generation. He keenly described his experience and feelings:

If, having been born and grown up here, this young generation’s spatial sense was limited to [the island of Taiwan], that would indeed be a pity. We would feel just about as inferior as young people in [small countries such as] Ceylon, Malagasy [Republic], and the Philippines once they begin to transcend the petty chauvinism of nationalist school textbooks and confront the wider world. But, arguably fortunately, due to the fact
that we’ve inherited a historical tradition that has compensated for the deficiency of our current spatial sense, we find in the past a support for the future. We can hold our heads high as we face the world. What we temporarily lack is merely a linkage [between the spatial imaginaries of past (the mainland) and present (Taiwan)], but we happen to grow up within the space of this “temporarily.” Thus, the stark contrast between our historical tragedy and our contemporary complacency, combined with the distinctive feeling of living “temporarily,” have constituted the spatio-temporal mainstream of this generation of young intellectuals.

Perhaps, today’s university students cannot help sighing: being a Chinese is a blessing, but being a Chinese in the present world more or less brings one a sense of melancholy, and [the feeling of] having grown up in Taiwan as a Chinese is hard to put into a few words.89

Obviously, it was precisely the kind of school education centering around the Chinese nationalist historical narrative sanctioned by the KMT state that fostered an uneasy feeling of living in a temporary state. In retrospect and prospect, young intellectuals of Zhu’s generation who grew up in the 1960s could not help feeling somewhat dispirited and depressed about both the present situation and the future. Situated in the particular realities of postwar Taiwan, Zhu had described acutely what Said called the exilic feeling of existing in a median state. Like those patriotic and anti-Communist movements the KMT state initiated in the period from the early 1950s to the late 1960s, the particular pedagogy created a paradoxical effect where the exilic nationalist historical narrative had ironically undermined the state’s attempts to mobilize society by fostering the exilic mentality.

**Isolation and depression, obligation and the ideal**

There was an affinity between the young intellectuals’ sense of estrangement from historical reality on the one hand and the Western culture and knowledge popular in 1960s Taiwan on the other. The Western influence intensified the young intellectuals’ sense of alienation and historical isolation. Looking back on how Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre had exercised a powerful influence on Taiwanese intellectuals of his generation, the famous fiction writer, Zhang Xiguo, pointed out:

> The two most powerful currents of thought in Taiwanese intellectual circles are logical positivism and existentialism. At least to us, Russell and Sartre are the patriarchs of two schools of thought … which more or less tell us: the intellectual is lonely and should be proud of it … There is no objecting to these two thinkers, but is the influence they have on us really a good one? Undeniably, we all more or less were influenced by them: we liked to stress the responsibility and pride of the intellectual.90

Existentialism in particular contributed to a mentality of isolation in the postwar generation. A contemporary interpreter of Sartre asserted that, “It is because people do not have an innate nature that when they come into this world they are as if thrown in a vast wilderness beyond the possibility of assistance. For everything they depend on themselves. They must create their own worlds and value systems, and at the same time give their worlds meaning.” He summed up: “An enlightened person. A solitary but proud hero. This is Sartre’s message.”91 In addition, as Zhang pointed out, Taiwanese youths’ mixed sense of solitude, depression, glory, and duty was shaped not only by Western thought, but also by traditional Chinese intellectuals’ high ideal of making contributions to social betterment.92 In general, the concerned and
reformism-oriented intellectuals of the postwar generation in the 1960s projected a solitary, narcissistic image.\textsuperscript{93}

The two journals that strongly influenced concerned intellectuals before the mid-1960s, \textit{Free China} and \textit{Apollo}, stood for the democratization and modernization of traditional Chinese culture shaped by Western thought. For those young intellectuals who lamented the Chinese national humiliation caused by foreign aggression in the recent century, to put their ideas of political and cultural reforms inspired by the West into practice and to realize the traditional Chinese intellectuals’ ideal of commitment and self-sacrifice were compatible with each other. \textit{The Intellectual} (Daxue zazhi, 1968–1987), a journal established by a group of young intellectuals in January 1968, echoed the reformist ideas promoted by \textit{Free China} and \textit{Apollo}. This new journal was infused with young intellectuals’ enthusiasm for service by putting their ideas about democracy and cultural modernization into practice. Almost without exception, the contributors to \textit{The Intellectual} were members of the postwar generation.

