Cultivating “Postmodern Citizens”? Reflections on the New Trends of Education in Taiwan

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Abstract

The institutionalist theory of world polity advanced by John W. Meyer and his colleagues provides us an insightful analytical tool to understand the ontological basis of the contemporary world constituted by nation-states and citizens, both of which are constructed through the rationalization process of modernity. However, does this theory still hold in a so-called postmodern or global era, in which the foundations of nation-states are said to be undermined? Are nation-states still the major authoritative actors in world polity? Does education as the main institution for social reproduction still produce reliable citizens for nation-states? This paper uses Taiwan as an illustrative case to explore the above questions. The author makes two arguments. First, the recent trends of education in Taiwan, epitomized in the so-called “chaos of educational reform,” are in part a reflection of the “postmodern condition” resultant from Taiwan’s national question. Taiwan’s abnormal status qua a nation-state can be viewed as an “ethnomethodological case” that demonstrates the resilience of institutional structures of world polity. In other words, the ontological principles that legitimate nation-states (on the collective level) and citizens (on the individual level) as constitutive members of world polity remain steadfast despite the impacts of globalization. Second, however, we have also observed in Taiwan new trends in education that may eventually undermine the rational foundation of such structures. The new trends in education can be characterized as “postmodern” for two reasons: first, due to its abnormal status qua a nation-state, metanarratives of nationalism can hardly hold in Taiwan; as a result, there is an overall
incredulity towards metanarratives in Taiwan’s educational system, where instead instabilities and dissensions are prominent features. Secondly, during the educational reform in the past two decades, postmodernism has been both implicitly and explicitly promoted in education. In addition to a variety of postmodern scenes that can be characterized as Disney-zation of education, we have observed a tendency of moral indifference towards ethical principles and civic virtues in students. While we may call these new subjects thus cultivated “postmodern citizens,” their impacts on the future of institutional structures of the modern world are yet to be explored.

**Keywords:** institutionalism; world polity; postmodern education; educational reform; Grade 1-9 Curriculum in Taiwan.

**INTRODUCTION**

Through their collaborative efforts embodied in the 1987 volume, John W. Meyer and his colleagues advance an institutionalist account of the Weberian thesis of rationalization by probing into the constitutive structures of the world polity (Thomas et al., 1987). According to this approach, the world polity is analyzed as a system of rules legitimating the extension and expansion of authority of rationalized nation-states to control and act on behalf of their populations (Meyer, 1987). Various aspects of institutions of nation-state are analyzed in terms of citizenship, welfare, human rights, constitutions, and so on. In the field of education, it is argued that the rapid expansion of education worldwide can be explained neither by the developmentalist account nor by the conflict theory, but by the institutionalist approach that emphasizes the global expansion of nation-states as the legitimate actors in the world polity, and that education has been institutionalized at the world level, acting as a social imperative for nation-states integrated within this institutional environment (Ramirez & Boli, 1987).

However, more than twenty years have gone by, during which the world has undergone fundamental transformations generally known as “globalization” that predict the “decline of nation-states” and/or champion the ideal of “transnational” or “post-national” values (Held,
It has also been widely held that we are moving from a national to post-national era, and that the term “postmodern” is more suitable than “modern” to characterize the spirits of the time (Lytard, 1984; Harvey, 1989; Bauman, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1997). With such accounts in mind, one may wonder to what extent the institutionalist account of the world polity still hold. Are nation-states still the major authoritative actors in world society? How about education? Does education as the main institution for social reproduction still produce reliable citizens to support the nation-state?

This paper will use Taiwan as an illustrative case to explore the above questions. While it is impossible to answer the above questions with a single case, I shall simply argue that recent trends in education in Taiwan can provide clues for us to further investigate the above questions. Specifically, two arguments will be made, although, paradoxical as it may seem, the two arguments run towards two different, some may even say opposite, directions. On the one hand, the recent trend of education in Taiwan, epitomized in the so-called “chaos of educational reform,” is in part a reflection of the “postmodern condition” resultant from the institutional exclusion of Taiwan from the world polity. Insofar as the institutionalist theory of world polity (Boli & Thomas, 1999, p. 3) is concerned, Taiwan’s abnormal status qua a nation-state can be viewed as an “ethnomethodological case” (in Garfinkel’s sense) that demonstrates the resilience of institutional structures of world polity. In other words, the ontological principles that legitimate nation-states (on the collective level) and citizens (on the individual level) as constitutive members of world polity remain steadfast despite the impacts of globalization. On the other hand, however, we have also observed in Taiwan new trends in education that may eventually undermine the rational foundation of such structures. The new trends in education can be characterized as “postmodern” in two senses: First, due to its abnormal status qua a nation-state, the metanarrative of nationalism can hardly hold in Taiwan; as a result, there is an overall incredulity towards metanarratives in Taiwan’s education, in which instabilities
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and dissensions are prominent features. Secondly, during the educational reform in the past two decades, postmodernism and postmodern values have been both explicitly and implicitly promoted in the educational system. In addition to a variety of postmodern scenes that can be characterized as Disney-zation of education, we have observed a tendency of moral indifference towards ethical principles and civic virtues in students. While we may call these new subjects cultivated by such an educational system “postmodern citizens”—an oxymoron in a sense—their impacts on the future of institutional structures of the modern world are yet to be explored. Put succinctly, the first argument maintains that institutional structures created from the top by rational culture of modernity still hold even in this so-called postmodern/global era, but the second argument suggests that such structures may change in the future, as they are being undermined from below in daily routines and educational practices in social reproduction.

Before we proceed, however, a few qualifications have to be made concerning the contested concept of the “postmodern.” Like many “big concepts” such as “modernity” or “modernism,” there have been a variety of ways of conceptualizing “postmodernism” or “postmodernity” by different scholars, some of which do not seem to be compatible with each other. Among them, this paper simply follows Jean-François Lyotard, one of the most definitive and influential authors on this subject, by conceptualizing the postmodern as the overall incredulity towards metanarratives or grand discourses. Postmodern, as the term itself suggests, is conceptualized in relation to modern. According to Lyotard (1984, p. xxiii), the term modern designates “any science that legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse of this kind making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth.” In contrast, postmodern is defined as “incredulity toward metanarratives. This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it. To the obsolescence of the
metanarrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds, most notably, the crisis of metaphysical philosophy and of the university institution which in the past relied on it. The narrative function is losing its functors, its great hero, its great dangers, its great voyages, its great goal” (ibid, p. xxiv). While Lyotard’s argument is mainly concerned with sciences and universities, I contend that the same can be applied to nationalism (in terms of metanarratives) and nation-states (in terms of institution). As we will see below, due to its ambiguous status as a nation-state, the institutional predicaments of the ROC (Republic of China) lead to the emergence of an overall incredulity towards metanarratives of nationalism, which, in turn, can be characterized as the “postmodern condition” in Taiwan. Some may contend that Taiwan has not gone through the “modern stage” of nation-building and hence it is unsuitable to call it “postmodern,” for it cannot be postmodern before it has become modern. However, I posit that “postmodern” should not be conceptualized in time sequence as being “posterior to the modern.” Rather, postmodern coexists with the modern and is “undoubtedly a part of the modern” (ibid, p. 79). Following Lyotard’s conceptualization, postmodernism tends to use “paralogy” as the source of legitimation, in which people search for instabilities rather than stability, dissensions rather than consensus. Again, as will be pointed out below, these characteristics of the postmodern can also be found in Taiwan.

Another important point of reference to the postmodern is the works by Zygmunt Bauman, a leading sociologist writing extensively on postmodernity (referred to as “liquid modernity” in his later writings). While Lyotard analyzes the causes and the condition of postmodernism from the philosophical stance, Bauman is more inclined to probe into the manifestations and consequences of postmodernism/postmodernity from the sociological perspective. To Lyotard, postmodernism implies the incredulity towards metanarrative, instability and dissensions; to Bauman, postmodernity is a tendency to champion fragmentation over totality, individuation over collectivity, pleasure over reason, and aesthetics over ethics. Deeply concerned with
the existential problems of human being in (post)modern society, Bauman identifies consumerism as one of the key features for grasping postmodernity. His relentless inquiries into value dimensions of consumer life reveal to us a moral vacuum in postmodern ethic (Bauman, 1993, 1995, 2007). These conceptualizations and criteria are also important for us to identify and analyze the postmodern condition in Taiwan.

In the following, I first provide a brief sketch of the changes brought about by the educational reform in the past two decades. In the third section, I employ the institutionalist theory of the world polity to expound the postmodern condition of Taiwan’s national question, and then analyze how such a condition impacts educational reform. In the fourth section, I analyze how postmodernism has been implemented in Taiwan’s educational system, using the Grade 1-9 Curriculum as an illustration, and investigate its manifestations and possible consequences. In the concluding section, the theoretical implications of the Taiwanese case will be further explored.

EDUCATIONAL REFORM AND ITS DISCONTENTS: A BRIEF SKETCH²

As noted in previous studies, globalization has led to a series of educational restructuring in East Asia (Mok & Welch, 2003). Taiwan within this context is no exception. In fact, education in Taiwan has undergone fundamental reform since the 1990s. From kindergarten to higher education, things have changed radically during the past twenty years. The reform has covered a wide rage of areas such as new laws, the adjustments of administrative organizations, increasing expenditures in education, new curriculum standards and teaching practices, new measures for entrance examinations, changes in teachers’ qualifications, payments and welfare benefits, etc. It would not be exaggerating to say that no stone has been left unturned in Taiwan’s educational system during the past two decades.
The educational reform in Taiwan took place at a historical conjuncture where democratization, nationalization, marketization, and the recent wave of globalization met each other. As a matter of fact, educational reform was directly connected with the lifting of martial law in 1987, a watershed in Taiwan’s political history since 1949. Before 1987, education, as with other social and cultural spheres, was under tight control by the KMT (Kuomintang) state, which had exercised authoritarian rule over the island for more than four decades. After the lifting of martial law, which made free associations possible, there emerged a number of social movement organizations or groups that took educational reform as their primary goal.

On 31 January 1988, thirty-two non-governmental organizations made collective efforts to launch a general attack on education by holding “The First Non-Governmental Conference on Education,” which can be said the prologue to the reform in the next decade. The next year, three consecutive conferences were held in February, June and September. The issues discussed included curricula in elementary schools, education quality, evaluation of teaching quality, multiple channels for teacher trainings and qualifications, etc. Although the government responded with a few measures and legal procedures (such as the drafting of University Law and Teacher’s Law), it was widely held that these efforts were deficient, and that much more thorough reform should be made. On 10 April 1994, the pressure by non-governmental sectors for educational reform reached its peak in the nationally mobilized “410 Great March for Educational Reform,” in which four major appeals were brought up: (1) to reduce the scale of schools and classes; (2) to increase the number of high schools and colleges; (3) to modernize educational systems; and (4) to make the Basic Law of Education (League of the 410 Educational Reform, 1996, p. 435).

During the same period of time, the ruling KMT state was undergoing some fundamental changes as well. Since Lee Teng-hui succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988 to become the first native Taiwanese to be President of the Republic of China (ROC), nationalist
politics in Taiwan has escalated to form a historical turn. Although Chinese nationalism and reunification (with mainland China) remained the official ideology of the KMT state, it was seriously undermined by the rise of Taiwanese identity or consciousness. The rising Taiwanese identity/consciousness made the old curriculum, which was previously constructed under the framework of Chinese nationalism, appear quite awkward and outdated. In addition, the authoritarian legacy in the educational system was rather incompatible with the newly established democracy. The need for reform was considered necessary and urgent.

Under the pressures from both inside and outside, the Premier approved the establishment of the Ad Hoc Council on Educational Reform in September 1994 to conduct an overall review of Taiwan’s educational system. During its operation from 1994 to 1996, the Ad Hoc Council on Educational Reform released five reports, which later became the major blueprint for educational reform. As the former Minister of Education Kuo Wei-fan puts it, educational reform in Taiwan has been under “a double transition from uniformity to diversity, and from authoritarian centralization to deregulation and pluralism.” (Kuo, 1996, p. 12). To be more specific, the measures and actions taken by the Ministry of Education (MOE) have followed six principal directions: (1) the improvement of the entrance examination system to reduce students’ workload; (2) democratization and deregulation in favor of institutional autonomy and decentralization; (3) reallocation of resources to assure equality of educational opportunity; (4) elaboration of a life-long learning system; (5) overall revision of school curricula and textbooks; and (6) restructuring of teacher training progress and teacher organizations. (ibid, pp. 4-5).