The self-criticisms of the exilic mentality began to emerge in \textit{The Intellectual} in the late 1960s, as a witness to this journal’s reformism. Young authors attacked the prevalence of the sense of loss, uprootedness, estrangement, and powerlessness among their generation. Like the young intellectuals’ other open discussions about the problems peculiar to their generation, this kind of self-criticism was rare. However, these infrequent self-criticisms were the herald of the return-to-reality and return-to-native-soil demands developed after the Defending Diaoyutai Movement in the early 1970s. Those who made such self-criticisms felt ashamed of isolating themselves from society at large, especially the masses. For these young intellectuals, the lifeworld of workers, peasants, and other sections of the lower class rather than their own intellectual life, constituted social reality. It needed to be understood in order to make social reforms. Clearly, their socio-political reformism and the return-to-reality idea were closely related to each other. For the young intellectuals, both local Taiwanese and mainlanders, Taiwan was the single society with which they were familiar despite their common exilic mentality. Regarding themselves as “modern Chinese intellectuals” (xiandai zhongguo zhishi fenzi), they drew on the Chinese nationalist historical narrative to make sense of their social reality. For them, the masses’ life experience, feelings, and destiny, either local Taiwanese or mainlander, constituted those of the “Chinese common people” (zhongguo laobaixing). A student who studied in the United States thus confessed in a letter to the editor of \textit{The Intellectual}:

Truly, I am insensitive. I cannot sense the meaning of “existence” [in existentialism]. I have no intention of being an Übermensch. And I do not feel as if I am lost, out of place. Yet I know that I am Chinese, born into a divided China in the sixties of the twentieth century. During my university days there were times when I walked the dark and dirty alleys of Taipei. Several times, in turning towards the glimmering towers along Zhongshan North Road, I’ve seen families crammed into dilapidated shacks. In the country, I’ve met people who worked extremely hard every day just to get by. Why is it that the farther we intellectuals go the more distant we get from society and the less true compassion we have for ordinary people? If the “new intellectual class” is built upon a confining intellectual “ideology,” then I’d rather not ascend into this “class.” I’d rather abandon the robes of the “intellectual.” I would be happier walking unadorned in the fields and shoot the breeze with the country folk by the side of the creek.

An intellectual is someone who truly lives the life of the Chinese people, who sees what the Chinese people see, who says what the people want to say, who gives voice to the
pain of the Chinese people, who shares their happiness by smiling, right? The age of the “literati” has already passed.94

As the letter showed, these young intellectuals were constructing the “Chineseness” of the Taiwanese society within the framework of a nationalist historical narrative. They also positioned themselves and struggled to make sense of their generation’s experience within the same narrative framework.

In general, an exilic mentality prevailed among the intellectuals of the postwar generation; this mentality included a sense of loss/solitude/estrangement/depression on the one hand, and a sense of glory about and obligation to the nation on the other. The sense of loss derived mainly from the white terror under the KMT state’s authoritarian control. The public sphere was highly limited, and the young intellectuals were confined to their intellectual world. Feeling trapped on an island with bleak political prospects, they found that they had become cold bystanders of the political situation and could do nothing about the historical reality of the KMT-CCP confrontation. Moreover, the engaged ones among them possessed a high ideal of contributing to social betterment, which had been shaped by Chinese intellectual tradition. Their sense of obligation to the nation was heightened by their indignation at Chinese national humiliation, which, in turn, had been shaped by the KMT-controlled historical education. Moreover, their sense of loss and their sense of obligation to the nation were mutually reinforcing. That is, the stronger their sense of obligation to the nation was, the more they felt depressed; and the more they felt powerless, the more they sought to contribute to the nation. Presumably surprised with the student movements in America, overseas students studying in that country felt the exclusion and passivity of their generation especially keenly. A year before the Diaoyutai Incident, overseas student of mainlander background and future activist in the Defending Diaoyutai Movement initiated in the United States, Liu Daren, gave the following account:

Basically, this generation of overseas students has played no active participatory role in modern Chinese history. Most of them grew up in the time after their parents and grandparents had already lowered the flags and silenced the drums. Their world was books and legends. Their life experiences have been textual transplants, airy inferences and imaginings. Most of them today cannot escape these frames [of knowledge]. They walk down the road paved for them by their elders. Regardless of how they feel about this road, they are unable to create a new road. Perhaps for their whole lives they will be unable to live up to the history created by their fathers. Walking in the shadows, they foggily follow in the direction in which their fathers have pointed.95

Liu’s account is a vivid profile of a passive, melancholy generation living under the shadow of the older generation in exile and the regime haunted by the specter of the past.

Conclusion
Taiwanese society was dramatically changed under the rule of the KMT-controlled ROC government following the end of Japanese colonialism on the island in 1945. The authoritarian state’s relocation in 1949 and the influx of mainlander refugees further transformed the island society. During the 1960s, a new generation, including members of local Taiwanese and mainlander background, came to maturity. Young intellectuals of this generation rarely engaged in public discussions about socio-political issues in
this decade. As a generation who grew up dominated by narratives constructed by the displaced KMT state and the previous generation in exile, they were characterized by a “quasi-exilic mentality” or even a “semi-quasi-exilic mentality,” by a form of “post-memory” or even “semi-postmemory.” It was not until the end of the 1960s that some of them began to openly criticize their generation’s exilic mentality.

For some, their generation’s enthusiasm was checked only temporarily. With regard to the sense of isolation and powerlessness prevalent among the concerned Chinese intellectuals in the United States, Ambrose Y.C. King (Jin Yaoji, 1935–), a young sociologist of mainland origin, argued that they “did not seem to lack confidence in their mother country’s [that is, the ROC’s or the Chinese nation’s] future.” For him, the young intellectuals of his generation were passively waiting for a favorable historical opportunity and were unable to create one actively. “They are just waiting – waiting for a challenging opportunity,” King believed.96 Viewed retrospectively, the challenging historical opportunity that King expected was precisely the drama of Taiwan losing the contest against Japan for the Diaoyutai islets and losing the UN seat representing all of China. These diplomatic setbacks raised the consciousness of the young intellectuals to the dangers facing their country. They then transformed into an active generation for-itself, playing a major role in the political and cultural changes in 1970s Taiwan and beyond.

Nevertheless, compared with the unrest caused by the student movements in the United States, Europe, Japan, and other places in the world in the 1960s, Taiwan remained tranquil. The young intellectuals in Taiwan during this decade constituted a passive generation in-itself. The major reason for their apathy was the fact that, as Zhang Junhong and Chen Guying stated, they were completely excluded from public affairs, especially politics, and therefore had little role to play in building their country.97 This was the case both for mainlander and local Taiwanese young intellectuals. Ye Hongsheng, a mainlander in his early twenties whose father was a general, summarized the peculiar character of his generation in the 1960s:

The stentorian slogans of the present day – [containing phrases] like “lost,” “indignant,” “lonely,” “rootless,” and so forth – are all products of this age of contradictions … Also in the context of the “expedient measures” of the period of “anti-Communist mobilization” these different types of people are brought about … [These qualities] may [like colors] blend and separate. Some people only possess only one hue, others several. The hues vary in richness, and [the individual] may choose one as representative.98

This is a living picture of 1960s Taiwan that lies outside of the purview shaped by the hegemonic symbolic frame of reference, the decade labeling of “the turbulent sixties” or “upheavals of the sixties.”

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Notes
2. For the relation between the political changes in the 1970s and the postwar generation of intellectuals, see, for example, Huang, *Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan*; Chen, “Qishi niandai yilai taiwan xinsheng yidai de gaige yundong (shang), (zhong), (xia)”; Chen, *The Reform Movement among Intellectuals in Taiwan since 1970*; and Hsiau, *Huigui xianshi*. Hsiau’s study also deals with the role of young intellectuals in the cultural changes of this decade.