As can be seen, the six principal directions mentioned above were wide-ranging in scope and far-reaching in depth. The overall reform of education has been under way since then. State officials, teachers, reformers, and activist groups have invested enormous efforts in reshaping the structure of the educational system and curriculum contents. Despite these efforts, however, the results of such a
profound or even radical reform have been far from satisfactory. In addition to criticisms, there have been complaints from students, parents and even teachers. On the eve of Teachers’ day in 2005, which marked the tenth year of educational reform in Taiwan, a survey conducted by a newspaper reported that 46% of teachers would like to send their own children to study overseas because they were not content with the education in Taiwan and they did not trust the system. On the side, it was also reported that 70 percent of teachers would like to change their jobs because they found it too difficult to deal with students and parents (United Evening News, September 27, 2005, p. A4). It is truly ironic to see that, after ten years of reform, teachers are losing confidence in their own profession and they would rather see their children being educated by others rather than by themselves, not in a system of which they are also a part, but in a system different from their own. Indeed, not only has the reform failed to gain support from teachers, but the general public have been rather dissatisfied by the reform. There even emerges a popular term called “jiaogai luanxiang” (教改亂象), which literally means “the chaos of educational reform.” The term expresses public discontent with the current situation in Taiwan’s educational system, which has been found to be full of controversies, inconsistencies, conflicts and contradictions.

It is difficult to evaluate the outcomes of the educational reform in terms of “success” or “failure.” Some of the goals have been achieved while some have not, but even these goals are sometimes mutually conflicting. This is so, because the reform is a mixed outcome of different goals set up by heterogeneous groups, notably the leftist and the rightist ones (Ho, 2010). In fact, the expression “chaos of educational reform” already implies that the reform has not been successful; otherwise it would not lead to chaos that was unintended by the reformers. While it is not my intention here to analyze the success/failure of the reform, which calls for a separate study, I shall simply argue that the so-called “chaos of educational reform” is, in part, a reflection of a larger structural situation that can be
characterized as the “postmodern condition.”⁴ To be sure, the postmodern condition in Taiwan has at least two sources. The first source stems from the idiosyncrasies of Taiwan’s national and international status, which leads some to characterize Taiwan as a “postmodern nation” (Chun, 2000; Wang, 2009). The second source comes from the promotion of postmodern values and the implementation of postmodernism in education. In the following two sections, I probe into these two sources and analyze how they shape the educational reform, as well as their possible consequences, respectively.

THE “POSTMODERN CONDITION” OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL QUESTION AND ITS IMPACTS ON THE EDUCATIONAL REFORM

The “national question” in Taiwan has been highly contested in the past two decades. It is widely held that the pre-existing ethnic cleavages and political process, including democratization, ethnic mobilization, and localization, are the main forces that drive the surge of Taiwanese nationalism, which has been escalating with the tide of democratization and indigenization since the 1990s (Chang Mau-kuei, 1993; Hsiau, 2000; Corcuff, 2002).

While ethnic cleavages, political mobilization and democratization are certainly important factors that contribute to the rise of Taiwanese nationalism, there is an institutional dimension that has often been overlooked but should not be left out in understanding nationalist politics in Taiwan. This institutional dimension is important, not only because it helps to shed new light on our understanding of nationalist politics in Taiwan, but also because it is essential for us to grip the postmodern condition that Taiwan’s national question leads to. To analyze this institutional dimension, this paper adopts an “institutionalist approach with global perspective” that takes inspirations from the works of Rogers Brubaker (1996) as well as John Meyer and his colleagues.
From this approach, nations are analyzed not as substantial entities or groups constituted by individuals, but as ensembles of intersecting institutions that then constitute the ontological basis of the nation-states. According to the two ideal types of the nation-state, we can distinguish between two types of institutions of nation-states: the civic-territorial, on the one hand, and the ethno-cultural, on the other. These two types of institutions, in turn, provide us respectively with political/territorial maps and cultural/cognitive maps. Furthermore, according to the property of relativity in institutional analysis, these two types of institutions have to function on at least two levels: the global/interstate level, and the national/domestic level.

With such an analytical framework, the national question in Taiwan can be understood in terms of institutional crises that eventually lead Taiwanese society into a postmodern condition. To begin with, there have been tensions and incongruence between the civic-territorial and the ethno-cultural institutions of the ROC nation. Although the civic-territorial institutions of the ROC maintain that it represents the government of China, it is, to a great extent, constrained by the de facto jurisdiction it can exercise in reality. The nation projected by the ethno-cultural institutions of the ROC is the entire China, but the de facto jurisdiction of the ROC territory contains nothing more than the island of Taiwan (as well as other smaller islands such as the Penghu archipelago, Kinmen & Matzu). As a result, there exists a sharp gap between cultural representation and political reality (Wang, 2004).

Furthermore, the two sets of institutions also run into crises respectively, especially on the international level. Here the institutionalist theory of world polity is particularly heuristic. Since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now virtually the only recognized government of China, the “one China policy” the PRC imposed on world polity has disqualified—or, rather, de-legitimated—Taiwan as a member qua political community (i.e., nation-state) in many international occasions. This results from two consequences of the system of rules in world polity: first, since there is only one China, the ROC on Taiwan
cannot be regarded as the government of China, nor can Taiwan be regarded as a nation-state, for the “one China policy” also prescribes that Taiwan is part of China; secondly, since only nation-states are legitimate political community member in world polity, Taiwan’s ontological status in such a polity has been denied. As the ROC is rarely recognized as a country (i.e., a legitimate nation-state) in world polity, it follows that many of its civic-territorial institutions, such as national title, flag and anthem, fail to function properly in the international arena. Even for naming itself, the political community in Taiwan has been struggling extraordinarily hard since neither the ROC nor Taiwan can be used in various international occasions because of the opposition of the PRC. The most widely accepted formula is “Chinese Taipei,” which has been used in the Olympic Games and many other international occasions (Wang, 2007).7

The crises of the ethno-cultural institutions are not as severe as those of their civic-territorial counterparts, but the foundation of their legitimacy has been seriously undermined in the past two decades because of both inside and outside factors. The inside factor is the increasingly perceived incongruence between the civic-territorial and ethno-cultural institutions, which has been discussed above, whereas the outside factor is the rise of China. When China was still closed to the outside world before the late 1970s, especially during the period of the Cultural Revolution, the ROC government on Taiwan was able to maintain that it was the authentic heir as well as the true guardian of traditional Chinese culture. During the 1960s and 1970s, many westerners came to Taiwan to see or study Chinese society and culture, viewing Taiwan as a “substitute” for China. However, after the PRC opened its door to outsiders in the reform era, and after China gradually rose on the global stage, its visibility in the cultural field was greatly enhanced, which threatened the legitimacy of cultural institutions of the ROC (Wang, 2004).

The institutional crises of the ROC were exacerbated by the process of globalization, since people have gradually realized that the institutions of the ROC are neither accepted nor recognized in most
international occasions. As a result, we have witnessed the escalation of nationalist politics since the 1990s (Wang, 2000). There have been the rise of Taiwanese identity/consciousness, on the one hand, and antipathy towards China (the PRC), on the other. Chinese nationalism as promoted by the KMT regime in the past is gradually giving way to rising Taiwanese nationalism, which aims to build Taiwan into a nation-state in its own right. Such a drive reached its peak during 2000-2008 when the pro-independence DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) was in power. However, due to the institutional constraints in world polity, which subscribes to the “one China policy” advocated by the PRC in most official occasions, even the DPP government was unable to solve the problems caused by the institutional predicament of the “neither-nor” status of the ROC: neither a state, nor a non-state, neither China, nor non-China (thus the strange title of “Chinese Taipei”). The identity is ambiguous at best and splitting at worst, while there has been widespread incredulity to the grand narratives of nationalism, since neither Taiwanese nationalism nor Chinese nationalism can fully hold up the ROC institutions due to the predicament they have faced on the international level. To follow Lyotard’s (1984) conceptualization of postmodern as the overall incredulity to metanarratives, we may well view Taiwan as a “postmodern nation.”

What, then, are the impacts of such a postmodern condition of the nation-state on education in Taiwan? As education is a crucial institution of social reproduction for the nation-state, the institutional crises of the ROC also lead to profound problems in education. As a response to solve these problems, “de-Sinicization” (quzhongguohua, 去中國化) and localization/indigenization (bentuhua, 本土化) have emerged as two major strategies. De-Sinicization refers to the efforts to deconstruct Chinese culture and debunk the ideology of Chinese nationalism imposed by the KMT state since 1945 (characterized as “Sinicization”), whereas localization or indigenization implies the re-centering of the nationalist discourse on Taiwan rather than on China. In the field of education, the most contested subjects are those
which are most closely associated with the imagination of the nation, namely: language, history, geography and civic education (the latter three being integrated into the subject called “Social Studies” to be discussed in the next section).

To begin with, Mandarin Chinese is still taught as “national language” in elementary school, but its hours are reduced to accommodate other language courses such as native languages (including Holo, Hakka and aboriginal languages, as a response to localization and indigenization) and English (as a response to globalization). Additionally, in order to dilute the influence of traditional Chinese culture, the proportion of classical Chinese (wenyanwen, 文言文) has been reduced, while the proportion for modern Chinese, especially those works by Taiwanese writers, has been increased.

Geography matters in national imagination because it concerns the question as to “how wide is nationwide.” In the past, courses about Chinese geography taught in the old curriculum were often ridiculed as “history,” for what was taught reflected only pre-1949 China, not the reality of contemporary China. Since the ROC government did not recognize the communist regime, what happened after the establishment of the PRC did not count. The “national territory” of China remained as “a begonia leaf” instead of “an old hen” because the ROC still regarded Mongolia as part of the Chinese territory.8

Virtually none of the administrative changes made by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was mentioned in the textbooks, such as the reorganization of provinces and administrative areas, the construction of new railways, and the change of place names (notably Beijing, renamed from Beiping). The issue was first brought up in early 1991 when the KMT government announced the end of the “period of mobilization for the suppression of Communist rebellion” (dongyuankanluan shiqi, 動員戡亂時期), which meant that the ROC government would no longer see the CCP as a “rebellious group” and would adopt a more practical view to deal with the reality (of PRC’s existence). However, the problem remained unsettled for several
years because the redrawing of the map implied the change of the territory of the ROC, which, in turn, became a constitutional problem that further caused the legitimacy crisis of the KMT. In 1998, the MOE approved the first high school textbook that used the PRC’s, not the ROC’s, map in geography. Although it has gradually become a common practice to use the PRC’s map in teaching geography nowadays, the issues surrounding the territory of the ROC remains a gray area that reflects the institutional predicament of the ROC nation.

In civic education, there has been a shift from Chinese ethnocentrism to multiculturalism, which no longer emphasizes the primacy of the Mandarin-speaking Chinese culture, but on the multiple cultures of Holo, Hakka, and aborigines. With the growth of migrant populations from South East Asia and mainland spouses in the recent years, there has also been emphasis on the so-called “new residents” (xinzhumin, 新住民). Since the changes are subtler while there is no obvious issue for contention, the reform in civic education has not caused as much controversy as other subjects.

In contrast, history appears to be the most contested terrain in the curriculum debate. This comes as no surprise if we consider Ernest Renan’s famous formulation that “getting history wrong is part of being a nation” (quoted in Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 12) History is essential to form a nationalist narrative that, in turn, lays the foundation to national identity regarding “who we are” and “where we come from.” In the old paradigm of Chinese nationalism, “national history“ was without any doubt Chinese history, which boasted a glorious five-millennium civilization. The history of Taiwan, in contrast, accounted for nothing more than a short, marginal chapter of Chinese history.