4. ROC is the official name of Taiwan to date, though recently in international relations Taiwan usually takes the name “Chinese Taipei” because of pressure from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). I use Taiwan and ROC interchangeably in this essay.

5. See Xingzhengyuan hukou puchachu, *Zhonghua minguo qishijiu nian tai min diqu hukou ji zhuzhai pucha baogao*, 166. For the formation and transformation of complicated ethnic categorization in Taiwan’s population census in the postwar period to date, see Wang, “You ‘zhongguo shengji’ dao ‘taiwan zuqun’.” I use the Pinyin system which has been increasingly adopted worldwide to render Mandarin Chinese words into the Roman alphabet, though the Wade-Giles system has been commonly used in Taiwan. The category of *waishengren* also includes those mainland Chinese who immigrated to Taiwan after 1945, when Japanese colonial rule (1895–1945) in Taiwan ended and the ROC government took it over and declared it a province of the ROC. Although the mainlanders came from different provinces in China, they and their children born on Taiwan have been lumped together under the name “*waishengren*.”

6. In this essay, based on the Chinese cultural convention, Chinese people’s family names go first, followed by the given name.

7. Xingzhengyuan hukou puchachu, *Zhonghua minguo qishijiu nian tai min diqu hukou ji zhuzhai pucha baogao*, 166. About two percent of the population in Taiwan are non-Han aboriginal peoples. For thousands of years, aboriginal peoples speaking Malayo-Polynesian or Austronesian languages lived on Taiwan. The island of Taiwan had been ignored for centuries by outsiders. In the 1620s, two small parts of Taiwan were occupied by Holland and Spain at roughly the same time. Han Chinese began to migrate to Taiwan in the Dutch period mainly because the Dutch imported laborers from the Chinese mainland and their offspring increasingly identified themselves as Taiwanese. The category of *benshengren* refers to these Taiwanese natives, including Hoklo Taiwanese and Hakka Taiwanese. However, in the government-published data of population census that I cite, *Zhonghua minguo qishijiu nian tai min diqu hukou ji zhuzhai pucha baogao*, the aboriginal peoples are lumped together with *benshengren* under the category of “locally domiciled population” (*bendiji*).


9. For the emerging criticism of the exile mentality that informed politics and culture in the 1970s, which constituted part of the open challenge to the KMT rule posed by the young intellectuals of the postwar generation, see Hsiau, *Huigui xianshi*.


12. Ibid., 64–8.


14. For a typological discussion of displacement, including exile, see Suvin, “Displaced Persons.”

18. Ibid., 22.
28. Concerning the elements in Table 1, I have followed Hayden White’s discussion of narrative features. White states that a narrative has a line of temporal progression, a central theme, a plot with a beginning, middle and end, and the perspective of a narrator, and that it links different incidents together causally and improvises an ending, conclusion, determination, or resolution to the story. See White, “The Value of Narrative,” 9–21.
32. For instance, see Chen, “Guanyu yike biyesheng chuguo wenti”; Hong, “Women mianlin de jixiang renkou wenti”; Huang, “Taiwan shaonian fanzui rizeng, liyuan tongguo shaonianfa jiang yu chengfa”; Liu, “Taiwan shaonian fanzui de dongyin yanjiu”; Liu, “Cong daxue jiaoyu tandao rencai wailu he luxue zhenge”; Wu, “Taiwan guangfu hou renkou zengjia zhi yanjiu”; Xi, “Daxue qingnian duiyu qiuxue ji jiuye de taidu”; Xu, “Rencai wailu mianmianguan”; and Zhang, “Dui women daxue jiaoyu de jiantao.”
34. Appleton, “Taiwanese and Mainlanders on Taiwan,” 56; Appleton, “Regime Support among Taiwan High School Students,” 759, note 12.
35. Born in 1952, local Taiwanese director Wu Nianzhen’s autobiographical movie *A Borrowed Life (Duosang)*, released in 1994, told a story of conflict between a miner who kept affections for Japanese language and culture and his son who was raised in the postwar anti-Japan climate. The movie vividly described how the generational tension was closely involved with the conflict of national identity.
36. I am grateful to one of the referees of this essay for bringing this point to my attention.
40. Ibid., 125–7.
41. For example, see Hong, “Deguo dazhuan xuesheng saodong de fenxi”; Huang, “Cong jin jinianlai meiguo qingnian canqia sheshui zhengzheng huodong kan minzhu zhengzhong.”
44. For instance, see Li, “Laonianren han bangzi” and “Shisan nian han shisan yue.” Also see such recollections as Bai, “Liulang de zhongguoren”; Ling, “Budong liulei de yidai”; and Ye, “Zixu.”