In 1997, the first curriculum focused exclusively on Taiwanese history, geography and society, named Getting to Know Taiwan (Renshi Taiwan, 認識台灣), was launched in junior high schools. As it overthrew the previous paradigm of writing history from the perspective of Chinese nationalism, it immediately incurred harsh criticisms and fervent debates (Wang Fu-chang, 2001, 2005). During
the same time, the so-called “concentric-circle theory” of history was brought up by historian Tu Cheng-sheng, who later became the Minister of Education in 2004 when DPP’s Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election to serve the second term. According to the concentric-circle theory, the core of history education is no longer Chinese, but Taiwanese, history. The three concentric circles are Taiwan, China, and the world. Taiwanese history, no longer a mere chapter in Chinese history, is taught in its own right and accounts for one-third of history education. Students are required to learn Taiwanese history first, and then move on to Chinese and world history subsequently. Under the guidelines based on such a perspective, history textbooks from elementary to high schools have been thoroughly re-written.9

The above changes have taken almost two decades to come about, and the battle is still ongoing. The trend of localization/indigenization emerged in the 1990s when KMT’s Lee Teng-hui was in power, and it reached the peak during 2000-2008 when the DPP was in control, with various measures of de-Sinicization taken in different fields during the eight years. However, after KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou won the presidential election in 2008, the momentum shifted again to what can be called “re-Sinicization.” For instance, the proportion of classical Chinese and Chinese history has been increased in the new guidelines of curriculum since the KMT regained power. The Minister of Education went far enough to prescribe that the Four Books (Sishu, 四書), the four Confucian canons, have to be listed as a “required optional course” under the name of “Basic Readings of Chinese Culture” (Zhonghua wenhua jiben jiaocai, 中華文化基本教材) in high schools. It has to be noted that the course of “Basic Readings of Chinese Culture” was implemented by the KMT state in the 1960s, in part as a campaign of “Renaissances of Chinese Culture” (Zhonghua wenhua fuxing yundong, 中華文化復興運動) to counter the Cultural Revolution in the PRC. The course had been required for all the high students to take in high schools until 2004 when the DPP government, renaming the course as “Classical Cultural Readings” to dilute its
Chineseness, changed it from a required to an optional course. The efforts by the KMT government to restore it as a required course were viewed by the opponents as nothing less than “re-Sinicization” that aims to re-cultivate Chinese identity among Taiwanese students.

The battle between de-Sinicization and re-Sinicization has become a tug of war in the past few years. Textbook guidelines, especially those concerning language and history, have been revised several times to fulfill the political needs of different camps. The struggles are ongoing and no consensus has been reached. Thus, just as controversies over ROC’s national title and national flags appear frequently in newspapers, debates concerning textbook and curriculum make headlines every once for a while. It would not be exaggerating to say that such struggles between the so-called “pan-Green” (pro-DPP) and the “pan-Blue” (pro-KMT) have become part of everyday life in Taiwan.

Youths brought up in such an environment might be expected to become more disenchanted from the nationalist ideologies, because they know both Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism are nothing more than ideological constructs by politicians and can be easily debunked. Instead of adopting an essentialist or primordial view on identity issues, they are more likely to take a situational, pragmatic, strategic, ambiguous, elastic or even sarcastic attitude. Due to the failure of signifying institutions of the ROC, there is no way to speak of identity in a clear way, and it becomes fashionable to speak of identity in a mixed, ambivalent or hybrid way. Such an attitude can be best seen in the so-called “Taiwan Cheerleader Team” (Taiwan jiayoudui, 台灣加油隊), which is organized by a group of youths who travel all over the world to support Taiwanese teams or athletes who play in international tournaments. The members are of different political stance, some of them are pro-DPP, some of them pro-KMT, some of them cynical to both, and some others are simply indifferent. However, regardless of different identities, they all get together to cheer for Taiwanese athletes, most of the time using all kinds of parodies, humorous styles and burlesque expressions to lighten the
heaviness of nationalistic issues (Taiwan Cheerleader Team, 2008). Identity to them is more about self-expression than about the sacredness of the nation, and they are also more immune, if not resistant, to nationalist propagandas of reunification advocated by the PRC. In this sense, we may well say they adopt a “postmodern” attitude towards the nation.

To sum up, Taiwanese society can be characterized as “postmodern” in the Lyotard’s sense that there is an overall incredulity towards metanarratives of nationalism, which, in turn, is a result from institutional predicaments of Taiwan in world polity. The system of rules in world polity prescribes, first, that nation-states are the only legitimate form of political community, and second, that there is only one China in the world while Taiwan is part of China. Such a system of rules denies Taiwan’s ontological status in world polity; consequently, metanarratives of nationalism, either of Chinese or Taiwanese versions, can hardly hold since neither of them can obtain institutional support from world polity. While there is a tendency to disbelieve in metanarratives of nationalism, the curricula in Taiwan have been full of instabilities and dissension insofar as “how the nation should be imagined” —all of which, once again, are characteristics of the postmodern condition that Lyotard has spelled out.

IMPLEMENTING POSTMODERNISM IN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM: THE GRADE 1-9 CURRICULUM AS AN ILLUSTRATION

The second source of postmodernism in Taiwan’s educational system is the direct importation of postmodern ideas by scholars, the implementation of these ideas in policy by decision-makers, and the practice of these ideas by educators in their pedagogical activities. It may sound absurd to say that postmodernism, which emphasizes instability, dissensions and incredulity to grand discourses, is being
implemented by the state as a policy, since the two do not seem compatible with each other. However, this is what has been happening in contemporary Taiwan. In this section, I shall use the subject of Social Studies in the Grade 1-9 Curriculum as an example to examine this issue. The subject of Social Studies is of particular importance to our concerns here, because by integrating history, geography and civic education, it cultivates students’ “world view” and the “nation view,” to put it in Duara’s (1995, p. 10) terms. Besides, since Social Studies are part of the curricula of compulsory education, all students have to receive such basic education before they become adults. In this sense, it can be called the most essential part of education in cultivating citizens for the nation-states.

The “Grade 1-9 Curriculum” is the official translation of “jiunianyiguan kecheng” (九年一貫課程), which literally means “nine-year integrated curriculum.” Basically, it can be viewed as an overall reform in curriculum in compulsory education. As with many other countries in the world, compulsory education in Taiwan covers nine years, divided into two stages: six years in the elementary school, and three years in the junior high school. In the past, the contents and standards of the curriculum in the elementary school and the junior high school were determined by two different committees. The result was inconsistencies, repetitions and ruptures between the curricula in the two stages. In addition, the curricula were considered to consist of too many narrowly specialized subjects, which increased the difficulties for both teaching and learning. In 1996, the Ad Hoc Council on Educational Reform published a summary report, which brought up a few concrete suggestions concerning curricular reform. As a response to these suggestions, the MOE released in September the “Guidelines of Grade 1-9 Curriculum for National Education” (referred to as Guidelines hereafter), which prescribes seven “learning areas” to replace previously existing subjects. The seven learning areas include Language, Health and Physical Education, Social Studies, Arts and Humanities, Mathematics, Science and Technology, and Integrative Activities. Each learning area, which integrates former
“subjects” to varying degrees, is to be taught throughout grade 1 to 9, divided into three or four “stages.” For instance, Social Studies integrates three former subjects (namely, History, Geography, and Civic Education) into one learning area, and it is divided into four stages: grade 1-2 forms the first stage, grade 3-4 the second, grade 5-6 the third, whereas grade 7-9 (in junior high schools) constitutes the fourth stage.

What is considered so “new” and “revolutionary” about this new curriculum lies in two facts. First, the structure of the curriculum has been completely changed. Consequentially, the pedagogy by teachers has been altered in response to the transformation of the curriculum. In addition, the contents of the curriculum have also transformed significantly due to the promulgation of the new Guidelines. Second, the new curriculum opens up the market of textbooks at the same time. The government no longer exclusively provides the authoritative textbooks for the schools; instead, textbooks and teaching materials prepared by private suppliers are not only allowed but encouraged. This, in fact, has been brought up under strong influences by neoliberalism, which paves the way for commercialization and marketization of the educational system. Furthermore, insofar as postmodernism is concerned, neoliberalism’s emphases on free market and free choice, along with commercialization and marketization, also provide structural conditions for the rise of consumerism, which Bauman has found to be central to postmodern society. As will be discussed below, consumerism has also become a prominent feature in Taiwan’s postmodern education.13

During the process of drawing the Guidelines, there were fervent debates and strong reactions from the public, particularly from those teachers who would be affected by the new curriculum. This is quite understandable and expectable because teachers had to make considerable efforts to adjust to the change. For instance, in the past, a history teacher should only teach history in school and nothing else, but under the new curriculum, s/he would be expected to teach Social Studies, which covers not only history but also geography and civic
education. The same holds true to teachers of geography and civic education as well. While the new curriculum brought a lot of pressures to school teachers, there were other controversies concerning issues such as the appropriateness of the Guidelines, the timing of implementation, and so on (Chou, 2003, p. 255).

From the start, the Grade 1-9 Curriculum has been imbued with postmodern hues. In a booklet titled *Innovation of Teaching: Q&A for the Grade 1-9 Curriculum* (MOE, 2003), the MOE makes it explicit that the Grade 1-9 Curriculum has been constructed based on four “currents of thoughts:” postmodernism, humanism, sociology of knowledge, and constructivism. At first glance, postmodernism accounts for nothing more than one forth in the “four currents of thoughts;” however, if we examine closely, we find that all the “four currents of thoughts,” as understood by the policy-makers and explained in the booklet, promote postmodern values to varying degrees. For instance, in the name of “humanism,” emphasis is placed on individual differences, minorities and the disadvantaged, particularism and flexibility. In the name of “sociology of knowledge,” it is asserted that, since knowledge is constructed by power and shaped by social structures, the boundary of disciplines can no longer be held. In the name of “constructivism,” it is implied that, since all knowledge is constructed according to different contexts, the concept of universal truth no longer holds: everything is local, relative and context-dependent.14

Furthermore, what appears more striking in this booklet is that postmodernism has become an explicit guideline according to which educational policy is made. Postmodernism as usually understood is, by implication, anti-institutional: it champions de-centering over centralization, deconstruction over construction, desire over reason, pleasure over discipline, fragmentation over integration, heterogeneity over homogeneity, difference over identity, dissent over consensus, and so forth.15 In this sense, it is truly ironic—paradoxical indeed—to see that such anti-institutional ideas are now institutionalized by state officials in their educational policy. If we follow Lyotard (1984, pp.
60-67) to see paralogy as the legitimate source of the postmodern era, then we may well say that Taiwan’s education is indeed a postmodern one in that not only is it full of paradoxes, but its very principle of legitimacy has been paradoxical.

Thus, postmodernism as an intellectual fad has been pursued by scholars and implemented by policy-makers and practitioners, although a majority of them may not really understand what postmodernism means. What it leads to is not only the spread and the institutionalization of postmodern values in educational policies, but also postmodern scenes in Taiwan’s education. Just as Bauman found consumer culture to be one of the keys to understanding postmodernity/liquid modernity (Bauman, 1997, 2007), so at core of the postmodern scenes in education do we find commercialization and consumerism, which are two sides of the same coin. As students are now treated as customers who consume educational goods in schools, which now operate more or less like a market, there emerges a strong tendency to please students. Textbooks are written in a fashion that uses a high amount of slang and trendy expressions to attract students. Goods and materials in popular culture are not only drawn upon for illustrations, but even treated as “knowledge” to be taught to students. There are textbook contents teaching students to “become wise consumers” or to “know the brand name.” Cultural icons and pop stars are also frequently mentioned in textbooks in the name of “daily experience.”¹⁶ In schools, it has become fashionable to be “hot and spicy teachers” (mala jiaoshi, 麻辣教師), which means to dress up in funky, usually arousing, ways and/or to use unconventional, sometimes provocative pedagogies (in the name of “innovation”) to teach in the classroom (United Evening News, September 19, 1999, p. A3). Even principals have tried a variety of means to please their students, such as performing go-go (pole) dancing or playing drag queens in open ceremonies (United Daily News, June 28, p. A5; December 20, 2000, p. A6).¹⁷ A recent episode best captures this trend. A popular writer named Jiubadao, who had been famous for his unruly style, was invited to give a speech in a
high school. After the speech, which turned out to be full of rude language such as “fucking” and “damned,” the principal concluded the event by immediately following the speaker to applaud: “Fuck! It’s a great speech!” While his comment became news in the media, the principal did not think that he had said anything inappropriate. Instead, he insisted that the educators had to follow the feelings of the students and make them feel understood. The students also supported their principal, praising him as an idol (Liberty Times, December 15, 2010, p. A1).18

Indeed, consumerism and commercialization have led to what can be called “Disney-zation” of education that turns schools into theme parks, in which the pursuit of joy and happiness overrides other considerations. Since students are now customers, it is essential to satisfy their wants and desires. In addition to students, their parents, who pay for the tuition, are regarded as customers, whose satisfaction becomes the primary concern of educators. In order to please their customers, educational authorities are ready to deconstruct their own authority. Rules, standards and truth are relativized, since, according to the postmodern maxim, no universal rules or ultimate truth can hold in the world. Such kind of education is indeed self-deconstructive if not self-destructing.