45. Wang Hongjun was born in 1922 in Tianjin and came to Taiwan at age 27. He went to the United States to study in 1954 and then received his MA in journalism from the University of Missouri-Columbia. He returned to Taiwan in 1957.


48. Li Ao was born in 1935 in Haerbin in north-eastern China and came to Taiwan at age 14.


51. A major reason the Movement rapidly died down was simply that the coming final examination and summer vacation prevented the concerned students from furthering the Movement. See Wu, “Wuershi qingnian zijue yundong,” 46.


57. Ibid., 44.

58. Li, Li Ao Huiyilu, 162. Green Island is a small island to the southeast of Taiwan. Before the late 1980s, it had been notorious as a place for confining and torturing political prisoners under the white terror of the KMT state.


64. I have conducted a sociological analysis on this transformation in the 1970s in my book, Huigui xianshi.

65. For descriptions of personal experiences of the white terror on campus, see, for instance, Chen, “Rongren yu liaojie,” 6 and Chen, “Jinri zhishi qingnian zhi chujing,” 33. For the KMT state’s suppression of Taiwanese nationalism initiated by local Taiwanese young intellectuals in the early 1960s, see, for example, Peng, A Taste of Freedom.

66. Chen, “Jinri zhishi qingnian zhi chujing,” 33. Since the early 1950s, military officers have been posted in every senior high school, college, and university to give students military training and conduct political indoctrination. For decades before 2000, when the KMT eventually lost power because Chen Shuibian, the candidate of the pro-Taiwan independence Democratic Progress Party (DPP), won the presidential election, this system of stationing military officers on campus had served as one of the KMT state’s important means to control campuses. Even during the eight years of the Chen Shuibian administration (2000–2008), the DPP was unable to put an end to the system.

67. See, for example, Lin, “Jieshao buganyu beiyiqi de yiqun,” 25 and Liu, “Gei xinxianren de jianyi,” 23–4 for their personal feelings.


69. Ibid.


yan,” 224–5. A number of early studies published in English have provided similar descriptions of the young intellectuals in Taiwan. See, for example, Israel, “Politics on Formosa,” 10; Mei, “The Intellectuals on Formosa,” 71–3; Appleton, “Taiwanese and Mainlanders on Taiwan,” 55–6 and “Regime Support among Taiwan High School Students,” 759–60; Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle, 90–1.


76. For example, see the self-criticism made by those of mainlandler origin, such as Yu, “Xihua de wenxue,” 155–6, and by those of local Taiwanese origin, such as Chen, “Cong ‘xihua wenxue’ dao ‘xiangtu wenxue’,” 174, 175 and Chen, “Qingnian yusheng,” 11.


78. Zhang, “Tan luxuesheng,” 11


84. Ibid., 420.


89. Ibid., 189.


91. Liu, Sate luo, 57, 70.


93. For instance, see Chen Guying’s wife’s graphic description of him (Tang, “Quan wode zhangfu liuzai shufang,” 197–8). Chen was a philosophy lecturer at the National Taiwan University in the early 1970s. Following the Defending Diaoyutai Movement, he appealed to the KMT to tolerate student movements and advocated organizing a student movement to promote political reforms. Due to this radical proposal, he lost his teaching position under pressure from the KMT.

94. See the letter by Liu Rongsheng (Daxue zazhi 7 (1968): 2); also see Zhang, “Zhishi fenzi de gudu yu gudu de zhishi fenzi,” 15.


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