The effects of such “postmodern education,” so to speak, have gradually emerged in the recent years. For instance, the problem of bullying is becoming more and more serious in on school campuses and has become one of the thorniest problems that bother not only students and teachers but also parents and state officials. To be sure, bullying is a long-standing problem, but it was not until recent years that bullying emerged as both a widespread and serious problem as well as a social and political issue. According to the statistics collected by the MOE, from January 2008 to December 2010, there have been more than 4,300 cases of bullying on Taiwanese school campuses; moreover, 3.23% of students said that they had been beaten by classmates (China Times, December 19, 2010, p. A15). What is conspicuous is not only the increase of cases, but also the degree of
violence and ruthlessness in bullying. What is more, bullying exists not only between students and students, but also between students and teachers. More and more reports have been made about teachers being bullied by students, some of whom even left their jobs because they could no longer take it. The pervasiveness of bullying and the increasing extent of unruliness on campus can be seen as indications of the postmodern syndrome, so to speak. Postmodern education encourages students to explore their potentials and liberate their desires, but relatively few emphases have been put on prudence, virtues and self-control. Students are asked to “be themselves” and “just do it,” but when self-expression goes too far, it becomes the pain of others.

As Zygmunt Bauman has pointed out, postmodern morality is one without ethic, because everything goes. According to a panel study based on a three-year survey, there is a tendency of indifference towards moral and civic values among Taiwanese students at the junior-high and high school levels (Chang, 2011). This finding confirms the prediction in my previous study that the postmodern values promoted in the current education system will have negative impacts on the future of civil society because they do not provide sufficient foundations to cultivate civic virtues (Wang, 2006). It also confirms Bauman’s assertion that one of the features of postmodern ethics has been moral indifference (Bauman, 1993, 1995). Although further research has to be done with this regard, it appears to us that there has emerged a tendency towards moral indifference among students in Taiwan, and such a tendency is becoming stronger with time as they grow older.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS: CULTIVATING POSTMODERN CITIZENS?**

In the above, I have argued that the new trends in Taiwan’s education can be characterized as “postmodern” in the sense that there is an overall incredulity towards metanarratives, while
instabilities and dissensions have been the prominent features in the educational system. Furthermore, the education in Taiwan can be said to be postmodern in that postmodern values—such as de-centering, deconstruction, desire, pleasure, and dissents—have been implemented and institutionalized in the system. Commercialization and consumerism, which Bauman has identified as key features of postmodernity, also dominates the educational scene in Taiwan, while the moral indifference of the postmodern ethic is also emerging, as indicated by recent studies.

What, then, can we learn from the case of Taiwan? I suggest that the theoretical implications of the Taiwanese case be understood from at least two aspects: one concerning the ontology of global society or world polity, the other concerning the process of rationalization. Both of the two aspects, once again, return to the central concerns in John Meyer and his colleagues’ insightful collaborative volume, *Institutional Structure*.

First, the anomaly of the case of Taiwan can be understood in the light of Garfinkel’s notion of ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967). Existing as a de facto nation-state but lacking de jure recognition, Taiwan has been “making troubles” and “breaking the rules” in various occasions on both collective and individual levels.21 By “making trouble” and “breaking the rule,” Taiwan has helped us to unveil the hidden norms and rules underlying world polity—namely, the ontological status of nation-state (on the collective level) and citizens (on the individual level). In other words, the institutional failures, crises and predicaments have helped to expose the institutional structure of world society that John Meyer and his colleagues have endeavored to prove. However, such an ethnomethodological case is not made possible without any cost. The institutional predicament has created a “postmodern condition” in which metanarratives can hardly hold, while dissensions and instabilities are constant in daily life, including educational routines. The new trends in Taiwan’s education, epitomized in the “chaos of educational reform,” can be viewed as a reflection of such a
postmodern condition.

Furthermore, the “postmodern condition” of Taiwan’s national question also creates a milieu in which postmodern values are able to gain widespread popularity and even institutionalized support. This brings us to the second theoretical implication. The ontology of world polity, which prescribes nation-states and citizens as rational actors on the collective and individual levels, respectively, has been made possible by the global expansion of modern Western culture. Put succinctly, such a process can be referred to as “rationalization” in Weber’s (1958) terms, or the “modernity project” in Habermas’s (1997) terms. The modernity project of rationalization, however, has failed to deliver its gospel and has faced strong resistance and criticisms around the world. Postmodernism, as a critique and anti-thesis to modernity, can be understood in this light. However, if the modern educational system, as Meyer and his colleagues have pointed out, is essential in linking individuals of the nation-state by producing/reproducing rational actors as citizens, what if postmodernism has now become part of such an educational system? What kind of citizens will such education (re)produce?

In the modernity project of nation-states, it is expected that the national education system will produce citizens who will be the rational members of the nation. It is found that the collectivist force, embodied in the nation-state, and the individualist force, emphasizing the individual growth, have merged in the ideology of citizenship that explains the global expansion of education (Ramirez & Boli, 1987). It follows that the educational system, as a mechanism for social reproduction under the modernity project, has cultivated individual citizens who, in turn, lend support to the legitimation of the nation-state.

However, the traditional model of national education, which emphasizes reason, discipline, duties, consensus and civic virtues, now seems to give ways to a new model that puts more weight on pleasure, dissensions and aesthetic styles, all of which are characteristics of the postmodern. This is exactly what is being
observed in Taiwan. We may well call the new subjects cultivated through such an educational system “postmodern citizens,” but the term appears to be oxymoronic in that postmodern is antithetical to the modernist model of citizen. Although Taiwan may not be the only place where postmodern values are implemented or even institutionalized in the educational system, its future development is worth our attention. Does it suggest to us the limit of the modernity project of rationalization, so that we should try to fix the problem, or is it an indicative sign of the dawn of a new era? Can there be “postmodern citizens,” and what kind of principle of legitimation will such a society rest on? These are the questions remain to be explored in future research. The case of Taiwan might be idiosyncratic, but the lessons we can learn from it can be both heuristic to our current situation and indicative of a possible future.

Notes

1) Some authors refrain from using the somehow stigmatized term “postmodern” by simply replacing it by other expressions such as “high modernity,” “late modernity” or “reflexive modernity” (Giddens, 1990; Beck, Giddens & Lash 1994). Even Zygmunt Bauman, one of the leading sociologists who has written extensively on postmodernity, move away from the term by replacing it with “liquid modernity” in his later writings (Bauman, 2000). Although put in different terms, these concepts all suggest that there have been some new features that should be emphasized, though in different aspects, as distinctive from conventional understanding of modernity.

2) Part of this and the forth section draws from my previous study, “Educational Reform and the Changing Representation of Japan in Taiwan’s Textbook: Reflections on the Trends since the 1990s” (Wang, 2010), with new literature and materials added to reflect the up-to-date situation.

3) The two terms “identity” and “consciousness” are chosen deliberately to distinguish between two situations here. Taiwanese identity leans more towards an identification of Taiwan as a nation, whereas Taiwanese consciousness refers to a vaguer awareness of the importance of Taiwan, but it
may not go so far as to identify Taiwan as a nation.

4) The emphasis on the terms “in part” in this statement cannot be overstated for two reasons. First, it is not implied here that “chaos” equals “postmodern,” for they are two different concepts. However, instabilities and dissensions resultant from the incredulity towards metanarratives contribute to forming the phenomena that may be characterized as “chaos” by some. Secondly, as pointed out above, chaos implies the failure of the reform. While many complicated factors are accountable for the failure of the reform, it is not my intention here to analyze these factors, nor am I suggesting that the postmodern condition is the cause of the failure of the reform. For an evaluation and analysis of the educational reform, one may refer to Ho (2010) and Huang (2010).

5) For a full elaboration of such an approach, see Wang (2001a, 2004, 2007).


7) The reason is somewhat complicated to be understood by outsiders. If the national title of the Republic of China is used, it immediately implies that there are two China’s and hence runs against the “one China policy” widely held in world polity. However, neither Taiwan is allowed to be referred to as “Taiwan” in official occasions because it then implies that Taiwan is a country, whereas the “one China policy” holds that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. As a result, neither the “ROC” nor “Taiwan” can be used to refer to the political community on the island.

8) The shape of Chinese territory on the map looked like a begonia leaf during the Republican period (1911-1949). However, since the PRC was established in 1949, the shape has been changed. It now looks like an old hen due to the change of the boundary, as the PRC recognizes Mongolia as an independent country and no longer considers it as part of China.

9) Tu Cheng-sheng wrote several articles in the newspaper and magazine to promote his “concentric-circle view of history.” See Tu (1995, 1997).


11) Studies have shown that Taiwanese students studying in the PRC tend to strengthen their Taiwanese identity after they go to the PRC and have further
encounters with people in the PRC (Wang, 2009; Lan & Wu, 2011).

12) These suggestions included: (1) an overall re-construction of curriculum centered on daily life experience ought to be done; (2) the government should soon draw new “curricular guidelines” to replace old “curricular standards;” (3) the application of curriculum should accommodate developments in technologies such as the Internet; (4) the contents of curriculum should be integrated as much as possible to reduce teaching subjects in the school; for instance, history, geography and civic education should be integrated into one single subject of “Social Studies;” (5) skills in daily life should be integrated into the curriculum; (6) evaluations should be diversified; each school should examine and establish its own evaluation system; (7) students in elementary schools should learn to read and write English alphabets; therefore, English should be introduced to the curriculum in elementary schools (Ad Hoc Council on Educational Reform, 1996, pp. 38-39).

13) The impacts of neoliberalism on Taiwan’s educational reform have been profound and widespread. For a further analysis, see Huang (2012).

14) For further discussions on these “currents of thoughts” and their affinities to postmodern values, see Wang (2006).

15) For a further elaboration on such a contrast between postmodern and modern, see Harvey (1989), especially Part I.

16) Examples of this kind can be found in various volumes published by different publishers. For instance, see Kang Hsuan Educational Publishing Group (2006), Nanyi Bookshop (2007).

17) These phenomena have gone so far as to incur criticisms from scholars. See Ou (2002), Huang (2003).

18) The very fact that the rude language itself appears in the headlines of newspapers indicates the overall decline of moral principles and basic rules, which, in turn, can be seen as a sign of the postmodern condition, as will be discussed in a later paragraph. In an open society (such as the US) where freedom of speech and expression has been highly valued, nonetheless, there are basic rules and underlying principles regarding what can and cannot be said in the public media. For instance, newspapers tend to refrain from using the “F-word” explicitly in their headlines, even in the case of direct quote. However, such basic rules do not seem to exist in Taiwan.
19) Here I am not suggesting that postmodern education is the only cause of the pervasiveness of bullying. As many experts have pointed out, there are factors in schools, families and social structures that also contribute to the problem of bullying. What is emphasized here, however, it that the basic orientation, or rather the disorientation, of values in the current educational system permeated by postmodernism may be one of the most fundamental factors that has remained unnoticed and under-examined.

20) This study is based on Taiwan Education Panel Survey (TEPS) collaborated by Academia Sinica, Ministry of Education, National Academy for Educational Research (preparatory office), and the National Science Council. It is one of the most authoritative collective projects done on the systematic study of students, parents, teachers and schools. The data it collects are comprehensive and the information it provides is valuable for our understanding of current situation of education in Taiwan.

21) Both Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, two former Presidents of the ROC, were referred to as “troublemakers” in the world polity when they sought to solve Taiwan’s ambiguous status as a nation-state in international politics. In addition, Taiwanese citizens are regarded as “troublemakers” from time to time when they try to wave the ROC’s national flag in the Olympics Games, or when their unrecognized ROC passports make people mistake them for the PRC’s citizens (Wang, 2001b).
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